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The contemporary debate over uneven and combined development began with Justin 
Rosenberg’s 1995 Deutscher Memorial Prize Lecture.1 Since then, opinion among the 
growing body of those who find the concept useful has broadly divided in two, with both 
sides able to claim varying degrees support from Trotsky’s writings. One sees uneven and 
combined development as a relatively recent process which only became possible during the 
imperialist era of capitalism – usually seen as beginning in the Great Depression of the 1870s 
– when geopolitical rivalry and colonial expansion partially extended industrialisation and 
urbanisation from their original capitalist heartlands to the remaining European absolutist 
states and what we now call the Global South.2 The other side sees it as a transhistorical or 
transmodal process which can be found throughout human history, although some adherents 
of this position accept that it only achieved a truly systematic character during the late 
nineteenth century.3 I have recently tried to assess the relative merits of these positions, from 
the perspective of the former, and will not repeat that discussion here.4  
 What I will address in this chapter is whether uneven and combined development can 
indeed be extended, not backwards through time, but sideways through space: in other words, 
whether the process has been generated in every society which has experienced capitalist 
modernity, rather than being confined to backward or underdeveloped areas. It may be useful 
to begin the discussion by reminding ourselves of the famous passage from The History of the 
Russian Revolution where Trotsky introduced the concept:   
 
The privilege of historic backwardness – and such a privilege exists – permits, or rather 
compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping a whole 
series of intermediate stages. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law 
which for want of a better name, we may call the law of combined development – by which we 
mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, 
an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms.5  
 
Alongside this passage, however, we also need to consider another by Trotsky, written 
shortly before his murder in 1940: ‘Only a minority of countries has fully gone through that 
systematic and logical development from handicraft through domestic manufacture to the 
factory, which Marx subjected to such detailed analysis.’6 In fact, the minority consisted of 
only one country, England, although there were also a handful of territories within countries 
                                                          
1 Justin Rosenberg, ‘Isaac Deutscher and the Lost History of International Relations’, New Left Review I/215 
(January-February 1996). 
2 Samantha Ashman, ‘Capitalism, Uneven and Combined Development, and the Transhistoric’, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 1 (March 2009); Neil Davidson, ‘Putting the Nation back into the 
‘International’”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 1 (March 2009), pp. 16-18. 
3 Alexander Anievas and Kerim Nişancıoğlu, How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of 
Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2015), pp. 57-63; Justin Rosenberg, ‘Why is there no International Historical 
Sociology?’ European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12, no. 3 (September 2006); Justin Rosenberg, 
‘The “Philosophical Premises” of Uneven and Combined Development’, Review of International Studies, vol. 
39, no. 3 (July 2013); for the argument that uneven and combined development takes on a qualitatively different 
aspect towards the end of the nineteenth century, see Alexander Anievas, Capital, the State and War: Class 
Conflicts and Geopolitics in the Thirty Year’s Crisis, 1914-1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2014), p. 53. 
4 Neil Davidson, ‘The Conditions of Emergence for Uneven and Combined Development, in Alex Anievas and 
Kamran Matin (eds), Historical Sociology and World History: Uneven and Combined Development over 
the Longue Durée (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). 
5 Leon D. Trotsky [1930–32], The History of the Russian Revolution (London: Pluto 1977), pp. 27-28. 
6 Leon D. Trotsky, ‘Karl Marx’, in Leon Trotsky Presents the Living Thoughts of Karl Marx (London: Cassell, 
1940), p. 41. 
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(the North-East of the USA, Catalonia before its incorporation into Spain) which had similar 
trajectories. The very shortness of the list does, however, support the argument I intend to 
make. For if the overwhelming majority of even the advanced capitalist states did not 
undergo the ‘systematic and logical development’ to which Trotsky refers, then surely they 
too must have ‘skipped intermediate stages’ and ‘drawn together the different stages of the 
journey’? Before turning to these issues, we need to explore Trotsky’s original argument in 
more detail.  
 
 
1. THE CLASSIC FORMS OF UNEVEN AND COMBINED DEVELOPMENT 
 
1.1. The ‘Law’ of Uneven and Combined Development 
 
Trotsky first formulated what he called the ‘law’ of uneven and combined development in 
1930, in order to explain the conditions of possibility for a particular strategy, that of 
permanent revolution, which he had first proposed twenty-five years earlier in relation to 
Russia. In this scenario, capitalist relations of production had been established and were 
perhaps even in the process of becoming dominant, but the bourgeois revolution had still to 
be accomplished. The existence of a militant working class, however, made the bourgeoisie 
unwilling to launch such a revolution on their own behalf for fear that it would get out of 
their control. The working class, on the other hand, could accomplish the revolution against 
the pre-capitalist state which the bourgeois itself was no longer prepared to undertake and – 
in Trotsky’s version of permanent revolution at any rate – move directly to the construction 
of socialism, providing of course that it occurred within the context of a successful 
international revolutionary movement: 
 
The irrevocable and irresistible going over of the masses from the most rudimentary tasks of 
political, agrarian and national emancipation and abolition of serfdom to the slogan of 
proletarian rulership, resulted…from the social structure of Russia and the conditions of the 
worldwide situation. The theory of Permanent Revolution only formulated the combined 
process of this development.7 
 
The societies which Trotsky originally identified as subject to uneven and combined 
development and to which he devoted most attention, were ruled by absolutist or tributary 
states which had been forced to partially modernise under pressure of military competition 
from the Western powers. As he noted, ‘the Great War, the result of the contradictions of 
world imperialism, drew into its maelstrom countries of different stages of development, but 
made the same claims on all the participants’.8 Combined development in Russia was 
therefore generated by attempts on the part of the absolutist state to overcome the 
backwardness attendant on uneven development; but as Trotsky pointed out:  
 
Historical backwardness does not imply a simple reproduction of the development of advanced 
countries, England or France, with a delay of one, two, or three centuries. It engenders an 
                                                          
7 Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, p. 907. For the trajectories of both the strategy of permanent 
revolution and the law of uneven and combined development, see Neil Davidson, How Revolutionary Were the 
Bourgeois Revolutions? (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), pp. 214-236, 284-308. 
8 Leon D. Trotsky [1924], ‘In Defence of the Russian Revolution’, in Leon Trotsky Speaks (New York: 
Pathfinder Books, 1976), p. 249. Or, in the words of a distinctively non-Marxist historian: ‘Industrialization 
was, from the start, a political imperative.’ See David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological 
Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1969), p. 139. 
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entirely new ‘combined’ social formation in which the latest conquests of capitalist technique 
and structure root themselves into relations of feudal or pre-feudal barbarism, transforming and 
subjecting them and creating peculiar relations of classes.9  
 
The former levels of stability typical of feudal or tributary societies are disrupted by the 
irruption of capitalist industrialisation and all that it brings in its wake: rapid population 
growth, uncoordinated urban expansion, dramatic ideological shifts. ‘When English or 
French capital, the historical coagulate of many centuries, appears in the steppes of the 
Donets Basin, it cannot release the same social forces, relations, and passions which once 
went into its own formation.’10  
Other Marxists had noted the coexistence of different temporalities within the same social 
formations. Antonio Labriola, perhaps Trotsky’s most important philosophical influence, 
wrote that Russian industrialization ‘seems destined to put under our eyes, as in an epitome, 
all the phases, even the most extreme, of our history’.11 Even here, however, Labriola is 
drawing attention to the coexistence of forms rather than their mutual interpenetration. 
Trotsky, however, was interested in the process by which these forms were fused, the result 
permeating every aspect of society, ideology as much as economy. The archaic and the 
modern, the settled and disruptive overlap and merge in all aspects of the social formations 
concerned, from the organization of arms production to the structure of religious observance, 
in entirely new and unstable ways, generating socially explosive situations. It is tempting to 
describe these as mutations, except that the inadequacy of the language involved led Trotsky 
to reject the biological metaphors in which stages of development had been described from 
the Enlightenment through to the Third International in its Stalinist phase – and which is 
continued in the present-day notion of ‘hybridity’: ‘The absorptive and flexible psyche, as a 
necessary condition for historical progress, confers on the so-called social “organisms”, as 
distinguished from the real, that is, biological organisms, an exceptional variability of internal 
structure.’12 Trotsky himself pointed to the existence of such forms in general terms in his 
notebooks on dialectics from the mid-1930s: 
 
Some objects (phenomena) are confined easily within boundaries according to some logical 
classification, others present [us with] difficulties: they can be put here or there, but within 
stricter relationship – nowhere. While provoking the indignation of systematisers, such 
transitional forms are exceptionally interesting to dialecticians, for they smash the limited 
boundaries of classification, revealing the real connections and consecutiveness of a living 
process.13  
 
Trotsky’s position is often misunderstood, albeit in diametrically opposite ways. On the one 
hand, Razmig Keucheyan writes:  
 
The theory of uneven and combined development, which is found in particular in Trotsky, 
refers to the idea that the development of ‘advanced’ countries has as its inevitable counterpart 
the under-development of ‘laggard’ countries. In other words, the lag in question is not in fact a 
lag, but strictly contemporaneous with the ‘advance’ of the western countries. In this sense, the 
underdevelopment of some is the direct result of the development of others – hence the idea of 
                                                          
9 Leon D. Trotsky, [1938]. ‘Revolution and War in China’, in Leon Trotsky on China, edited by Les Evans and 
Russell Block (New York: Monad, 1976), p. 583. 
10 Leon D. Trotsky [1908–1909/1922], 1905 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 68. 
11 Antonio Labriola [1896], ‘Historical Materialism’, in Essays on the Materialist Conception of History 
(Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1908), p. 133. 
12 Leon D. Trotsky [1932], ‘In Defence of the Russian Revolution’, p. 251. 
13 Leon D. Trotsky [1933–5], ‘The Notebooks in Translation’, in Trotsky’s Notebooks, 1933–1935: Writings on 
Lenin, Dialectics, and Evolutionism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 77. 
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‘combined’ uneven development. This thesis has significant strategic consequences. Among 
other things, it assumes breaking with the idea that a country must be ‘mature’ for socialist 
forces to unleash a revolution in it. Such maturity is impossible to achieve, since under-
developed countries are maintained in a state of underdevelopment. This idea has been 
developed by ‘world-systems’ theorists, among them Wallerstein and Arrighi.’14  
 
On the other hand, Gurminder Bhambra complains:  
 
We were all seen to be headed in the same direction and Europe, or the West, simply provides 
the model of where it is that the rest of the world would arrive.  … The narrative of historical 
transition, in this case of ‘uneven and combined development’, is reified as the narrative of 
history – where ‘unevenness’ points to difference and ‘development’ to the universal 
framework within which those differences are to be located – and the histories of the rest of the 
world are understood within the problematics of this narrative.15   
 
From one perspective then, uneven and combined development sees the non-West 
permanently trapped in a subordinate role, while from the other, the Rest of the World slowly 
ascends the developmental ladder towards the same level as the West, without ever arriving. 
Keucheyan assimilates Trotsky’s position to another (World Systems) of which he approves; 
Bhambra does likewise to another which she rejects (Eurocentrism). In fact, Trotsky held 
neither position. It is true that he emphasizes the partial nature of their adoptions from the 
advanced countries: 
 
Russia was so far behind the other countries that she was compelled, at least in certain spheres, 
to outstrip them. ...the absence of firmly established social forms and traditions makes the 
backward country – at least within certain limits – extremely hospitable to the last word in 
international technique and international thought. Backwardness does not, however, for this 
reason cease to be backwardness.16  
 
Within these spheres and limits, however, backward societies could however attain higher 
levels of development than in their established rivals: ‘At the same time that peasant land-
cultivation as a whole remained, right up to the revolution, at the level of the seventeenth 
century, Russian industry in its technique and capitalist structure stood at the level of the 
advanced countries, and in certain respects even outstripped them.’17  
 These adoptions had, however, did not in themselves necessarily undermine the state, 
since: ‘The [backward] nation...not infrequently debases the achievements borrowed from 
outside in the process of adapting them to its own more primitive culture.’18 Indeed, initially at 
least, ‘debased adaptation’ helped preserve the pre-capitalist state in Russia. From 1861 tsarism 
established factories using the manufacturing technology characteristic of monopoly capitalism 
in order to produce arms with which to defend feudal absolutism.19 The danger for the state lay 
in what these factories required in order to run, namely workers – and workers more skilled, 
                                                          
14 Razmig Keucheyan [2010], The Left Hemisphere: Mapping Critical Theory Today (London: Verso, 2013, p. 
114; see also Warwick Research Collective, ‘World Literature in the Context of Uneven and Combined 
Development’, in Combined and Uneven Development: Towards a New Theory of World Literature (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2015), p. 8 for similar parallels with World Systems theory. 
15 Gurminder K Bhambra, ‘Talking among Themselves? Weberian and Marxist Historical Sociologies as 
Dialogues without “Others”’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol.  39, no. 3 (May 2011), p. 678.  
16 Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, p. 906; my emphasis. 
17 Ibid, p. 30; my emphasis. 
18 Ibid, p. 27. 




more politically conscious than that faced by any previous absolutist or early capitalist state.20 
Uneven and combined development in Russia created a working class which, although only a 
small minority of the population, was possessed of exceptional levels of revolutionary 
militancy. ‘Debased adaptation’ was intended to preserve the existence of the undemocratic 
state; but to the extent that the former was successful it helped provoke the working class into 
destroying the latter. Thus, for Trotsky, the most important consequence of uneven and 
combined development was the enhanced capacity it potentially gave the working classes for 
political and industrial organization, theoretical understanding, and revolutionary activity:  
 
…when the economic factors burst in a revolutionary manner, breaking up the old order; when 
development is no longer gradual and ‘organic’ but assumes the form of terrible convulsions 
and drastic changes of former conceptions, then it becomes easier for critical thought to find 
revolutionary expression, provided that the necessary theoretical prerequisites exist in the given 
country.21  
 
S. A. Smith describes the trajectory of one Russian worker who had his mind opened in this 
way to ‘critical thought’:  
 
For Kanatchikov, discovery of evolutionary theory came like a lightning bolt… His discovery 
of Darwin was soon complimented by his discovery of Marx: by 1902, aged 23, he had 
painfully mastered the first volume of Capital. This furnished him with a scientific 
understanding of society and the determination to dedicate himself to the cause of overthrowing 
capitalism.22  
  
Kanatchikov exemplifies a general tendency identified by Tim McDaniel, namely that the 
militancy of Russian workers was ‘the product of leadership by a militant proletarian core of 
advanced workers employed in modern industry’, not of ‘disorientated workers of peasant 
origin and to young recruits into industry’. In his view, with which I agree, accounts ‘which 
emphasise the ‘“spontaneity” and unpredictability of worker militancy’ end up ‘denying to it 
the coherence and ultimate rationality ascribed by Trotsky’.23 
Trotsky was not alone in seeing the possibilities for Russia to avoid supposedly necessary 
stages of development; but those who shared his vision tended not belong to the ranks of his 
fellow-Marxists, but to be among the community of modernist writers and artists whose work 
– as we shall see in the Part 2 – was in many ways a response to or cultural expression of 
uneven and combined development. In his novel Petersburg, completed on the eve of 1917, 
Andrei Biely wrote of Russia needing to accomplish ‘a leap over history’ in order to escape 
the tensions caused by its multiple temporalities, even though he envisaged this occurring in 
quite a different way than Trotsky did.24  
 
 
                                                          
20 Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, p. 55.  
21 Leon D. Trotsky [1924], ‘For the Internationalist Perspective’, in Leon Trotsky Speaks (New York: Pathfinder 
Books, 1972), p. 199. 
22 S. A. Smith, Revolution and the People in Russia and China: A Comparative History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p. 78. 
23 Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 125. 
24 Andrei Biely [1913-16], Petersburg (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 65. Trotsky’s own 
assessment of Biely was deeply unsympathetic and, while not entirely misconceived, is so fixated on 
demonstrating that the latter was uncomplicatedly embedded in Russia’s pre-revolutionary past that he misses 
Biely’s contradictions and consequently the parallels with his own position. See Leon D. Trotsky [1923], 
Literature and Revolution (London: Bookmarks, 1991), pp. 79-87. 
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1.2. Eastern Variations 
 
Trotsky began to identify uneven and combined development in countries other than Russia 
from the late 1920s. Some modern writers like Fouad Makki have argued that this involved 
overestimating ‘the significance for the non-Western world of the specific political 
experience and pattern of development of early twentieth century Russia’ on the grounds that 
‘Russia was a major territorial empire in its own right, and its absolutist state was able to 
relate to the geo-political and economic exigencies of its Western capitalist milieu from a 
position of relative political autonomy.’25 This is true, but of limited significance, since the 
key point is not whether particular states are able to compete externally in geopolitical terms, 
but the internal relationships and experiences produced by the processes of industrialisation 
and urbanisation – whatever the reasons for which they were undertaken.  
A stronger case for Russian exceptionalism has been made by McDaniel, who argues that 
the Tsarist Empire tended to produce a revolutionary labour movement in four ways. First, it 
eliminated or at least reduced the distinction between economic and political issues. Second, 
it generated opposition for both traditional and modern reasons – the defence of established 
religious practices on the one hand, and of wages and conditions on the other. Third, it 
simultaneously reduced the fragmentation of the working class and prevented the formation 
of a stable conservative bureaucracy, thus leading to more radical attitudes. Fourth, it forced a 
degree of interdependence between the mass of the working class, class conscious workers 
and revolutionary intellectuals.26 McDaniel claims that, since the emergence of the Russian 
labour movement under tsarism, a comparable set of conditions has only arisen in Iran during 
the 1970s.27 It is true that the Pahlavi state bore some similarities to that of the Romanovs, 
although these are largely formal since – as we shall see in Part 4 – the former was a 
capitalist state and the latter was not; but more importantly, McDaniel ignores the way in 
which working class movements comparable to and contemporary with those in Russia arose 
in societies with quite different state formations. What then were these other types of society 
identified by Trotsky as subject to uneven and combined development?  
One was exemplified by China and the post-Ottoman Arab Middle East after the First 
World War – formerly analogous state forms now past the point of collapse and 
disintegrating under Franco-British imperialist pressure. Here it is the absence of any 
centralised state which forms the context. Instead of being directly colonized, these newly 
fragmented territories saw agents of foreign capital establish areas of industrialization under 
the protection of either their own governments or local warlords, both of which presented the 
same blocks to overall development. The result in relation to China was made by one of 
Trotsky’s then-followers, Harold Isaacs: ‘The pattern of Chinese life is jagged, torn, and 
irregular. Modern forms of production, transport and finance are superimposed upon and only 
partially woven into the worn and threadbare pattern of the past.’28 As this suggests, even 
where industrialisation and urbanisation did occur, uneven and combined development did 
not necessarily follow, as sometimes the archaic and modern may be too distant from each 
other to fuse. Smith quotes an assessment of conditions in Beijing in 1918 by a founding 
member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Li Dazhao, in which he describes how ‘the 
gap in time between old and new is too big, that the spatial juxtaposition is too close’: 
                                                          
25 Fouad Makki, ‘Reframing Development Theory: The Significance of the Idea of Uneven and Combined 
Development’, Theory and Society, vol.  44, no. 5 (2015), p. 486. 
26 Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Capitalism and Revolution in Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), pp. 41-47. 
27 Ibid, p. 407. 
28 Harold R. Isaacs [1938], The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Second revised edition, Stanford CA: 




Wheels and hooves move side by side, sirens hoot, there is the sound of cars and horses, of 
rickshaw pullers spitting and cursing each other. There is diversity and confusion, complexity 
to an extreme degree. … The new resents the obstacles posed by the old. The old resents the 
dangers posed by the new.29  
 
It was Shanghai, rather than Beijing, where the different temporalities fused to such an 
extent such that the city became both a centre of capitalist modernity and of the opposition to 
it, serving as the venue for the launch of the CCP: ‘Shanghai thus served as a polyvalent 
symbol; an emblem of consumer affluence and of class exploitation, of foreign imperialism 
and patriotic resistance, of individualism and mass society.’30 Combined development was 
experienced throughout the entire texture of urban life where capitalism took hold. Shanghai 
was in the vanguard in terms of both production and consumption, as J. G. Ballard recalls 
from his childhood in the 1930s:  
 
…Shanghai was a waking dream where everything I could imagine had already been taken to 
its extreme. The garish billboards and nightclub neon signs, the young Chinese gangsters and 
violent beggars watching me keenly as I pedaled past them, were part of an overlit realm more 
exhilarating than the American comics and radio serials I so adored. Shanghai would absorb 
everything, even the coming war, however fiercely the smoke might pump from the warships of 
the Whangpoo River. My father called Shanghai the most advanced city in the world, and I 
knew that one day all the cities on the planet would be filled with radio-stations, hell-drivers 
and casinos.31 
 
These were not simply childhood impressions. The city had textile mills before anywhere in 
the Southern states of the USA and by 1930 was home to the largest mill in the world; the 
first cinema in Shanghai opened only five years after the first large cinema opened in San 
Francisco.32 
 The most dramatic changes affected the working class. After 1918, workers were mainly 
former peasants or rural labourers, who were now subject to the very different and 
unaccustomed rhythms of industrial urban life without intervening stages. Jean Chesneaux 
writes that the main characteristics of the Chinese proletariat were ‘its youth, its instability, 
its swollen lower ranks and its lack of a developed labour elite’.33 In this respect the Chinese 
working class closely resembled its Russian forerunner, not least in the openness to Marxism 
which these conditions tended to produce: ‘The fact that the students and workers...are 
eagerly assimilating the doctrine of materialism’, wrote Trotsky, ‘while the labour leaders of 
                                                          
29 Smith, Revolution and the People in Russia and China, p. 18. These comments reflect unevenness within 
cities of the Global South, but unevenness also existed quite as starkly between cities. During a visit to Brazil in 
1963, Eric Hobsbawn contrasted Recife, the impoverished capital of the north east with São Paulo: ‘It is 
astonishing to think I am in the same country as Recife. The skyscrapers spout, the neon lights glow, the cars 
(mostly made in this country) tear through the streets in their thousands in typically Brazilian anarchy. Above all 
there is industry to absorb the 150,000 people who stream into this giant city every year–north-easterners, 
Japanese, Italians, Arabs, Greeks.’ See Eric J. Hobsbawm [1963], ‘South American Journey’, in Viva la 
Revolucion: On Latin America, edited by Leslie Bethell (London: Little, Brown, 2016), p. 35. 
30 Smith, Revolution and the People in Russia and China, p. 18. 
31 J. G. Ballard, The Kindness of Women (London: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 18-19. This passage, from one of 
his more autobiographical novels, is effectively an unreconstructed memoir, as can be seen by comparing the 
relevant sections of his actual autobiography. See J. G. Ballard, Miracles of Life: Shanghai to Shepperton, an 
Autobiography (London: HarperCollins, 2008), pp. 3-36.   
32 Lucien W. Pye, ‘Foreword’, in Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis, edited by 
Christopher Howe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. xv. 




civilized England believe in the magic potency of churchly incantations, proves beyond a 
doubt that in certain spheres China has outstripped England.’ In these cases, ideology 
outstrips economy, for ‘the contempt of the Chinese workers for the mediaeval dull-
wittedness of [Ramsay] MacDonald does not permit the inference that in her general 
economic development China is higher than Great Britain’.34  
 Trotsky also identified a third type of society as experiencing uneven and combined 
development: these were among the actual colonies, although not every colony did so. 
‘Commercial, industrial and financial capital invaded backward countries from the outside’, 
he wrote, ‘partly destroying the primitive forms of native economy and partly subjecting 
them to the world-wide industrial and banking system of the West.’35 What Peter Curtin calls 
‘defensive modernization’ was not enough to protect these societies from Western incursions. 
In the case of the Merinian monarchs of Madagascar, for example: ‘They not only failed to 
modernize beyond adopting Christianity and superficial European fashions, they failed to 
build a kind of society and government administration that would perpetuate their own 
power.’36 Once the race for imperial territory began in earnest during the closing decades of 
the nineteenth century, it became strategically necessary for the Western powers to seize 
territories which were often of no value in themselves – indeed, which were often net 
recipients of state expenditure – but which it was necessary to retain in order to protect those 
territories which were of economic value, like India.37 Colonial rule could of course throw 
societies backward, as in the case of British-occupied Iraq. Ruling through the Hashemite 
monarchy after 1920, the regime deliberately rejected any attempts at modernization, except 
in the oil industry. Instead, it reinforced disintegrating tribal loyalties and semifeudal tenurial 
relationships over the peasantry. Peter Gowan describes the British initiatives as ‘the creation 
of new foundational institutions of landownership in order to revive dying traditional 
authority relations, resulting in economically and socially regressive consequences, 
undertaken for thoroughly modern imperialist political purposes – namely, to create a ruling 
class dependent upon British military power and therefore committed to imperial interests in 
the region.’38  
 Nevertheless, even in this type of colonial context, some industrialisation took place. The 
British in India, for example, were unwilling to allow full-scale industrialization in case it 
produced competition for its own commodities, but was prepared to sanction it in specific 
circumstances for reasons of military supply or where goods were not intended for home 
markets – a form of ‘licenced industrialisation’, particularly in textiles.39 This could not lead 
to general economic development, it is true, but as Jürgen Osterhammel writes, ‘even at the 
end of the nineteenth century, the socially and economically “backward” regions of Europe 
were certainly not ahead of the more dynamic ones of India or China’.40 
As in the case of absolutist states like Russia, there were examples among the fragmented 
former empires and the outright colonies of how it was possible to pull ahead in particular 
areas or industries of all but the most developed areas of the West. Here too the outcomes 
were not always straightforwardly revolutionary, but leaving aside complete rejection of 
                                                          
34 Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, p. 1220. 
35 Trotsky, ‘Karl Marx’, p. 41. 
36 Peter Curtin, The World and the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age of 
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 150. 
37 Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1975-1914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), pp. 67-69. 
38 Peter Gowan [1991], ‘The Gulf War, Iraq and Western Liberalism’, in The Global Gamble: Washington’s 
Faustian Bid for World Dominance (London: Verso, 1999), p. 167. 
39 Christopher A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World: 1780-1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 182; Jürgen 
Osterhammel [2009], The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 663. 
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capitalist modernity, there were three possible responses to it, all of which I illustrate here 
with examples from the history of modern Islam.  
One was renewal, where capitalist modernity led to existing cultural practices being 
maintained in new ways which were then assimilated to tradition. Eric Hobsbawm has 
written of ‘the invention of tradition’ that: ‘we should expect it to occur more frequently 
when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which 
“old” traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which they were not applicable, or 
when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators prove no longer 
sufficiently adaptable and flexible or are otherwise eliminated’.41 Here is one, highly 
pertinent, example of this process from the late nineteenth century: 
 
In the Muslim world, the Islamic burkah, the full body covering of Muslim women, was 
growing in popularity. Often wrongly regarded as a mark of medieval obscurantism, the burkah 
was actually a modern dress that allowed women to come out of the seclusion of their homes 
and participate to a limited degree in public and commercial affairs. Even in this insistence on 
tradition, therefore, one glimpses the mark of growing global convergence.42  
 
Indeed, as even one of the arch-defenders of the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis points out of 
another innovation: ‘The office of ayatollah is a creation of the nineteenth century; the rule of 
Khomeini and of his successor as “supreme Jurist”, an innovation of the twentieth.’43 
These examples illustrate one extreme. At the other we find adoption, a similar embrace of 
modernity – or at least one version of it – and rejection of tradition that we have already 
encountered in Russia and China, here in 1940s Iraq: 
 
The impact of the [Marxist] theory, particularly on minds that lived on ancient ideas – ideas 
that assumed that poverty and wealth were something fated, unalterable features of life – can be 
imagined. An Iraqi of a religious family, who had been brought up according to the traditional 
Shi'ite precepts and became a member of the Politbureau of the Communist party in the forties, 
recalled in a conversation with this writer how when reading a forbidden book he first came 
across the idea that distinctions between men were not God-given but were due to human and 
historical causes, the idea was to him 'something like a revelation'. There was nothing in his 
previous experience to suggest anything different. He had taken for granted the Koranic 
injunction: 'And as to the means of livelihood we have preferred some of you to others'.44 
 
 A third response lies between these extremes, all the more interesting because it can be 
seen as a potential bridge from one to the other – adaptation, where ‘contemporary’ forms of 
class struggle were deployed in order to defend ‘archaic’ forms of religious observance, as 
occurred around the jute weaving industry in Bengal during the 1890s. During this period the 
Scottish mill managers both introduced night working and attempted to prevent workers – 
many of whom had only recently arrived from the countryside – from attending religious 
festivals, to which the mainly, but by no means exclusively Muslim weavers responded by 
rioting and striking. Anthony Cox writes of their motivations: ‘In part, this growing militancy 
was encouraged, if not fostered, by notions of fairness and honour held by Indian workers.’ In 
                                                          
41 Eric J. Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’, in The Invention of Tradition, edited by Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 4-5.  
42 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 15. 
43 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (London: Phoenix, 2002), 
p. 127. 
44 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: a Study of Iraq's Old 
Landed Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978), p. 481. 
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particular, they held to notions of customary rights (Dasturi), fairness (Instaf) and social 
honour (Izzat): 
 
For many Julaha weavers, the imposition of night working and the attack on their rights of 
worship, as well as challenging concepts such as dasturi and insaf, also challenged their sense 
of honour as Muslims and must have underlined the alien, colonial character of the mill 
managers and supervisors, making them more receptive to the nationalist and Pan-Islamic 
rhetoric of Indian nationalism and Muslim reform organisations respectively. The militancy of 
the workers, though, went much further than was thought politic by many nationalists and Pan-
Islamic leaders.45     
 
Much the same spurs to action can be found in the great strike wave of 1920-22 in which 
individual disputes were often responses to assaults by supervisors on children or women:  
 
The patriarchal character of social relations within the jute workforce, encompassing ideas of 
personal honour or Izzat, undoubtedly contributed towards male workers coming to the defence 
of women and child workers. It is also clear that the heightened political atmosphere that 
accompanied, and contributed towards, the labour upsurge of the time played a major role in 
the jute workers’ willingness to challenge paternal despotism.46 
 
Thus far, I have drawn examples from the areas identified by Trotsky as experiencing 
uneven and combined development and having the potential for permanent revolution, 
roughly from the period encompassed by his own lifetime. Ankie Hoogvelt speaks for many 
commentators when she describes the process outlined by Trotsky as leading to a ‘historically 
unique situation which is ripe for socialist revolution’.47 How ‘unique’ was the situation 
though? Peter Thomas writes of one important case: ‘Italy, along with much of Western 
Europe, had experienced a “belated” modernity not qualitatively dissimilar from that which 
preceded the Russian Revolution’.48 Indeed, in the case of Italy – one of the established, 
imperial capitalist powers – these developments were occurring contemporaneously with 
those in Russia. As Gail Day notes:        
 
In Italy and especially in Russia the peasant-based life ‘of the past’ and the urban life ‘of the 
present’ co-existed side-by-side on the cities’ borders. … It seems to have been that the 
existence of sharp contrasts between the old ways of life and new ones that gave the [artistic] 
movements in Italy and Russia their sense of greater urgency – an urgency that was bound up 
with the social and political crises that both countries faced.49  
 
Despite the diametrically opposite political affiliations of the Constructivists in Russia and 
the Futurists in Italy – themselves indicative of the different outcomes to the crises in these 
countries – their artistic practices were comparable, suggesting similar responses to a 
common experience. How could a virtually universal socio-economic process generate such 
similar cultural responses while simultaneously leading to such different political results?  
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46 Ibid, p. 119. 
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202. 
49 Gail Day, ‘The Futurists: Transcontinental Avant-Gardism’, in The Challenge of the Avant-Garde, edited by 




2. CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CONSTRAINTS 
 
2.1. Capitalist Modernity: Industrialisation and Urbanisation 
 
I wrote in Part 1 that uneven and combined development was a consequence of ‘capitalist 
modernity’, but how does the meaning of this composite term differ from those of 
‘capitalism’ on the one hand and ‘modernity’ on the other? Perry Anderson once dismissed 
the very notion of modernity on the grounds that it is so ‘extensive’ that it risks ‘dilution and 
banalization’: ‘If the modern is simply the new, and the passing of time assures its progress, 
everything in recent or current experience has acquired equal validity and meaning.’50 Jack 
Goody has expressed similar views, but extends the indictment from ‘modernity’ to 
encompass ‘pre-modernity’ and ‘post-modernity’: ‘From the viewpoint of everyday usage, 
these terms do not make much sense, since modern, like contemporary, is a moving target 
and cannot represent a periodization or a style, except in a fleeting or ambiguous sense.’51 
There would be more force in these criticisms if the term was generally used in the relative 
sense of indicating that every successive era in human history was equally modern in relation 
to those which preceded them. This was of course the original meaning of the term and 
continued to be so from the fifth century CE down to the dawn of the Enlightenment.52  
It is also true that even some of the classic nineteenth-century discussions of modernity 
carry this meaning. During the 1860s, for example, Baudelaire wrote that ‘every old master 
has his own modernity’ and asserted the necessity for any ‘modernity’ to be worthy of one 
day taking its place as ‘antiquity’.53 Like most contemporary commentators, however, I do 
not intend to deploy the notion of modernity in this way, but rather to indicate a break in 
temporal continuity, a way of dividing history into ‘before’ and ‘after’. In other words, it is 
not the case that every age has its own modernity; the modern age begins after a certain point 
in historical time. ‘The Middle Ages were interested in eternity, the Renaissance was 
interested in the past’, writes Boris Groys: ‘modernity was interested in the future.’54 At what 
point did it become possible to imagine a future in which one could be interested because it 
was radically different from the past?   
 One obvious historical turning point would be the emergence of capitalism. As Peter 
Osborne points out:  
 
There is a widespread tendency to counterpose the categories of ‘capitalism’ (Marx) and 
‘modernity’ (Durkheim and Weber) as competing alternatives for the theoretical 
interpretation of the same historical object. Yet there is no obligation to continue to use 
terms in the way in which they have been most consistently abused.55  
 
                                                          
50 Perry Anderson [1985], ‘Postscript to “Modernity and Revolution”’, in A Zone of Engagement (London: 
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51 Jack Goody, Capitalism and Modernity: The Great Debate (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 6. 
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On this reading, the concept of ‘modernity’ is a way of avoiding references to capitalism 
while effectively describing the same reality. Accordingly, Fredric Jameson argues that ‘the 
only satisfactory semantic meaning of modernity lies in its association with capitalism’ and 
recommends, in order to demonstrate this, ‘the experimental procedure of substituting 
capitalism for modernity in all the contexts in which the latter appears’.56 Derek Sayer has 
similarly argued that capitalism and modernity are identical and furthermore claims that this 
was Marx’s position.57 There are however, two reasons why a simple identification of 
capitalism with modernity is untenable.58  
One concerns the future. As Jameson himself writes elsewhere in the work cited above, we 
should ‘entertain the possibility that modernity is incomplete because it could never be 
completed by the middle class and its economic system’, which suggests that modernity 
could continue to exist after the overthrow of capitalism.59 Anderson is more definitive: ‘The 
energies of modernity, once generated by capitalism, are now ever more trapped and 
compromised by it.’60 In other words, modernity may owe its existence to capitalism, but is 
not necessarily confined to it. David Frisby notes that ‘Marx himself was not a modernist in 
the sense of identifying himself with the experience of modernity that he outlined’.61 Instead, 
Marx saw modernity, not only as characterising the capitalist present, but also pointing 
towards the socialist future. Perhaps more than any other interpreter, Marshall Berman has 
emphasised this dual aspect of Marx’s attitude: 
 
The basic fact of modern life, as Marx experienced it, is that this life is radically contradictory 
at its base... ...miseries and mysteries fill many moderns with despair. Some would ‘get rid of 
modern arts, in order to get rid of modern conflicts’; others will try to balance progress in 
industry with neofeudal or neoabsolutist regression in politics. Marx, however, proclaims a 
paradigmatically modernist faith... ...a class of ‘new men’, men who are thoroughly modern, 
will be able to resolve the contradictions of modernity, to overcome the crushing pressures, 
earthquakes, weird spells, personal and social abysses, in whose midst all modern men and 
women are forced to live.62      
                                                          
56 Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: An Essay on the Ontology of the Present (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 
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With the exception of Deep Green advocates, or related ‘back-to-hunter-gathering’ anarcho-
primitivist tendencies, most left-wing movements since Marx’s time have accepted that 
socialism will complete modernity.63 ‘The socialist and communist movements were fully set 
within the framework of the cultural program of modernity, and above all the framework of 
the Enlightenment and of the major revolutions’, writes Shmuel Eisenstadt: ‘Their criticism 
of the program of modern capitalist society revolved around their concept of the 
incompleteness of these modern programs.’64 We can imagine the balance of continuity and 
change that a socialist modernity might involve: the majority of people would not abandon 
the cities for rural communes, although the cities would now be fully habitable for their 
denizens; they would not revert from industrial to artisanal production, although industry 
would be designed with the needs of the workers and their environment; we would not cease 
to use electricity, although this would no longer be produced by fossil fuels or nuclear power, 
but by wind or solar power.65 We will continue to be modern after the revolution. 
 The second reason for questioning the equivalence of capitalism and modernity – and the 
one most relevant to this chapter – concerns the historical past. For modernity did not emerge 
with the capitalist mode of production in its original mercantile, financial or agrarian forms, 
but only with the beginnings of capitalist industrialisation and the related, but partially 
distinct process of urbanisation in Europe, North America and Japan. In other words, it is 
associated with a particular stage in capitalist development. Political Marxists in particular 
have stressed that capitalism, as a set of (what they call) ‘social property relations’, is 
radically different from all pre-existing exploitative modes of production: ‘Only in capitalism 
is the dominant mode of appropriation based on the complete dispossession of direct 
producers, who (unlike chattel slaves) are legally free and whose surplus labour is 
appropriated by purely “economic” means.’66 This is true, but less significant than is 
sometimes claimed, since the establishment of capitalism as a mode of production does not in 
and of itself immediately transform the lives of subaltern classes. There are two reasons for 
this. 
 One concerns the labour process and is outlined by Marx in Capital vol. 1, in his 
discussion of the difference between the ‘formal’ and ‘real’ subsumption of labour. In the 
case of the former, rather than ‘a fundamental modification in the real nature of the labour 
process...the fact is that capital subsumes the labour process as it finds it, that is to say, it 
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takes over an existing labour process, developed by a different and more archaic modes of 
production’: 
 
For example, handicraft, a mode of agriculture corresponding to a small, independent peasant 
economy. ... The work may become more intensive, its duration may be extended, it may be 
more continuous or orderly under the eye of the interested capitalist, but in themselves these 
changes do not affect the character of the labour process, the actual mode of working. This 
stands in striking contrast to the development of a specifically capitalist mode of production 
(large-scale industry, etc.); the latter not only transforms the situations of the various agents of 
production, it also revolutionizes their actual mode of labour and the real nature of the labour 
process as a whole.67 
 
In other words, the pre-existing ways of working can remain in place even during the initial 
phases of capitalist development. It may be possible for historians to retrospectively identify 
when the transition from feudalism was complete, but this does not mean that direct 
producers at the time understood that they had entered a new historical period.   
 The other concerns outputs, and particularly the productive capacities of the first fully 
capitalist states compared with the great Eastern empires which had once been impossibly 
more wealthy and civilised than the poverty-stricken lands of European feudalism. Peer Vries 
notes: ‘The type of growth that became normal in the industrial world had simply not existed in 
the past.’68 The industrial world was in the West, but it only arose there relatively late, and 
certainly not the latest-manifestation of Western superiority, claims for which would have for 
most of history produced mocking laughter from the East. Indeed, as Kenneth Pomeranz notes, 
down to around 1800: 
 
Far from being unique…the most developed parts of Western Europe seem to have shared 
crucial economic features – commercialization, commodification of goods, land, and labour, 
market-driven growth, and adjustment by households of both fertility and labour allocation to 
economic trends – with other densely populated core areas in Eurasia.69  
 
It is possible that Pomeranz is being insufficiently attentive to the difference between 
capitalist and non-capitalist social property relations here, but the central point is accurate: 
even after the transition to capitalism the formerly backward Western European states, above 
all England, did not immediately catch-up and overtake those of the hitherto more advanced 
East. Our estimations of GDP for both areas were similar and, in the Chinese Empire at least, 
standards of living may have even been higher than in Western Europe and North America. It 
took until 1880 for per capita income there to reach double that of the East, and until the eve 
of the First World War for it to reach three times the size.70  
 In fact, it was the advent of industrial capitalism which initiated ‘the great divergence’ 
between West and East, and the overwhelmingly uni-directional impact of the former on the 
latter. As Justin Rosenberg points out: ‘Imperial China sustained its developmental lead over 
several centuries; yet the radiation of its achievements never produced in Europe anything 
like the long, convulsive process of combined development which capitalist industrialization 
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in Europe almost immediately initiated in China.’71 It is important to understand, however, 
that the decline of Imperial China was not simply an effect of direct or indirect Western 
intervention, but of its own internally generated limits to development:   
 
After 1800, things changed very fast. Conditions in Asia deteriorated sharply, as continuing 
population growth ran into the traditional energy and land limits that constrain all organic societies. 
Indeed, it is reasonable to think that Europe and Asia had similar material conditions because prior 
to industrialization all societies were limited in what they could produce by the ability of farmers 
to produce food with organic inputs and muscle power, and of manufacturers to produce products 
with organic raw materials and wind and water power.72  
 
For both reasons then, ‘it seems reasonable to argue that it was only with the British 
Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century that modernity received its material 
form’, as Krishan Kumar explains:  
 
Partly this is because of the very explosiveness of the development – a speeding up of 
economic evolution to the point where it took on revolutionary proportions. Modernity 
therefore has a before-and-after quality that is also the hall-mark of revolution. With the 
Industrial Revolution, such a quality increasingly became evident to contemporaries, to the 
extent that for many of them the only significant division in human history appeared that 
between pre-industrial and industrial civilization.73   
 
For Ronald Hartwell too, industrialisation is ‘the great discontinuity of modern history’.74 
Indeed, if we accept the notion that we have entered into a new epoch of geological time 
known the Anthropocene, then the discontinuity is even greater than these writers could have 
imagined. Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer argued in 2000 that the epoch of the Holocene 
– the 11,500-year era contiguous with human civilization – had come to an end as a result of 
industrialisation, which they date as symbolically beginning in 1784, when James Watt 
patented the steam engine and began the use of fossil energy as the basis for economic 
activity.75  
 Yet it was not industrialisation alone which impacted on members of the new factory 
proletariat, but the fact that many of their new workplaces were situated in towns and cities. 
Indeed, as Osterhammel notes, ‘urbanization was a much more widespread process than 
industrialisation: cities grew and became more dense even where industry was not the driving 
force’. After noting that many of the greatest European cities, including London, had never 
been truly industrial, but administrative and commercial, he concludes: ‘Urbanization is a 
truly global process, industrialization a sporadic and uneven formation of growth centres.’76 
Osterhammel’s point about London can be generalised to some other historic cities whose 
existence long predated capitalism, let alone industrialisation. ‘In a very important sense 
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Vienna and Berlin were much more typically “modernist” cities, almost along the lines of 
American cities like Chicago, than were cities like London and Paris which underwent slower 
and more organic growth’, writes Scott Lash.77 But Vienna and Berlin were not equivalent 
either: of the two, Berlin was far closer to the American model – although the latter too need 
to be differentiated: ‘If Vienna is not Berlin, neither is Boston Chicago.’78 There is 
unevenness between the cities of capitalist modernity as well as combination within them. 
Even those cities which remained administrative and commercial rather than industrial 
centres were shaped by the requirements of industrialisation, not least the necessity for 
railways. Berman has identified ‘the unease and uncertainty that comes from constant motion, 
change, and diversity’ with ‘the experience of modern capitalism’; Wood however claims 
that this is merely ‘the age-old fear and fascination aroused by the city’, and what Berman has 
to say ‘about the experience of “modern life” could have been said by the Italian 
countrydweller arriving in the ancient city of Rome’.79 Now, it is certainly the case that 
Berman’s specific example (Paris in the 1760s) could be challenged on the grounds that 
capitalism was not highly developed in France at this time, but Wood is making a general 
argument that rural populations encountering the city are essentially the same at any point in 
history. At one level it is obviously true that the size, noise and populousness of cities has 
often been bewildering for rural populations forced to cross their boundaries (although for 
some rustics they also provided a welcome relief from the narrowness and conformity of the 
countryside); but Berman is drawing attention to a qualitatively different situation.     
In fact, the experience of urban life under industrial capitalism was quite different from 
any predecessor: ‘In comparison with the village or ‘pre-modernist’ city, not just the sense of 
time but the experience of space was altered’, writes Scott Lash.’80 There is evidence for this 
from first-hand observations of the English industrial cities. Here is Engels reporting on the 
changed forms of human interaction in Manchester during the 1840s:  
 
The very turmoil of the streets has something repulsive, something against which human nature 
rebels. The hundreds of thousands of all classes and ranks crowding past each other, are they 
not all human beings with the same qualities and powers, and with the same interest in being 
happy? And have they not, in the end, to seek happiness in the same way, by the same means? 
And still they crowd by one another as though they had nothing in common, nothing to do with 
one another, and their only agreement is the tacit one, that each keep to his own side of the 
pavement, so as not to delay the opposing streams of the crowd, while it occurs to no man to 
honour another with so much as a glance. The brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of 
each in his private interest, becomes the more repellent and offensive, the more these 
individuals are crowded together, within a limited space. And, however much one may be 
aware that this isolation of the individual, this narrow selfseeking, is the fundamental principle 
of our society everywhere, it is nowhere so shamelessly barefaced, so self-conscious as just 
here in the crowding of the great city.81 
 
Engels is here registering the destructive impact of city life on the first generations of the 
industrial working class, but as urban development stabilised and living conditions slowly 
improved, it began to take on a more multi-faceted aspect for new arrivals in particular. 
Beyond positive or negative experiences, life in the city was simply, vastly different from 
what inhabitants had previously known, creating new forms of consciousness. Some 
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inhabitants still found this deeply disturbing. Writing in the early 1870s, the Scottish poet 
James Thompson drew on his personal experience of Glasgow earlier in the century to invoke 
a city constructed from ‘ruins of an unremembered past’:   
 
 The City is of Night, but not of Sleep; 
 There sweet sleep is not for the weary brain; 
 The pitiless hours like years and ages creep, 
 A night seems termless hell.  This dreadful strain 
 Of thought and consciousness which never ceases,             
 Or which some moments' stupor but increases, 
 This, worse than woe, makes wretches there insane.82 
 
But for every nay-sayer like Thompson, there were others for whom the modern city of 
‘thought and consciousness which never ceases’ was not a source of ‘dreadful strain’ but 
something to be willingly embraced for providing experiences which were simply 
unimaginable earlier in human history. George Simmel, writing in Germany before the First 
World War, described the impact of urbanism on city-dwellers in this evocative passage from 
his essay, ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’: 
 
The psychological foundation, upon which the metropolitan individuality is erected, is the 
intensification of emotional life due to the swift and continuous shift of external and internal 
stimuli. Man is a creature whose existence is dependent on differences, i.e., his mind is 
stimulated by the difference between present impressions and those which have preceded. 
Lasting impressions, the slightness in their differences, the habituated regularity of their 
course and contrasts between them, consume, so to speak, less mental energy than the rapid 
telescoping of changing images, pronounced differences within what is grasped at a single 
glance, and the unexpectedness of violent stimuli. To the extent that the metropolis creates 
these psychological conditions – with every crossing of the street, with the tempo and 
multiplicity of economic, occupational and social life – it creates in the sensory foundations 
of mental life, and in the degree of awareness necessitated by our organisation as creatures 
dependent on differences, a deep contrast with the slower, more habitual, more smoothly 
flowing rhythm of the sensory-mental phase of small town and rural existence.83  
 
These are experiences which would simply not have been available to an Italian country-
dweller visiting first-century Rome, or, for that matter, an English one visiting sixteenth-
century London. How were these experiences represented in culture?  
 
 
2.2. Modernism: The Cultural Logic of Uneven and Combined Development 
 
It is difficult to disagree with the Warwick Research Collective that ‘the cultural aspects of 
Trotsky’s initiating formulation concerning the “amalgamation of archaic with more 
contemporary forms”’ have received little attention – certainly in comparison with current 
interest levels in International Relations and the social and political sciences more 
generally.84 The authors of this assessment apart, applications of uneven and combined 
development in the field of culture have often involves attempts – like those of Bhambra and 
Keucheyan in other disciplinary contexts – to treat it as synonymous or at  least compatible 
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with more contemporary notions, above all, ‘hybridity’. Take, for example, this sentence by 
Gareth Williams:  
 
The radically hybrid bearing of Latin American literary expression – a hybridity that emerges 
as a result of the historical realities of uneven and combined development; as a result of the 
disjunctive simultaneity of its subaltern/metropolis articulations; and ultimately as a result of 
Latin America’s profoundly nonunitary geopolitical location within world history – embodies 
and reproduces (perhaps) the discursive tensions (the encounters and disencounters) that are 
capable of opening up the supply-lines of reflection to a certain kind of futurity.85  
 
Amid the general incomprehensibility of this passage, one relatively clear statement presents 
hybridity as a function of uneven and combined development; but the former was 
characteristic of human societies long before the emergence of capitalism, let alone capitalist 
industrialisation.86 As Eric Wolf has demonstrated, the notion that the Americas consisted of 
self-contained, indigenous societies was false at least a hundred years before Columbus 
inadvertently ‘discovered’ them:  
 
Conquest, incorporation, recombination, and commerce…marked the New World. In both 
hemispheres populations impinged upon other populations through permeable social 
boundaries, creating intergrading, interwoven social and cultural entities. If there were any 
isolated societies these were but a temporary phenomenon – a group pushed to the edge of a 
zone of interaction and left to itself for a brief moment of time. Thus, the social scientist’s 
model of distinct and separate systems, and of a timeless ‘precontact’ ethnographic present, 
does not adequately depict the situation before European expansion; much less can it 
comprehend the worldwide system of links that would be created by that expansion.87  
 
Of course, once capitalism had emerged it increased the number and intensified the extent of 
these encounters, mainly through moving people, often forcibly, around the globe, by slavery, 
colonialism and migration. ‘Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one 
another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, 
and unmonolithic’, writes Edward Said, who also notes that this is as ‘true of the 
contemporary United States’ as it is of the Global South.88 But even within the context of 
multiple oppressions resulting from conquest and colonization, at least some of the 
populations which inhabited both North and South America were able to draw on techniques 
and styles of European origin in their own forms of cultural production, as Peter Wollen 
explains:     
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…the flow from core to periphery and its appropriation by artists on the periphery is nothing 
new. The rich nineteenth-century tradition of Haida soapstone carving developed directly 
because of the new market of sailors and travellers, who began to visit the Northwest Coast [of 
North America] for trade or tourism. … Spanish baroque was appropriated by indigenous artists 
in Mexico, and increasingly complex forms emerged (as we can see in the work of Frida Kahlo 
and, more recently, artists on both sides of the Mexican-United States frontier). Indeed this new 
baroque once again is beginning to redefine Americanness, in a complex composite of 
differential times and cultures.89  
 
The direction of fusion has by no means been all one way. If Kahlo absorbed aspects of 
Spanish Baroque in Mexico, then her contemporary, Jackson Pollock, absorbed those of the 
Mexican muralists – which were themselves hybrids – and the Native America Navajo tribes 
in the USA.90  It is the temporal and not merely geographical distance between the elements 
which are brought together that differentiates the cultures of uneven and combined 
development from those of pre-existing forms of hybridity.   
The experience of capitalist modernity was one of the conditions for the emergence of 
modernism, of which Kahlo and Pollock were leading representatives. Trotsky himself was 
alert to the relationship between modernism and the experience of capitalist modernity in its 
urban form, as in these remarks on Futurism: ‘Urbanism (city culture) sits deep in the 
subconscious of Futurism, and the epithets, the etymology, the syntax and the rhythm of 
Futurism are only an attempt to give artistic form to the new spirit of the cities which has 
conquered consciousness.’91 He did not, however, explicitly link modernism as a general 
movement with uneven and combined development except in a handful of passing comments. 
Reporting on the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 he wrote:  
 
Like all backward countries, Bulgaria is incapable of creating new political and cultural forms 
through a free struggle of its own inner forces: it is obliged to assimilate the ready-made 
cultural products that European civilization has developed in the course of history.  
 
However, in addition to referencing technological and political forms, Trotsky then goes on 
to mention ‘other spheres’: ‘Bulgarian literature lacks traditions, and has not been able to 
develop its own internal continuity. It has had to subordinate its unfermented content to 
modern and contemporary forms created under a quite different cultural zenith.’92 Ten years 
later, he similarly noted how ‘the backward countries which were without any special degree 
of spiritual culture, reflected in their ideology the achievements of the advanced countries 
more brilliantly and strongly’. Eighteenth and nineteenth German philosophy was one 
example of this, but so too was Futurism, ‘which obtained its most brilliant expression, not in 
America and not in Germany, but in Italy and Russia’.93    
 
2.2.1. Theories of Modernism: Lukács, Greenberg, Jameson 
 
Few discussions of modernism have, however, attempted to explicitly relate it to Trotsky’s 
concept. One writer who might have been expected to do so was Clement Greenberg, doyen 
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of post-war American art critics and himself a former Trotskyist sympathiser. In a late 
interview from 1967 Greenberg actually invoked combined development to explain why New 
York took over from Paris as the world centre of Modernist painting in the 1940s:  
 
…we Americans felt so much further behind the French, or behind Paris, that we tried much 
harder to catch up – just catch up. Then what Marx called the law of combined development 
came into operation: the strenuous effort you make to catch up sends you ahead in the end; you 
don’t just catch up, you overtake.94   
  
Marx had no theory of combined development and the process to which Greenberg refers 
(‘catch up and overtake’) is in any case an example of uneven development. Nevertheless, 
Greenberg’s rather more cogent earlier writings constitute, along with those of Georg Lukács 
and Fredrick Jameson, one of the three most important Marxist attempts to periodise and 
define modernism. Reviewing these in order of their appearance will allow us to see how 
uneven and combined development offers a more general and comprehensive alternative to 
them.   
 For Lukács, modernism is indicative of bourgeois decline. Realism, from Shakespeare and 
Cervantes onwards, had been the literary tendency most expressive of the bourgeois world 
view during its prolonged struggle against the feudal nobility and the absolutist state. The 
realist novel in particular was the form which played that role between the French Revolution 
in 1789 and the failure of the revolutions of 1848–9. Lukács held consistently to the position 
that the connection between class position and aesthetic form remains even after the 
revolutionary phase of bourgeois history is over, but to different effect, for the art of the 
subsequent period is therefore the obverse of that produced earlier. Lukács is absolutely explicit 
about the date after which this reversal takes place, writing that ‘the decline of bourgeois 
ideology set in with the end of the 1848 revolution’.95 From around that date – and certainly no 
later than 1871 – the bourgeoisie are said to have abandoned the struggle to reconstruct society 
in its own image, and settled instead for an alliance with their former aristocratic enemies 
against a now infinitely more threatening proletariat. In other words, the bourgeoisie had gone 
from a class challenging for power and anxious to reveal the workings of the society they were 
in the process of conquering, to one in control, all too aware of the class threatening their 
position, and as anxious to conceal the reality of this new situation as they had been to confront 
the old.  
 The realist novel therefore enters a decline after 1848: 'The evolution of bourgeois society 
after 1848 destroyed the subjective conditions which made a great realism possible.' In the first 
place, these changes affected the novelists themselves: 'The old writers were participants in the 
social struggle and their activities as writers were either part of this struggle or a reflection, an 
ideological and literary solution, of the great problems of the time.'96 Dissatisfied with the world 
which the bourgeoisie had made, but unable to embrace the alternative, the novelists first 
retreated to reporting the surface of events, to mere naturalism: 'As writers grew more and more 
unable to participate in the life of capitalism as their sort of life, they grew less and less capable 
of producing real plots and action.'97 Then, in a further declension, came the retreat inwards 
signalled by the rise of modernism. 'Modernist literature thus replaces concrete typicality with 
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abstract particularity.'98 Lukács does allow, however, that this shift did not take place uniformly. 
In societies which had neither experienced the bourgeois revolution nor completed the transition 
to capitalism, the conditions still obtained for great realist writing to take place. In particular he 
refers to the work of Heinrich Ibsen (1828–1906) in Norway and, in particular, Leo Tolstoy 
(1828–1910) in Russia, but this could only be a temporary salvation for the form.99 Lukács thus 
accounts for some late exceptions in a manner compatible with his general thesis. In the case of 
others which are clearly associated with the triumphant bourgeois world, however, he simply – 
and not very convincingly – cites uneven development without any attempt at explanation: ‘Of 
course we can find many latecomers – especially in literature and art – for whose work this 
thesis by no means holds good (we need only mention Dickens and Keller, Courbet and 
Daumier).’100 
 Largely consistent up till this point as a purely historical argument, Lukács now shifts ground 
and asserts that, far from being tied to a bourgeoisie which no longer has any need for it, realism 
has the potential instead to become a method appropriate to the cultural politics of the working 
class. Thus, in one of his contributions to the debates of the 1930s, he wrote that: 
 
Through the mediation of realist literature the soul of the masses is made receptive for an 
understanding of the great progressive and democratic epochs of human history. This will 
prepare it for the new type of revolutionary democracy that is represented by the Popular 
Front... Whereas in the case of the major realists, easier access produces a richly complex yield 
in human terms, the broad mass of the people can learn nothing from avant–garde literature. 
Precisely because the latter is devoid of reality and life, it foists on to its readers a narrow and 
subjectivist attitude to life (analogous to a sectarian point of view in political terms).101 
 
Is realism a method destined to decline with the revolutionary potential of the bourgeoisie which 
gave it birth then, or one which, detached from its origins, still represents a resource for critical 
artists today? And the contradictions do not stop there. ‘Lukács asserts that realistic literature 
has been produced by both bourgeois and socialist writers’, notes George Parkinson: 
 
That he should assert this of socialist writers is not surprising, but may seem strange that he 
should grant the existence of bourgeois realists. We have seen that realism implies a grasp of 
reality; but in History and Class Consciousness…Lukács argues that the bourgeoisie, by 
virtue of its very nature as a class, is incapable of grasping a totality, which is something 
that only the proletariat can achieve.  
 
Does Lukács, as this would suggest, therefore expect realist literature to be produced, if not by 
proletarians, then by writers who adopt ‘the perspective of the proletariat’, those whose sense of 
totality is informed by Marxist theory? No. ‘Lukács’ explanation of the existence of bourgeois 
realism is that some bourgeois writers were capable of grasping a totality after a fashion, 
though their knowledge of this totality was class–limited and their dialectics were only 
instinctive.’102 In fact, the later Lukács goes out of his way to argue that realism can be 
produced by writers who are neither Marxists nor even socialists. These contradictions flow 
from the Stalinist political tradition within which Lukács stood during the period when his major 
works of criticism were written and they shatter the coherence of his historical argument, with 
which there are nevertheless two serious difficulties.    
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One is that the definition of realism which Lukács gives is quite specific to literature and this 
raises the question of the extent to which it can be generalised across the entire spectrum of 
artistic production. Some ill–considered comments on Schönberg apart, Lukács usually 
restricted himself to the discussion of writers, yet despite this refusal to engage with disciplines 
outside his professional specialism, he nevertheless made sweeping general statements about 
realism and modernism on the basis of literary developments alone. Now, while it is at least 
possible to compare Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain with James Joyce’s novel 
Ulysses on a formal level; it is not possible to compare The Magic Mountain with Jackson 
Pollock’s painting Autumn Rhythm. Considerations on the realist novel cannot be the basis of a 
discussion of modernist art – which includes not only literature, but painting, sculpture, 
architecture and cinema. A modernist painting can scarcely be expected to fulfil the same 
function as a realist novel; indeed, a realist painting cannot be expected to fulfil the same 
function as a realist novel – and in some key modernist disciplines–architecture, for example–
there are styles which precede it, but no 'realist' school with which comparisons can be made. 
Music is perhaps the most obvious example. As Adorno wrote:  
 
If we listen to Beethoven and do not hear anything of the revolutionary bourgeoisie – not the 
echo of its slogans, the need to realise them, the cry for that totality in which reason and 
freedom are to have their warrant – we understand Beethoven no better than does the listener 
who cannot follow his pieces’ purely musical content, the inner history that happens to their 
themes.103  
 
Beethoven’s work is surely as expressive of bourgeois ascendancy as Scott or Balzac, but in 
what sense can it be described as ‘realist’? In other words, even if we accept for the moment 
that Lukács makes a coherent case (which is not the same as a convincing case) for the decline 
of literature after the bourgeois revolution, the very way in which his categories are drawn from 
literature make that case difficult to extend to other mediums other than by assertion.  
 The other difficulty with Lukács's position is summarised in a statement from late in his 
life: ‘The author of these essays subscribes to Goethe’s observation: “Literature deteriorates 
only as mankind deteriorates.”’104 As Anderson writes: 'The basic error of Lukács's optic here 
is its evolutionism: time, that is, differs from one epoch to another, but within each epoch all 
sectors of social reality move in synchrony with each other, such that decline at one level must 
be reflected in descent at every other.'105 Anderson rightly rejects this, arguing that 
transformations in culture do not simply occur in lockstep with those of the economic or the 
political; to imagine that they do is to ignore the distinction between the ‘immediate and 
mediated effects of the “economic structure” upon the various social institutions’ under 
capitalism to which Lukács himself had earlier drawn attention.106 At one point in his later 
work Lukács still appeared to recognise this, quoting a passage from the Grundrisse in which 
Marx argues that uneven development means developments in art do not necessarily coincide 
with those of the economy: ‘In art it is recognised that specific flourishing periods hardly 
conform to the general development of society, that is, of the material base, the skeleton, so 
to speak, which produces them.’107 The point endorsed here by Lukács is perfectly correct, 
but he ignores what Marx then goes on to say, which is not at all compatible with his general 
position:  
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Is the view of nature and of social relations on which Greek imagination and hence Greek 
[mythology] is based possible with self – acting mule spindles and railways and locomotives 
and electrical telegraphs? What chance has Vulcan against Roberts and Co., Jupiter against the 
lightning rod and Hermes against the Credit Mobilier? … From another side: is Achilles 
possible with powder and lead? Or the Illiad with the printing press, not to mention the printing 
machine? Do not the song and the saga and the muse necessarily come to an end with the 
printer’s bar, hence do not the necessary conditions for epic poetry disappear? 108 
 
There are two aspects to what Marx is saying here, one concerned with form and the other 
with technology; it is the former which is most relevant to Lukács’ arguments. Marx does 
indeed reject the idea that art must change in lockstep with socio-economic development, but 
the disjunction between the two is not infinitely extendable to the point of complete 
autonomy: some forms of artistic practice are so specific to a particular time that they cannot 
be practised outside it to any serious effect. As Jameson writes: 'We cannot...return to aesthetic 
practices elaborated on the basis of historical situations and dilemmas which are no longer 
ours.'109 James Wood points out that one of the functions of the novelist is to explore 
consciousness, yet there are greater difficulties in doing so today than at the height of the 
historical novel:  
 
For consciousness and the construction of consciousness has changed, and is changing, 
rapidly. In fact, the rapidity of that change is one of the new challenges for writers. The 
reason that historical novels are nowadays almost always failures or of no artistic merit has 
to do with the speed of change. Tolstoy was able to reach back 60 years to the Napoleonic 
Wars because he had a confidence that those 60 years had made hardly any difference to the 
kind of humans he was writing about…110 
 
But this is not now the case, and has not been since decades before Tolstoy died. As Henry 
James wrote to one practitioner of the historical novel over a hundred years ago: 
 
The ‘historical novel’ is, for me, condemned…to a fatal cheapness…You may multiply the 
little facts that can be got from pictures and documents, relics and prints, as much as you like – 
the real thing is almost impossible to do, and in its essence the whole effect is as nought: I mean 
the invention, the representation of the old CONSCIOUSNESS, the soil, the sense, the horizon, 
the vision of individuals in whose minds half the things that make our, that make the modern 
world were non-existent. You have to think with your modern apparatus a man, a woman – or 
rather fifty – whose own thinking was intensely otherwise conditioned, you have to simplify 
back by an amazing tour de force – and even then it’s all humbug.111 
 
In other words, Lukács is right that the realist novel (as he conceived it, at least) could not 
survive indefinitely, but not for the reasons he gives.  
 For Greenberg, unlike Lukács, modernism is not an unmediated expression of bourgeois 
cowardice and vulgarity, but rather a hostile reaction to these characteristics: 'It was no 
accident…that the birth of the avant-garde coincided chronologically – and geographically too – 
                                                          
108 Karl Marx [1857-8], Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft) 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books/New Left Review, 1973), pp. 110-111. The passage quoted by Lukács above 
comes from an earlier and inferior translation.  
109 Fredric Jameson [1984], ‘The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic 
of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 50. 
110 James Wood, ‘Life Just Isn’t Like That’, The Guardian (8 January 2000. 
111 Henry James [1905], James to Sarah Orne Hewlett, October 5, 1905, in Henry James Letters, vol. 4, 1895-
1916 edited by Leon Edel (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 208. 
25 
 
with the first bold development of scientific revolutionary thought in Europe’. Greenberg argues 
that the revolutionary movements of the time allowed the avant-garde both to ‘isolate their 
concept of the “bourgeois” in order to define what they were not’ and gave them ‘the courage 
to assert themselves as aggressively as they did against the prevailing standards of society’. 
However, although avant-garde artists shared with Marxists a revulsion at the bourgeoisie, this 
was mainly on aesthetic rather than socio-economic grounds; and they was as much removed 
from the working class movement it was from the philistinism of the Moneybags. However, 
while they could remain aloof from the former, they could not entirely escape the latter; having 
abandoned aristocratic patronage, ‘the avant-garde remained attached to bourgeois society 
precisely because it needed its money’: ‘No culture can develop without a social basis, 
without a source of stable income. And in the case of the avant-garde, this was provided by 
an elite among the ruling class of the society from which it assumed itself to be cut off, but to 
which it remained attached by an umbilical cord of gold.’112 This contradictory relationship 
with the bourgeoisie was unprecedented for an artistic movement, although it was to become 
the norm as the 19th century went on: 
 
Romanticism was the last great tendency following directly from bourgeois society that was 
able to inspire and stimulate the profoundly responsible artist – the artist conscious of certain 
inflexible obligations to the standards of his craft. By 1848, Romanticism had exhausted. After 
that the impulse, although indeed it had to originate in bourgeois society, could only come in 
the guise of a denial of that society, as a turning away from it. It was not to be an about – face 
towards a new society, but an emigration to Bohemia which was to be art’s sanctuary from 
capitalism. It was to be the task of the avant-garde to perform in opposition to bourgeois society 
the function of finding new and adequate cultural forms for the expression of that same society, 
without at the same time succumbing to its ideological divisions and its refusal to permit the 
arts to be their justification.113 
 
Greenberg pointed out that where there is an ‘advance-guard’ there is usually also a ‘rear-
guard’. Industrial capitalism sucked the rural masses into the new urban centres of 
production, obliterating or making irrelevant the folk culture they had known in the 
countryside. What would replace it? ‘To fill the demand of the new market, a new 
commodity was devised: ersatz culture, kitsch, destined for those who, insensible to the 
values of genuine culture, are hungry nevertheless for the diversion that only culture of some 
sort can provide.’ Kitsch, as Greenberg describes it is ‘mechanical’, formulaic, relies on 
‘vicarious experience’ and ‘faked sensations’: ‘Kitsch pretends to demand nothing of its 
customers except their money – not even their time.’ But there was nevertheless a connection 
between kitsch and the avant-garde: ‘The precondition for kitsch, a condition without which 
kitsch would be impossible, is the availability close at hand of a fully matured cultural 
tradition, whose discoveries, acquisitions, and perfected self-consciousness kitsch can take 
advantage of for its own ends.’ But there is a central difference: ‘If the avant-garde imitates 
the processes of art, kitsch…imitates its effects.’114 Greenberg insists that only by crossing the 
divide between aesthetic and political rejection of capitalism – by the mutual embrace of avant-
garde and vanguard, if you like – was there any possibility of defending what was of value in 
culture against the remorseless advance of kitsch.115  
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Timothy Clark has described Greenberg as being an advocate of ‘Eliotic Trotskyism’ in 
which the defence of the artistic values of the bourgeoisie in the period of its ascendancy are 
necessary for the continuation of culture as such:  
 
They are the repository, as it were, of affect and intelligence that once inhered in a complex 
form of life but do so no longer, they are the concrete form of intensity and self–consciousness, 
the only one left, and therefore the form to be preserved at all costs and somehow kept apart 
from the surrounding desolation.116  
 
Greenberg’s attachment to Trotskyism was however considerably weaker than Lukács’ 
adherence to Stalinism, and by the late 1940s at the latest the former had abandoned his earlier 
revolutionary commitments, a shift which did not leave his theory of modernism untouched. 
From being a defence against appropriation by the bourgeoisie, modernism becomes an 
internally-generated process of disciplinary self-purification.   
 The differences from his earlier positions can be seen most clearly in the essay ‘Modernist 
Painting’ (1960). Greenberg argues that before the Enlightenment, art functioned in a similar 
way to religion; indeed, it usually functioned as an extension of religion. With the triumph of 
rationalist consciousness much of religion's explanatory role was removed and it was reduced to 
the level of entertainment and, as Greenberg has it, therapy. 'The arts could save themselves 
from this levelling down only by demonstrating that the kind of experience they provided was 
valuable in its own right and not to be obtained by any other kind of activity.' But the 
Enlightenment not only posed this problem, it also offered a solution. Beginning with the work 
of Kant, modernism declared itself as a self-critical tendency in Western culture:  
 
The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic methods of a discipline to 
criticise the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its 
area of competence. ... Realistic, naturalistic art had dissembled the medium, using art to conceal 
art; Modernism used art to call attention to art. ... Whereas one tends to see what is in an Old 
Master before one sees the picture itself, one sees a Modernist picture as a picture first. ... 
Modernist painting in its latest phase has not abandoned the representation of recognisable objects 
in principle. What it has abandoned in principle is the representation of the kind of space that 
recognisable objects can inhabit. ... To achieve autonomy, painting has had above all to divest itself 
of everything it might share with sculpture, and it is in its efforts to do this, and not so much – I 
repeat – to exclude the representational or literary, that painting has made itself abstract.117  
 
Unlike Lukács, Greenberg does not use a single style within a single discipline as a model for all 
contemporary artistic production, although, as an art critic, he is obviously most concerned with 
painting. In 1960 he began 'Modernist Painting' with a declaration of the universal significance 
of modernism: ‘Modernism includes more than art and literature. By now it covers almost the 
whole of what is truly alive in our culture.’118 If Greenberg’s conception of modernism avoids 
confining it to a particular discipline, he does reduce it to a particular style or approach, and 
in this, at least, the later Greenberg was consistent with the earlier. In 1944 he had declared that:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the origins of the modern artist outlined by Greenberg was given, nearly 50 years later, by Raymond Williams, 
without reference of the earlier thinker. Given the academic specialisation which means that literary critics are 
unlikely to be acquainted with the work of art critics, this was probably not plagiarism on the part of the latter, but it 
is indicative of how little Greenberg’s work has been absorbed into the intellectual culture of the Left. See Raymond 
Williams [1987], ‘When was Modernism?’ In The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists, edited 
by Tony Pinkney (London: Verso, 1989). 
116 Timothy J. Clark [1982], ‘Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art’, in Pollock and After: the Critical Debate, 
edited by Francis Frascina (London: Harper and Row, 1985), p. 54. See also p. 50. 
117 Clement Greenberg [1960], 'Modernist Painting', in in The Collected Essays and Criticism, vol. 4, pp. 85-88. 




Poetry is lyric and ‘pure’; the serious novel has become either confessional or highly abstract, 
as with Joyce or Stein; architecture subordinates itself to function and the construction 
engineer; music has abandoned the programme. Let painting confine itself to the disposition 
pure and simple of colour and line, and not intrigue us by association with things we can 
experience more authentically elsewhere.119   
 
This was the basis of his rejection of Surrealism – it was figurative, and no matter how bizarre 
the juxtapositions involved in Surrealist painting, it was consequently a literary form.120  
 Is this the sum total of modernism though? Eugene Lunn argues that there were four 
features of modernism common to all art forms: ‘aesthetic self–consciousness or self–
reflexiveness; ‘simultaneity, juxtaposition, or “montage”’; ‘paradox, ambiguity and 
uncertainty’; and ‘”dehumanisation” and the demise of the integrated individual 
personality.’121 Yet only the first features in the Greenberg’s conception of modernism, here 
expressed in relation to Joyce: ‘Ulysses and Finnegan’s Wake seem to be, above all…the 
reduction of experience to expression for the sake of expression, the expression mattering 
more than what is being expressed.’122 But as George Orwell noted of the first of these 
novels:  
 
Ulysses could not have been written by someone who was merely dabbling in word–patterns; it is 
the product of a special vision of life, the vision of a Catholic who has lost his faith. What Joyce is 
saying is “Here is life without God. Just look at it!” and his technical innovations, important 
though they are, are primarily to serve this purpose.123  
 
More recent commentators like Colin McCabe have suggested that the content of certain 
chapters in the novel is specifically related to Irish politics: ‘The resonances and allusions of [the 
Aeolus section] indicate that the paralysis of Irish politics is a result of the illusions about class 
antagonisms that were fostered by nationalist ideology.’124  
But even if we accept that one tendency within modernism has indeed been towards what we 
can refer to in shorthand as ‘abstraction’, there is more than one reason why this should be the 
case. One might be that artists were attempting to transcend their own historical moment. Boris 
Groys argues that the avant-garde had set themselves the following questions: 
 
How could art continue under the permanent destruction of cultural tradition and the familiar 
world that is a characteristic condition of the modern age, with its technological, political and 
social revolutions? Or, to put it in different terms: How can art resist the destructiveness of 
progress? How does one make art that will escape permanent change – art that is atemporal, 
transhistorical?  
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This was written in relation to the Russian pre-revolutionary Constructivism, but the point is 
of general application: one way of producing an ‘art for all time’ might be to remove from it 
any of the recognisable markers of history or contemporaneity.125 Another reason might be 
the one that Greenberg himself had given earlier in his career. He was not alone in doing so. 
In 1931 Walter Benjamin wrote a letter in which he commented on the attitude a committed 
writer should take to his work, faced with the prospect that it might be used in unintended ways 
by the class enemy: 'Should he not...denature them, like ethyl alcohol, and make them 
definitively and reliably unusable for the counter–revolution at the risk that no one will be able 
to use them?'126 Although none of the Abstract Expressionists would have known Benjamin's 
name, let alone his work, during the late 1940s, the strategy he outlined was the one which some 
of them, at least, pursued as the Cold War intensified. Serge Guilbaut writes that:  
 
Rothko tried to purge his art of any sign that could convey a precise image, for fear of being 
assimilated by society. Still went so far as to refuse at various times to exhibit his paintings 
publicly because he was afraid critics would deform or obliterate the content embedded in his 
abstract forms.127  
 
In fact, the danger would not come from critics misrepresenting the content of his work but from 
critics – of whom Greenberg was in the, as it were, advance-guard – misrepresenting his work as 
having no content. There are two issues here. 
The first is the distinction between ‘subject’ and ‘content’. The early Greenberg was aware 
of the difference: ‘Subject matter as distinguished from content: in the sense that every work 
of art must have content, but that the subject matter is something the artist does or does not 
have in mind when he is actually at work.’128 The later, not so much:  
 
I, who am considered an arch-‘formalist’, used to indulge in...talk about ‘content’ myself. If I do 
not do so any longer it is because it came to me, dismayingly, some years ago that I could always 
assert the opposite of whatever it was I did say about ‘content’ and not get found out; that I could 
say almost anything I pleased about “content” and sound plausible.’129 Now, at one level this is a 
necessary caution against ‘reading-in.130  
 
Because one cannot say just ‘anything’ about content does not mean that there is nothing to say. 
David Caute once noted the confusion which exists in the minds of some critics (he was 
thinking particularly of Susan Sontag) with regard to these terms ‘subject’ and ‘content’:  
 
The Anzin miner’s strike of 1884 is the subject of Zola’s novel Germinal; the content of the novel 
is what emerges through Zola’s literary treatment of the subject. It is not, therefore…a matter of 
choosing between form and content because every work of art, however ‘abstract’, however 
formalistic, has a content. Content always refers to the world (material, mental, associative or 
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whatever) outside the work of art mediated and reshaped by artistic form. The fact is grasped 
once we cease to identify content with the mimetic representation of a subject or theme.131  
 
Jameson too has criticised precisely the fallacy 'that works of art...are conceivable that have 
no content, and are therefore to be denounced for failing to grapple with the “serious” issues 
of the day, indeed distracting from them...' If this is understood, then the supposedly 'abstract' 
aspects of modernism take on a new meaning: 'Modernism would then not so much be a way 
of avoiding social content...as rather of managing and containing it, secluding it out of sight 
in the very form itself, by means of specific techniques of framing and displacement which 
can be identified with some precision.'132 Pollock, the doyen of abstract impressionism whose 
reputation was at least partly constructed by Greenberg, was himself was unambiguous on the 
question. In an interview in 1950 he said:  
 
It seems to me that the modern painter cannot express his age, the airplane, the atom bomb, the 
radio, in the old forms of the Renaissance or of any other past culture. Every age finds its own 
technique...method is, it seems to me, a natural growth out of a need, and from the need the 
modern artist has of expressing the world about him.133 
 
 This brings us to the second distinction, between 'representation' and ‘resemblance’. In 
everyday usage ‘represents’ is taken to mean 'something which stands in for something else'. 
In Greenberg's hands, it appears to mean 'something which resembles something else'. But 
representation can take place without resemblance. The Art and Language group (i.e. as far as 
this text is concerned, Michael Baldwin, Charles Harrison and Mel Ramsden) draw precisely 
this distinction: ‘Those features of a picture according to which we are able… to see it as 
resembling a person or etc. compromise… the descriptive content of the picture, although 
these features are in general neither necessary nor sufficient for descriptive or 
representational content.’ They conclude: ‘We cannot infer realism from resemblance.’134  
 Both aspects of this question were discussed in a brilliant article by Meyer Schapiro, one of 
Greenberg's contemporaries and a fellow Trotskyist, in 1937:  
  
The logical opposition of realistic and abstract art...rests on two assumptions about the nature of 
painting, common in writing on abstract art: that representation is a passive mirroring of things and 
therefore essentially non–artistic, and that abstract art, on the other hand, is a purely aesthetic 
activity, unconditioned by objects and based on its own eternal laws...These views are thoroughly 
one–sided and rest on a mistaken idea of what representation is. There is no passive, 'photographic' 
representation in the sense described. ... All renderings of objects, no matter how exact they seem, 
even photographs, proceed from values, methods and viewpoints which somehow shape the image 
and often determine its contents. On the other hand there is no 'pure art', uncontaminated by 
experience; all fantasy and formal construction, even the random scribbling of a hand, are shaped 
by experience and non–aesthetic concerns.135 
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The final conception of modernism is that of Jameson. In his foundational essay on 
postmodernism, Jameson follows Ernest Mandel in arguing that there have been three stages 
(‘fundamental moments’) in capitalism: ‘These are market capitalism, the monopoly stage or 
the stage of imperialism, and our own, wrongly called postindustrial, but what might better be 
termed multinational, capital.’ As he goes on, ‘my own cultural periodization of the stages of 
realism, modernism, and postmodernism is both inspired and confirmed by Mandel’s 
tripartite scheme’.136 There are in fact differences in the chronologies deployed by Mandel 
and Jameson; for the purposes of this discussion, however, they are secondary.137 The key 
point is that Jameson sees particular periods in the history of capitalism as possessing distinct 
‘cultural logics’ and that of modernism is associated with the period which begins after 1848. 
He therefore retains the element of periodization characteristic of Lukács, but identifies realism 
and modernism as ‘cultural logics’ corresponding respectively to the market and imperialist 
stages in the development of capitalism, rather than indices of totality or fragmentation in the 
bourgeois world-view. This is free from both the moralism with which Lukács judged 
modernism and the narrowness with which Greenberg defined it, but is misleading in a different 
way. Jameson is right, in my view, to associate modernism with a period in capitalist 
development, but wrong about the nature of that period.  
It is remarkable that Jameson and Anderson, his most persistent interlocutor, both 
recognise that modernism does not emerge from monopoly capitalism as such, but rather 
from the fusion of the ‘contemporary’ and the ‘archaic’, which it initiates. Yet neither man 
ever invokes the concept specifically intended to illuminate these juxtapositions. Indeed, 
Anderson has rarely discussed uneven and combined development at all, except for a very 
brief reference to Germany, post-Unification, although he has discussed uneven development, 
but not in the context of modernism.138 Jameson, as we shall see, tends to refer to uneven 
development, even when he is discussing uneven and combined development. The latter 
concept therefore forms a ghostly unacknowledged presence in the background of their more 
concrete discussions, to which we now turn.  
In his early work, Marxism and Form (1971), Jameson noted of Surrealism that the 
juxtaposed objects which it depicted are ‘places of objective chance or preternatural 
revelation…immediately identifiable as the products of a not yet fully industrialised and 
systematized economy’.139 Although written of one specific school of Modernism, the 
essential point – that it involved the representation of a world in which old and new co-
existed and inter-penetrated each other – was capable of generalisation to the entire field. 
Over a decade later, in his assessment of Berman’s All That is Solid Melts into Air, Anderson 
took this step, quoting Jameson on Surrealism but in order to illustrate a much more general 
argument.140  
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In my view, ‘modernism’ can best be understood as a cultural field of force triangulated by 
three decisive coordinates. The first…was the codification of a highly formalized academicism 
in the visual and other arts, which itself was institutionalized within official regimes of states 
and society still massively pervaded, often dominated, by aristocratic or landowning classes: 
classes in one sense economically ‘superseded’, no doubt, but in others still setting the political 
and cultural tone in country after country of pre-First World War Europe. … The second 
coordinate is then a logical complement of the first: that is, the still incipient, hence essentially 
novel, emergence within these societies of the key technologies or inventions of the second 
industrial revolution: telephone, radio, automobile, aircraft and so on. Mass consumption 
industries based on the new technologies had not yet been implanted anywhere in Europe, 
where clothing, food and furniture remained overwhelmingly the largest final-goods sectors in 
employment and turnover down to 1914. The third coordinate of the modernist conjuncture, I 
would argue, was the imaginative proximity of social revolution.141  
 
In summary, Anderson argues that, in Europe at least, modernism 'arose at the intersection 
between a semi-aristocratic ruling order, a semi-industrialised capitalist economy, and a semi-
emergent or insurgent labour movement.'142 This was the situation, not only in Russia, but across 
most of Europe, down to 1945.   
In the conclusion to his first collection of essays on postmodernism, Jameson, deployed 
what he called ‘uneven development’ to reach very similar conclusions to those of Anderson: 
 
…in an age of monopolies (and trade unions), of institutionalized collectivization, there is 
always a lag. Some parts of the economy are still archaic, handicraft enclaves; some are more 
modern and futuristic than the future itself. Modern art, in this respect, drew its power and 
possibilities from being a backwater and an archaic holdover within a modernizing economy: it 
glorified, celebrated, and dramatized older forms of individual production which the new mode 
of production was elsewhere on the point of displacing and blotting out. 
 
Jameson then refers to Joyce creating his version of Dublin alone in his rooms in Paris, but 
the point is clearly intended to be of wider application than literature, or any specific form of 
artistic production, almost an explanation for modernism itself. ‘Modernism must thus be 
seen as uniquely corresponding to an uneven moment of social development’ – but here 
Jameson refers specifically to Bloch and ‘non-synchronicity’ rather than Trotsky and uneven 
and combined development, before going on to describe ‘the coexistence of realities from 
radically different moments in history – handicrafts alongside the great cartels, peasant fields 
with the Krupp factories or the Ford plant in the distance’.143 It was left to one of Jameson’s 
admirers, Julian Stallabrass, to draw out the connection with Trotsky’s concept:  
 
Jameson has convincingly argued that the most systematic works are produced in circumstances 
where, due to combined and uneven development, thinkers are faced with extreme contrasts of 
scene, as if they lived in an environment where it is easy to step from one historical period to 
another. Peasants in paddy fields may raise their eyes from their work to glimpse a new 
neighbour, a high rise postmodern office complex. Such variegated environments, argues 
Jameson, foster systematic and totalising thinking about historical change.144 
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Modernism must be seen then, not as a conjunctural moment in the history of capitalism, 
but as a form of artistic production generated by the triumph of capitalism as the globally 
dominant socio-economic system. The significance of 1848, in this perspective, is not the 
failure of the revolutions of that year, but as a marker indicating the when that system became 
definitively established. If the argument here is correct, however, then the form taken by that 
triumph was precisely the sudden onrush of capitalist modernity into long-established pre-
capitalist societies: modernism is not the cultural logic of monopoly capitalism, but of uneven 
and combined development, which is one of the reasons why countries as politically distinct 
as Italy and Russia could both manifest such similar versions. Modernism is the way in which 
the experience of that transformation has been transmitted and understood through culture. In 
this, modernism would appear not as a set of artistic practices related to the historic decline of 
the bourgeoisie – or indeed to the fortunes of any particular class – but to the contemporary 
reality of class society itself; the rhythms of capitalist industrialisation, the stimuli associated 
with urban life and the patterns of social conflict during the epoch of Classical Imperialism – an 
epoch which, like modernism itself, apparently climaxed with the Second World War. 
 Modernism is obviously not an unmediated expression of experience. Lukács argues that the 
key distinction between realist authors (such as Mann) and their modernist contemporaries 
(such as Joyce) is the ability of the former to convey the totality of the social world and the 
inability of the latter to convey anything but the fragmented experience of that world.145 As 
Terry Eagleton has pointed out, however, the view that modernist work simply embodies 
subjective ‘experience’ is untenable: ‘Expressionist and surrealist art, need it be said, are 
every bit as much constructed as Balzac; we are judging (if we need to) between two different 
products of ideological labour, not between “experience” and the “real”’.146  
 I began this section by quoting Trotsky’s views on Futurism. Here, Day shows three 
different ways in which that branch of modernism was able to translate the experience of 
capitalist modernity into the forms of art: 
 
First, it can refer to a range of modern motifs (cars, aeroplanes, telephones) or their associated 
qualities (speed). Second, it can refer to the experiential ‘sensations’ of life in modern cities 
(experiences of speed and of ‘simultaneity’ across time and space, as new methods of transport and 
communication make the world seem smaller, or the feeling of exhilaration produced by 
competing sensations in the city). Third, it might refer to the technical and formal devices used by 
artists to ‘represent’ any of the above (the fragmentation and fracturing of picture space, the 
juxtaposition or collaging of different materials/elements as a way of ‘expressing’ sensations of 
speed or simultaneity).147 
 
One final issue remains in this connection: the attitude of modernists to capitalist 
modernity. ‘Generally it is right to stress that modernism was no simple rejection of 
modernity; it was rather a reaction, a critical response to it,’ writes Krishan Kumar. As we 
have already seen, it was possible to critically embrace modernity from diametrically 
opposed political positions.  According to Kumar, for the Futurists and Constructivists, 
‘modern society was not modern enough’: ‘It was ‘inauthentically’ modern. It was too 
cautious, too cowardly, to accept all the implications of modernity. It preferred to harbour 
past relics, so preventing the realization of modernity’s full potential.’148 These attitudes 
extended beyond the Italian and Russian representatives of modernism: they could be found 
in Weimar Germany, for example: ‘What Gropius taught, and what most Germans did not 
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want to learn, was the lesson of Bacon and Descartes and the Enlightenment: that one must 
confront the world and dominate it and that the cure for the ills of modernity is more, and the 
right kind of modernity.’149 
Not every modernism embraced modernity and wished to extend it. Modernists in 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ireland – in every sense the most ‘Western’ society in 
the colonial world – took a quite different perspective. Eagleton describes it as 
‘stratified…made up of disparate time scales. Its history was differentiated rather than 
homogenous, as the anglicised and atavistic existed side by side, and a commercialised 
agriculture still bore a few quasi-feudal traces.’ This is a by-now-familiar exercise in 
identifying an example of uneven and combined development without using the actual 
concept; for, as Eagleton makes clear, the two temporalities of Irish life did not simply co-
exist in separate life worlds: ‘…what is afoot in nineteenth-century Ireland, with the 
cataclysm of the Famine, the agricultural revolution, the sharp decline of the language and the 
sea changes in popular culture, is the transformation within living memory of a social order in 
some ways quite traditional, and so a peculiarly shocking collision of the customary and the 
contemporary.’ The intrusion of capitalist modernity was associated with British colonial 
power and its local agents, and as a consequence: ‘The modernist sensibility [in Ireland] is 
not of course synonymous with modernity. On the contrary, it is its sworn enemy, hostile to 
that stately march of secular reason which was precisely, for many a nineteenth-century Irish 
nationalist, where a soulless Britain had washed up.’ Modernism in this context was ‘a last 
ditch resistance to mass commodity culture’.150 Or to put it in Greenberg’s terms, the struggle 
between avant-garde and kitsch expressed in terms of nationalist resistance to imperialism.  
What this example suggests is that the attitude of modernists to modernity is less to do 
with left-right oppositions within nation-states, but where these nation-states (actual or 
aspirant) are situated within the structured inequality of the capitalist system in its imperialist 
stage. And that, in turn, inevitably leads us to the question of the state. 
 
 
2.3. Capitalist States and Bourgeois Hegemony 
 
All societies which have undergone the impact of factories and cities have experienced 
uneven and combined development to some degree, with the important exception of England, 
which completed the transition to capitalism before these processes began. Why then have 
they had such different outcomes, above all with respect to their propensity for revolution? 
According to David Armstrong, uneven and combined development:  
 
…has no real explanatory power when it comes to understanding why some societies 
experience revolution while others, apparently very similar societies do not; why some quite 
different societies experience fairly similar revolutions and why some similar societies had 
rather different revolutionary experiences.151  
 
I think the concept can be defended against these challenges. First, Trotsky never claimed 
that all revolutionary situations were or would be the result of uneven and combined 
development: the working class insurgencies which convulsed Britain in 1919, France in 
1968 or Poland in 1980-1 do not require the concept in order to be understood. Second, even 
where revolutionary situations were made more likely by the existence of uneven and 
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combined development, it is scarcely the only relevant factor; some decisive trigger event 
such as wartime defeat (Germany 1918), military coup (Spain 1936), external aggression 
(Hungary 1956), or economic crisis (Egypt 2011) is usually necessary to detonate the socially 
combustible material. Whether these situations develop into actual revolutions, and whether 
these revolutions are subsequently successful is partly dependent on subjective factors – such 
as the existence and quality of leadership – on both sides. Equally important, however, is the 
political context in which revolutionary situations arise; in particular, whether the state is pre-
capitalist or capitalist or in nature and, if the latter, whether or not the ruling class is capable 
of exercising hegemony. These questions make reference to another, overlapping discussion 
in the Classical Marxist tradition unavoidable.  
Between the victory of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the defeat of the Chinese 
Revolution in 1927 Trotsky tended to treat the question of permanent revolution as an 
essentially historical one, relevant only to Russia, which he seems to have considered as sui 
generis, uniquely situated exactly half-way between West and East, as he explained in this 
speech from early in the 1920s: 
 
We Russians find ourselves – in terms both of sociology and geography – on the border-line 
between those countries which possess colonies and those which are themselves colonies. We 
are a colony in the sense that our largest factories in Petrograd, in Moscow and in the South 
were obtained by us ready-made from the hands of European and American finance capital 
which formerly drew off the profits. That a Russian industrial capitalist was merely a third-rate 
agent of world finance capitalism – this fact tended immediately to invest the struggle of the 
Russian worker with an international revolutionary character. Russian workers had before their 
eyes: on the one hand, the combined money-bags of Russia, France, Belgium, etc.; and on the 
other – the backward peasant masses, entangled in semi-feudal agricultural relations. At one 
and the same time we thus had in our country both London and India. This, despite all our 
backwardness, brought us flush up against European and world tasks in their most developed 
historical forms.152 
 
Permanent revolution was unnecessary in the West where the bourgeois revolution had been 
accomplished and inapplicable in the East where the working class was not yet of sufficient 
size or militancy to move directly to the socialist revolution; in the East, Lenin’s original 
formula for Russia, the bourgeois-democratic – now rechristened ‘national-democratic’ – 
revolution was still relevant. Stalin’s disastrous adherence to this supposedly necessary stage 
of the revolution in China led Trotsky to generalise the strategy of permanent revolution 
beyond Russia, but also provoked him into formulating uneven and combined development 
as an explicit ‘law’, rather than an implicit but untheorized set of conditions which made 
permanent revolution possible.153 Thereafter, he tended to regard countries where some level 
of capitalist industrialisation had occurred, but which were still subject to pre-capitalist states 
of one sort or another, as subject to uneven and combined development and consequently as 
possible sites of permanent revolution. He did not, however, ever consider whether uneven 
and combined development might also exist in the West, except perhaps as a historical 
phenomenon long since surpassed; he wrote, for example, of the consequences ‘when the 
productive forces of the metropolis, of a country of classical capitalism...find ingress into 
more backward countries, like Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century’.154     
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At one level this geographical delimitation was unsurprising. One of the major debates in 
the Communist International, while it was still a forum for genuine debate (1919-1924), was 
the extent to which the more advanced countries – above all, Germany – required different 
strategy and tactics from those which had proved successful in Russia. The initial view of the 
Bolshevik leadership was that assumptions about the universal applicability of the Russian 
experience were deeply problematic. Karl Radek, for example, wrote in The Development of 
the World Revolution and the Tactics of the Communist Parties in the Struggle for the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1919): ‘The illusion of a quick victory arose from the 
incorrect interpretation of the lessons of the Russian Revolution, the conditions of which, 
although within an identical historical framework, were by no means the same as those of the 
European revolution.’155 The West was different from Russia in two key respects: on the one 
hand, it lacked a revolutionary peasantry, but on the other hand it possessed a more confident, 
experienced bourgeoisie and a far stronger reformist tradition. The conclusions were drawn 
by Lenin the following year in ‘Left-Wing Communism – an Infantile Disorder’ (1920):  
 
The whole difficulty of the Russian revolution is that it was much easier for the Russian 
revolutionary working class to start than it was for the West-European classes, but it is much 
more difficult for us to continue. It is more difficult to start a revolution in West-European 
countries because there the revolutionary proletariat is opposed by the higher thinking that 
comes with culture, and the working class is in a state of cultural slavery.156  
 
However, from around the time Lenin’s article was published, the direction of Bolshevik and 
Comintern leaderships began to move firmly away from this kind of differentiation towards 
an ever-greater emphasis on the universal significance of the Russian experience, including, 
in Lenin’s own work.157 There seems to have been two reasons for this reversal.  
One was the need to counter the twin problems of centrism and ultra-leftism within the 
Comintern. The former downplayed or the need for a revolutionary strategy on the grounds 
that Western parliamentary democracy rendered an insurrectionary overthrow of the state 
unnecessary; the latter tended to reject Bolshevik tactics – above all the united front and 
participation in parliamentary elections – on opposite grounds, namely that under Western 
conditions these would simply lead to a strengthening of reformism; both in their different 
ways started from the differences between the West and Russia, which in turn led the 
Bolsheviks to minimise them. This was justified in relation to centrist vacillations, but the 
problem was that the Dutch, German and Italian ‘ultra-left’ had a serious point, however 
misguided were the political conclusions they drew from it.158 Here, for example, is 
Pannekoek: 
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The German experience brings us face to face with the major problem of the revolution in 
Western Europe. In these countries, the old bourgeois mode of production and the centuries-old 
civilisation which has developed with it have completely impressed themselves upon the 
thoughts and feelings of the popular masses. Hence, the mentality and inner character of the 
masses here is quite different from that in the countries of the East, who have not experienced 
the rule of bourgeois culture; and this is what distinguishes the different courses that the 
revolution has taken in the East and the West.159 
 
A second reason for Bolshevik denial of Western difference was the conflation of the issue 
with another: the universal need for Communist Parties on the Russian model. This was a 
powerful argument, since the only country to have developed this kind of organisation was 
also the only one to have achieved a successful revolution, but it did not require pretending 
that there were no significant differences between Russia and the West. Indeed, in the 
absence of the socially explosive situation produced by uneven and combined development in 
Russia, it might have been argued that the revolutionary party is actually more important in 
the West, not least in developing and maintaining working class consciousness. The point is 
rather that organisational forms and revolutionary strategies have to be appropriate to the 
situations in which the former have to operate and the latter have to be advanced. 
 In any event, even before the consolidation of Stalinism in the late 1920s, there were no 
longer serious attempt within the ‘official’ Communist movement to argue for different 
strategy and tactics in the West than in Russia. When the argument did revive, it did so from 
the inside of the fascist prisons in which Trotsky’s great contemporary, Antonio Gramsci, 
was incarcerated from late 1926. Gramsci was aware of the similarities between Italy and 
Russia, as he wrote the year of his arrest: ‘The proletariat has even greater importance in Italy 
than in other European countries, even of a more advanced capitalist nature: it is comparable 
only to that which existed in Russia before the Revolution.”160 Gramsci shifted his position to 
one which, while not retreating from his estimation of Italian working-class militancy, was 
instead concerned with explaining why the outcome of the class struggle had been so 
different from that in Russia – and not only in Italy.  
 Around the same time that Trotsky was formulating the law of uneven and combined 
development, Gramsci was criticising the very strategy of permanent revolution which it was 
designed to explain, in lines which have perhaps become the most famous in the Prison 
Notebooks, and which summarise his revised position:  
 
In the East, the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, 
there was a proper relationship between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a 
sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind 
which there was a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from 
one State to the next, it goes without saying – but this precisely necessitated an accurate 
reconnaissance of each individual country.161 
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In his critique of this passage, Anderson accepted the distinction between East and West but 
argued that it was not in fact the greater strength of civil society which distinguished the West 
from the East, but nature of the state. According to Anderson, it was Gramsci’s comrade 
Bordiga – another of the ‘ultra-lefts’ – who more accurately understood ‘the essential twin 
character of the capitalist state’:   
 
…it was stronger than the Tsarist State, because it rested not only on the consent of the masses, 
but also on a superior repressive apparatus. In other words, it is not the mere ‘extent’ of the 
State that defines its location in the structure of power (what Gramsci elsewhere called 
‘Statolatry’), but also its efficacy. The repressive apparatus of any modern capitalist State is 
inherently superior to that of Tsarism, for two reasons. Firstly, because the Western social 
formations are much more industrially advanced, and this technology is reflected in the 
apparatus of violence itself. Secondly, because the masses typically consent to this State in the 
belief that they exercise government over it. It therefore possesses a popular legitimacy of a far 
more reliable character for the exercise of this repression than did Tsarism in its decline, 
reflected in the greater discipline and loyalty of its troops and police – juridically the servants, 
not of an irresponsible autocrat, but of an elected assembly.162 
 
As we shall see, Anderson was right to draw attention to the extent of the differences between 
capitalist and pre-capitalist states (and ‘Tsarism’ can act as a synonym for all the different 
varieties of the latter) and these have to be incorporated into any discussion of uneven and 
combined development. He is at least partly wrong, however, about the nature of those 
differences.163  
First, capitalist states do indeed have greater repressive powers than their pre-capitalist 
forerunners or contemporaries. One of Gramsci’s more accurate recent admirers, Ranajit 
Guha, has pointed to ‘the absurdity of an uncoercive state’.164 This is not, however, their only 
distinguishing characteristic. Equally important is their flexibility, which enables them to 
make gradual structural reforms in ways that pre-capitalist states, of the sort which existed in 
Trotsky’s lifetime and for several decades after his death, were not; the latter consequently 
had to be either overthrown by revolution, or destroyed in war. The same type of flexibility is 
also constitutive of contemporary capitalist states, even those in the Global South or former 
‘East’. However backward they may be in many other respects, they have a far greater 
capacity for absorption and renovation under pressure. Jeff Goodwin’s ‘state-centred’ 
approach identifies a number of ‘practices’ or ‘characteristics’ which can make the 
emergence of revolutionary movements or situations less likely. The most relevant to our 
discussion is ‘political inclusion’, which: 
 
…discourages the sense that the state is unreformable or an instrument of a narrow class or 
clique and, accordingly, needs to be fundamentally overhauled. … Accordingly, neither liberal 
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populist polities nor authoritarian yet inclusionary (for example) ‘populist’ regimes have 
generally been challenged by powerful revolutionary movements.165 
 
If the states in question need not be ‘democratic’, then this suggests a second difficulty with 
Anderson’s argument, namely his claim that representative institutions in and of themselves 
form a second ‘bulwark’ against overthrow. The role of democracy had been emphasised 
during the debates in the early 1920s. Here, for example, is Paul Levi responding to the 
idiocies of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), one of which 
was to assume a false identity between German and Russian conditions:  
 
Here the proletariat faces a fully developed bourgeoisie, and confronts the political 
consequences of the development of the bourgeoisie, i.e. democracy, and under democracy, or 
what is understood as democracy under the rule of the bourgeoisie, the organisational form of 
the workers takes different forms from the state-form of agricultural feudalism, which is 
absolutism.166  
 
The significance of democracy is, however, not so great as it might first appear. In fact, if we 
take bourgeois democracy to involve, at a minimum, a representative government elected by 
the adult population, where votes have equal weight and can be exercised without 
intimidation by the state, then it is a relatively recent development in the history of 
capitalism.167 Indeed, in the context of his discussion of modernity, Anderson himself noted 
that down to the close of the Second World War: ‘In no European state was bourgeois 
democracy completed as a form, or the labour movement integrated or co-opted as a force.’168 
Far from being intrinsic to bourgeois society, representative democracy has largely been 
introduced by pressure from the working class and extended by pressure from the oppressed. 
The authors of an important study of the relationship between capitalism and democracy are 
therefore right to reject any automatic correspondence between the two:  
 
It was not the capitalist market nor capitalists as the new dominant force, but the contradictions of 
capitalism that advanced the cause of democracy. … The relationship between working-class 
strength and democracy may be summarised in the following way: a diachronic analysis within 
each of the Western European countries reveals that the growth of working-class organizational 
strength led to increased pressure for the introduction of democracy; a synchronic analysis reveals 
that these pressures led to the development of stable democratic regimes where the working class 
found allies in other social groups.169  
 
It is true that that mass suffrage has not proved as dangerous to capitalism as the bourgeoisie 
initially feared it would; but recognizing this does not involve accepting the much more 
sweeping claim that it is the main source of popular legitimacy for the capitalist state. Most 
capitalist states in the West and the system over which they presided were afforded 
legitimacy by their working classes before the vote was extended to them. In the case of 
Britain, the Representation of the People Act which finally introduced suffrage for all men 
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and women over the age of 21 was only passed in 1928, two years before Gramsci composed 
his note.  
 The key factor in securing the adherence of the subaltern is surely not democracy, but the 
concept most closely associated with Gramsci, hegemony, which may include democratic 
institutions, but not necessarily so. Above all, it is not exercised solely through the state, as 
Peter Thomas explains: 
 
A class’s hegemonic apparatus is the wide-ranging series of articulated institutions (understood 
in the broadest sense) and practices – from newspapers to educational organisations to political 
parties – by means of which a class and its allies engage their opponents in a struggle for 
political power. This concept traverses the boundaries of the so-called public (pertaining to the 
state) and the private (civil society), to include all initiatives by which a class concretizes its 
hegemonic project in an integral sense.170 
 
These are some of the mechanisms through which hegemony is maintained; its content 
need not be wholehearted endorsement of capitalism. As Jeremy Lister notes:  
 
Capitalism is not maintained by a mass popular affirmation or affection for what the system 
objectively produces for society as a whole; it is maintained by the way it has hitherto 
marginalised alternatives against it, a “better the devil you know” kind of common sense 
attitude, which in turn promotes a notion of apathy and disinterestedness in the very possibility 
of change.  
 
In this context all that capitalism requires to do is maintain a majority of the working class in 
circumstances which are bearable compared to the imaginable alternatives, and as Lister 
points out, those for whom it is not bearable, ‘often lack the conceptual and linguistic tools to 
understand their position in this system, let alone do anything about it.’171 One reason why an 
irreplaceable component of capitalist hegemony is nationalism, both as a source of psychic 
compensation and means of political mobilisation, is to prevent the most oppressed and 
exploited from acquiring the tools of which Lister writes.172  
 The social and cultural experiences produced by uneven and combined development were 
similar across East and West, albeit to different degrees, but the class adversary and 
consequently the nature of the state was quite different. Guha once described colonial India 
as a situation involving ‘dominance without hegemony’, but this could be found throughout 
the East.173 In a sense, it is where uneven and combined development is present but 
hegemony is absent that the conditions for permanent revolution arose. This in turn suggests 
that there is no necessary connection between uneven and combined development and 
permanent revolution, as the former existed throughout much of the West, outside of North-
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These discussions of modernity, modernism and hegemony may seem to have taken us some 
distance from uneven and combined development, but in fact they constitute a necessary 
basis for understanding the full implications for those societies – the vast majority – which 
have been subject to it. In concrete terms, the concept of uneven and combined development 
should help us explain why – to pick two wildly different example – former peasants from the 
Staritski uezd in Tver’ province could become the driving force behind the factory committee 
of the Baltic shipyard in Petrograd, and why former black sharecroppers from Clarksdale in 
the Mississippi Delta could create the electric blues in the South Side of Chicago. In this part 
I will sketch the impact of uneven and combined development in the West which began some 
decades earlier than in Russia, but for the most part, and in most cases, occurs 
contemporaneously. There is, of course, one major exception, to which I will turn first: 
England    
 
 
3.  CARTOGRAPHIES AND CHRONOLOGIES 
 
3.1. The English Exception 
 
Memoirs of individuals who lived in England through most of the nineteenth century often 
reflect on the scale of the transformation which occurred during that period. The historian 
Godwin Smith, for example, recalled the difference between the town of Reading at the time 
of his birth in 1823 and on the eve of the First World War. At the former date:  
 
It is a very quiet place. The mail-coaches travelling on the Bath road at the marvellous rate of 
twelve miles an hour change horses at The Crown and the Bear. So do the travelling carriages 
and post-chaises of the wealthier wayfarer. The watchman calls the hour of the night. From the 
tower of old St. Lawrence's Church the curfew is tolled. My nurse lights the fire with the tinder-
box. Over at Caversham a man is sitting in the stocks. … From this state of things I have lived 
into an age of express-trains, ocean greyhounds, electricity, bicycles, globe-trotting, Evolution, 
the Higher Criticism, and general excitement and restlessness. Reading has shared the progress. 
The Reading of my boyhood has disappeared almost over the horizon of memory.174 
 
Yet England had completed the transition to capitalism over a century before Smith was 
born and these changes began. It was not, of course, the only territory to have done so, as it 
was preceded by both the Italian city-states and the Netherlands.175 Capitalist relations of 
production were considerably more highly developed in England than in either of these, but 
England was also able to absorb their genuine innovations and those of states which failed to 
make the transition, then put them to more effective use than in their places of origin, a 
process for which the possession of an effective capitalist state apparatus was essential. As 
Marx noted in the chapter from Capital on ‘The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist’:  
 
The different moments of primitive accumulation can be ascertained in particular to Spain, 
Portugal, Holland, France and England, in more or less chronological order. These different 
moments are systematically combined together at the end of the seventeenth century in 
England; the combination embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system, and 
the system of protection.176 
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This is not ‘combination’ in Trotsky’s sense, however, as all the forms referred to by Marx 
are ‘contemporary’. 
Recognising the uniqueness of England at this time should not lead us to exaggerate the 
immediate impact of the transition to capitalism in the countryside there. ‘Englishmen and 
women did not know that they had crossed a barrier that divided them from their own past 
and from every other contemporary society’, writes Joyce Appleby.177 For well into the 
eighteenth century labour in the English countryside under the capitalist mode of production, 
whether in agriculture or handicraft production, was still carried out in the natural daylight 
hours and – in the case of the first, at any rate – according to the rhythms of the farming 
seasons, within the framework of long-established customary rights and traditions. Edward 
Thompson famously discussed plebeian resistance ‘in the name of custom’ to ‘innovation in 
the capitalist process’ which is ‘most often experienced by the plebs in the form of 
exploitation, or the expropriation of customary use-rights, or the violent disruption of valued 
patterns of work and leisure’: ‘Hence the plebeian culture is rebellious, but rebellious in 
defence of custom.’178 By the latter half of the eighteenth-century this rebelliousness was 
therefore not resistance to capitalism, but a reaction to the transition from the ‘formal’ to the 
‘real’ subsumption of labour. In this respect, only the Northern states of the US, particularly 
those on the North-Eastern seaboard, underwent a comparable development to that of 
England. There too an established agrarian capitalist economy, under an existing bourgeois 
regime, made the transition to industrial capitalism, initially, as Charles Post has detailed, 
with industry servicing the farming sector in what was effectively an ‘agro-industrial 
complex’.179 It is unsurprising therefore that in these areas within the US the class struggle 
also took the form of a defence of an earlier form of socio-economic life, although this lasted 
later into the nineteenth century than it did in England.180  
The move from field or cottage to the factory as a workplace constitutive of real 
subsumption is one of the most unsettling and disorientating experiences human beings can 
collectively undergo. Sydney Pollard has written of the process by which the English were 
transformed into industrial wage labourers:  
 
The worker who left the background of his domestic workshop or peasant holding for the 
factory entered a new culture as well as a new sense of direction. It was not only that ‘the new 
economic order needed…part humans: soulless. Depersonalized, disembodied, who could 
become members, or little wheels rather, of a complex mechanism’. It was also that men who 
were non-accumulative, non-acquisitive, accustomed to work for subsistence, not for 
maximization of income, had to be made obedient to the cash stimulus, and obedient in such a 
way as to react precisely to the stimuli provided.181 
 
To make the experience even more disruptive of previous forms of life, labour increasingly 
took place in an urban context. As Engels noted in 1845, previously, the workers had been 
‘shut off from the towns, which they never entered, their yarn and woven stuff being 
delivered to travelling agents for payment of wages – so shut off that old people who lived 
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quite in the neighbourhood of the town never went thither until they were robbed of their 
trade by the introduction of machinery and obliged to look about them in the towns for work 
– the weavers stood upon the moral and intellectual plane of the yeomen with whom they 
were usually immediately connected through their little holdings’.182 In this and preceding 
passages Engels may be guilty of over-romanticising country life, but his summary of the 
conditions to which they were subsequently subject in Manchester cannot be accused of 
exaggeration: ‘In a word, we must confess that in the working-men's dwellings of 
Manchester, no cleanliness, no convenience, and consequently no comfortable family life is 
possible; that in such dwellings only a physically degenerate race, robbed of all humanity, 
degraded, reduced morally and physically to bestiality, could feel comfortable and at 
home.’183  
 Thompson noted that ‘industrialization is necessarily painful’ involving as it did ‘the 
erosion of traditional patterns of life; but adds to this general assessment that ‘it was carried 
through with exceptional violence in Britain’.184 Thompson’s reassertion of the ‘cataclysmic’ 
view of the English industrial revolution is defensible in the context of a discussion which 
sought to overturn the economistic vulgarity of the ‘standard of living’ debate, but does not 
require that we regard that country as having undergone a uniquely traumatic experience. 
Indeed, as Craig Calhoun has pointed out, when we consider the experience of India, Africa 
the USSR and even the USA, his claim for the singularity of the English experience in 
relation to both physical and ‘psychic’ violence is extremely difficult to uphold: ‘Where are 
the mass shootings, for physical violence, and the prison camps and utter defeats, for psychic 
violence?’185 For our purposes, the point of distinguishing the English experience from that of 
what Thompson used to call Other Countries is not the respective severity of their 
industrialisations, but why the experience did not lead to the same type of revolutionary 
upheavals which were to convulse Petrograd and Shanghai a hundred years later.186 There 
was certainly a high level of class struggle in Britain between the 1790s and 1840s but, with 
the possible exception of 1831-2, at no point was there a revolutionary threat to the state.  
 Nor did English conditions produce a local modernist movement, as can be seen in we 
take one of the few painters working in the period of English industrialisation which might 
plausibly be categorised in this way: J. M. W. Turner (1775-1851). During the last 15 years 
of his life in particular, Turner made his subject, not industrialisation as such, but rather the 
fossil-fuel powered transport which made it possible, above all steamboats and trains. A 
sense of how unusual this was in his national context can be gathered from the assessment by 
Nikolaus Pevsner – Hungarian-born but in most respects a naturalised Englishman – who 
described Turner’s world as ‘a fantasmagoria’ and his work as ‘irrational’: ‘Turner’s position 
in English art is indeed baffling from whatever point of view one considers it – also from that 
of his Englishness.’187 During the same year (1955) as Pevsner was expressing his 
bafflement, Greenberg was equally dismissive, albeit for different reasons: ‘Turner was 
actually the first painter to break with the European tradition of value painting’, he wrote of 
Turner’s later paintings. Despite describing them as ‘atmospheric’, however, ultimately he 
regards them as merely ‘picturesque’, a verdict endorsed by their popularity with a public 
which would not have expected his intangible subject matter – clouds, rain, mist, sea – to be 
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rendered with ‘definite shape or form’: ‘what we today take for a daring abstractness on 
Turner’s part was accepted then as another feat of naturalism’.188 Here Greenberg is judging 
Turner against his own assumptions about the necessity for modernism in the visual arts to 
necessarily involve an increasing shift from resemblance (‘representation’) towards 
abstraction. Turner’s later work is however neither a regression towards naturalism nor a 
prototype of abstraction, but an attempt to express his response to mechanisation in a way 
similar to the Italian Futurists, with boats and trains as his subject rather than automobiles. 
Rain, Steam and Rail – the Great Western Railway (1844) is not primarily about H2O in its 
various forms, but about the intrusion of modernity into nature in the shape of the train, the 
rail bridge which it necessitates and the city of London, looming indistinctly in the 
background of the picture, from which it has emerged. In Turner’s most famous and popular 
painting, The Fighting Temeraire tugged to her last berth to be broken up (1838), the 
symbolism could not be more obvious: the steam-powered tug (representing the mundane but 
functioning modernity) pulls a ghostly ship from the age of sail (representing the heroic but 
outmoded past) towards its final dismemberment.  
Turner’s intimations of modernism are all the more startling for their almost complete 
isolation. Paul Wood notes the influence Turner had on the French Impressionists: 
 
But in a British context, such artistic radicalism was isolated, even idiosyncratic. Turner’s Rain, 
Steam and Speed…a dynamic image of the modern if there ever was one, was painted in the 
1840s, 30 years before comparable studies of Gare St Lazare by Claude Monet...in Paris. But in 
Britain Turner’s example gave rise to no school.  
 
Wood concludes that ‘something seems to have restrained British artists from the innovations 
embarked on in France’.189 Steve Edwards similarly writes of British painters in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, that ‘something about English society prevented them from finding 
a way to make ambivalence and incoherence suggestive of modern experience; from making 
a moral dilemma from uncertainty’:  
 
Modernity is depicted in the British art of the period, but modernist form doesn’t really break 
the surface. In France, the ongoing clash between traditional ways of life and the rapid 
transformations of Paris and other urban centres made these changes available for 
representation.  
 
As Edwards stresses, the point is not that Britain (or more precisely, England) was free from 
conflict – we have already seen that this was not the case – but rather that the capitalist 
modernity was so embedded as to produce a sense of familiarity, it ‘had come to seem 
natural’ and ‘this made it more difficult to depict modern society as bewildering or awkward, 
simultaneously exhilarating and horrifying’.190 The determining nature of context is nicely 
illustrated by a conversation from the beginning of the twentieth century reported in the 
biography of Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957). It is important to remember here that Lewis was 
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one of the very few native English modernists. When Filippo Marinetti (1876-1944) tried to 
claim him for Futurism, Lewis replied: 
 
‘Not too bad,’ I said. ‘It has its points. But you Wops insist too much on the Machine. You’re 
always on about these driving-belts, you are always exploding about internal combustion. 
We’ve has machines here in England for a donkey’s years. They’re no novelty to us. 
 
To which Marinetti responded: 
 
‘You have never understood your machines! You have never known the ivresse of travelling at 
a kilometre a minute. Have you ever travelled a kilometre a minute?’ 
 
Lewis had not, nor had he any wish to.191  
 The dominant theme in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century English art and literature – 
including that produced by socialists – is a rejection of both modernity and modernism. 
Alasdair MacIntyre once commented:  
 
There have been since the industrial revolution in Britain two main critiques of our form 
of life. One was the romantic protest against capitalist ugliness whose culmination is in 
Lawrence and Leavis. The other was the socialist protest. William Morris held them 
together in his own day: it is a prime victory of bourgeois ideology to have kept them apart 
ever since.192  
 
But if we look at the socialist future envisaged by Morris, it is described in the subtitle of his 
most famous novel as ‘an epoch of rest’:    
 
‘You see, guest, this is not an age of inventions. The last epoch did all that for us, and we are 
now content to use as much of its inventions as we find handy, and leaving alone those which 
we don’t want.’ … ‘In the half-century that followed the Great Change…it began to be 
noteworthy: machine after machine was quietly dropped under the excuse that machines could 
not produce works of art, and that works of art were more and more called for.”193   
 
This constitutes the main exception to the socialist and indeed Marxist conception of 
socialism representing a new form of modernity. Raymond Williams wrote of Morris that, 
 
…what the representation of discontinuity typically produces is a notion of social simplicity 
which is untenable. The extent to which the idea of socialism is attached to simplicity is 
counter-productive. It seems to me that the break towards socialism can only be towards an 
unimaginably greater complexity.194  
 
England, or more precisely, London was a subject of modernist writing – think of Eliot’s 
‘Unreal City’ in The Waste Land (1922) – and a provided a destination for modernist writers 
from outside Britain, like James, Pound and Eliot himself from the USA, Conrad from Poland 
or Yeats from Ireland. What Malcolm Bradbury calls, ‘a distinguishable English brand of 
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Modernism’, was much more a literal sense of writing expressive of a new ‘Modern’ era after 
‘the era of Victorianism was ending, [and] a new phase in society, art and thought beginning’, 
than expressive of the tension between the archaic and the modern.195 The reason why 
capitalist modernity in England produced neither a social nor artistic revolutionary movement 
lies with the two unique conditions under which industrialisation and urbanisation took place.  
 First, the capitalist state in England was consolidated at the completion of the bourgeois 
revolution in 1688, at a time when its economy was still dominated by agrarian, mercantile 
and financial capital. None of the other early capitalist states achieved this. The Italian city-
states refused to unite and indeed were involved in ferocious competition with each other 
which left them exposed to conquest and enforced regression at the hands of local feudal 
lords and ultimately the Spanish Empire by the beginning of the sixteenth century. The 
United Netherlands, although formally a unified state even before the revolt against Spain in 
1567, did not possess an integrated economy, but rather a highly fragmented one in which 
competition between cities and provinces was unimpeded. More importantly, in this context, 
the state itself remained resolutely decentralised and unable to pursue initiatives in the 
interest of Dutch capital as a whole, with power lying in regional governments which tended 
to be dominated by particular capitalist banking and mercantile interests.196 It was, as 
Anderson points out, ‘a hybrid between a city-state and a nation-state’.197 As a result, 
industrialisation in both areas was largely postponed until nation-states were finally 
consolidated in the mid-nineteenth century. Industrialisation in England, however, arose 
within the context of a society where the state was already dedicated to the accumulation of 
capital, and that state had a far greater capacity for absorption and renovation under pressure 
than rival pre-capitalist states. As Norman Stone notes of the English – later British – 
bourgeoisie, in whose interests the state acted: 
 
In Great Britain, that class existed so strongly, even in the eighteenth century, that liberal 
reforms were introduced piecemeal there, and often without formal involvement of parliament. 
Existing ancien-régime institutions, such as the old guilds or corporations, would be gradually 
adapted to suit a changing era. Thus, in form, England (more than Scotland) is the last of the 
ancien régimes; she did not even have a formal law to abolish serfdom.198  
 
In other words, while Britain, or perhaps England, appeared to represent an ancien regime 
(‘in form’) this concealed what was actually a supremely adaptive modernity, which is only 
now reaching its limits.199 As I noted in Part 2, the absorbent character of the English state 
had had nothing to do with democracy as such: no section of the working class was granted 
the vote until after industrialisation and urbanisation were well advanced. It is rather that, on 
the one hand, the different sections of the ruling class were fundamentally united and 
presided over a series of protective structures and enabling institutions which had developed 
over a prolonged period of time. This did not simply involve repression or control: 
confronted by major working class insurgency they were collectively prepared to make 
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gradual compromises over non-essentials rather than risk losing what meant most to them: 
their capital. 
 Second, the internal pressures to which England was subject were in any case more 
containable than in later-developing states because of the extended timescale in which 
industrialisation took place. At least in part this was because it faced no real economic 
competition in capitalist terms until the latter third of the nineteenth century and was 
therefore not subject to the types of pressure to which all other subsequent developers, with 
the exception of the United States, were subject. As Pollard writes: ‘Unlike the experience of 
the following countries which were faced with a fairly comprehensive package of mutually 
reinforcing changes, the British [sic] evolution was slow, piecemeal and unconscious, in the 
sense of being unperceived as a whole.’200 Consequently, notwithstanding the significance of 
industrialisation, even it did not have an immediately transformative impact on every aspect 
of social life. This is partly because the effects were cumulative and partly because, initially 
at least, industrialisation took place within a broader pre-existing non-industrial context as 
Jonathan Crary explains: 
 
Modernity, contrary to its popular connotations, is not the world in a sweepingly transformed 
state. Rather... it is the hybrid and dissonant experience of living intermittently within 
modernized spaces and needs, and yet simultaneously inhabiting the remnants of pre-capitalist 
life-worlds, whether social or natural. ... Factory manufacturing, for example, did not abruptly 
extinguish the long-standing diurnal rhythms and social ties of agrarian milieus. Instead there 
was an extended period of coexistence during which rural life was incrementally dismantled or 
subsumed into new processes.201 
 
The gradual, dispersed and unplanned nature of the process in England had implications for 
both the structure of the working class and the nature of the class struggle, both of which are 
in stark contrast to the forms these took later under actual conditions of uneven and combined 
development. Workplaces remained relatively small until very late in the nineteenth century, 
not least in London. As a result, trade union struggles were typically defensive of traditional 
or at least transitional forms of labour.202 This was one of the reasons Trotsky identified for 
the greater implantation of Marxism among the working classes of Russia than in that of Britain. 
In the case of Russia itself,  
 
…the proletariat did not arise gradually through the ages, carrying with itself the burden of the 
past, as in England, but in leaps involving sharp changes of environment, ties, relations, and a 
sharp break with the past. It was just this – combined with the concentrated oppressions of 
czarism – that made Russian workers hospitable to the boldest conclusions of revolutionary 
thought – just as the backward industries were hospitable to the last word in capitalist 
organization.203  
 
Describing the situation prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917, Gareth Stedman Jones has 
contrasted ‘the revolutionary maturity of the Petrograd proletariat, uniquely concentrated in 
the most advanced factories of the capitalist world’ with Britain, ‘the most advanced 
capitalist country’, where ‘the structure of the metropolitan working class still looked back to 
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pre-industrial divisions of skill and status’: 'A few large plants were lost in an ocean of small 
workshops’.204 These conditions were productive of neither Bolsheviks nor Constructivists. 
Elsewhere in the West the effects of industrialisation and urbanisation would fall between the 
English and Russian extremes. 
 
  
3.2. The Western Origins of Uneven and Combined Development  
 
The most important new capitalist nation-states to follow Britain – the USA, Italy, Germany 
and Japan – unified (or re-unified) and consolidated themselves between 1848 and 1871. 
France achieved this slightly earlier – 1830 is the French 1688, in the sense of concluding the 
era of its bourgeois revolution; but French industrialisation takes place essentially within the 
same time frame as these later developers. These involved transitions to capitalism which 
were, as Robert Looker and David Coates put it, ‘virtually contemporaneous’ with 
industrialisation and urbanisation, rather than preceding them, as had been the case in 
England.205 The very existence of the British imperial state altered both the context for 
subsequent capitalist development and the pace with which it occurred. The latter was faster, 
partly because the long period of experiment and evolution characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon 
pioneer could be dispensed with, but partly because of the urgency involved in acquiring the 
attributes of capitalist modernity in the face of military and economic competition from 
Britain. In very compressed timescales these emerging rivals adopted Britain’s socio-
economic achievements to the extent that they became recognisably the same kind of 
societies, without necessarily reproducing every key characteristic – an impossible task 
anyway, given their very different histories and social structures. Harry Harootunian writes of 
Marx’s comments on German uneven development (in the ‘Preface to the First Edition’ of 
Capital Volume 1) that he ‘was proposing that capitalist modernization is inevitably destined 
to produce the co-presence of colliding temporalities, contemporary non-contemporaneities 
forcing people constantly to navigate their way through different temporal regimes as a 
condition of becoming modern’.206 The point is capable of being generalised beyond 
Germany: in fact, all of the second wave capitalist nation-states simultaneously faced in two 
directions, although usually inclining more towards one than the other.  
One direction was forward to conditions which would later emerge in Russia and to 
anticipations of permanent revolution. The increased tempo of development meant that the 
process of capitalist modernisation, and consequently the character of the class struggle, took 
respectively more intense and explosive forms – first of all in the country which was also 
geographically closest to England, and which since 1707 had been joined with it in the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain: Scotland. From the suppression of the last Jacobite attempt at 
counter-revolution in 1746 through to the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, Scottish 
society was marked by two processes, both in sharp contrast to the English experience: one 
was the extraordinary speed with which capitalist agriculture and the foundations of 
industrialisation was introduced in the Lowlands; the other was the concentrated 
effervescence of the Enlightenment, which was both a programme for agrarian transformation 
and a theorisation of the process. Even a society accelerating out of feudalism at this speed 
would however inevitably retain some of the characteristics of pre-existing conditions and 
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Jameson has correctly noted some of the implications, although as usual without identifying 
them as the results of uneven and combined development: 
 
Enlightenment Scotland is above all the space of a coexistence of radically distinct zones of 
production and culture: the archaic economy of the Highlanders and their clan system, the new 
agricultural exploitation of the Lowlands, the commercial vigour of the English ‘partner’ over 
the border, on the eve of its industrial ‘take-off’. The brilliance of Edinburgh is therefore not a 
matter of Gaelic genetic material, but rather owing to the strategic yet eccentric position of the 
Scottish metropolis and intellectuals with respect to this virtually synchronic coexistence of 
distinct modes of production, which it now uniquely fell to the Scottish Enlightenment to 
‘think’ or to conceptualize. Nor is this merely an economic matter: Scott, like Faulkner later on, 
inherits a social and historical raw material, a popular memory, in which the fiercest revolutions 
and civil and religious wars now inscribe the coexistence of modes of production in vivid 
narrative form.207 
 
One aspect of what Jameson calls ‘the co-existence of radically distinct zones of 
production and culture’ is the Highland/Lowland divide. This was not, however, the inert 
juxtaposition of two mutually sealed societies but their mutual interpenetration, first through 
the imposition of capitalist social relations on Highland land occupancy, then – a virtually 
inevitable consequence of this – the migration of now landless Highlanders into the 
industrialising Lowland towns and cities, above all to Glasgow. Migration was then and 
remains now one of the great catalysts for uneven and combined development. ‘Since most 
Europeans were rural, so were most migrants’, notes Hobsbawm of the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, and, while pointing out that some migrants exchanged ‘a poor agricultural 
milieu for a better one’, for the majority the most important fact was ‘their exodus from 
agriculture’: ‘Migration and urbanization went together, and in the second half of the 
nineteenth century the countries chiefly associated with it (the United States, Australia, 
Argentina) had a rate of urban concentration unsurpassed anywhere except in Britain and the 
industrial parts of Germany.’208 In this respect as in many others, Scotland was a forerunner 
for what was to follow more widely later, as external migration from Ireland was at least as 
significant as internal migration from the Highlands in providing the labour force for 
industrialisation.   
Although industrialisation took place more or less simultaneously in both England and 
Scotland, the latter largely ‘skipped the intervening stages’ between peasant self-sufficiency 
and wage labour which the former had experienced. ‘Scotland entered on the capitalist path 
later than England,’ wrote Trotsky in 1925, ‘a sharper turn in the life of the masses of the 
people gave rise to a sharper political reaction’.209 By the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, the enormous tensions produced by industrialisation were heightened by the 
repressive weight of undemocratic state forms retained from the Union of 1707 until the 
Great Reform Act of 1832. These tensions and expressed themselves in moments of sharp 
class struggle, above all the unsuccessful 1820 general strike for male suffrage, first such 
action in history, involving around 60,000 workers – a substantial section of the global 
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working class at the time – and two attempts at armed insurrection.210 However, because 
Scotland did make the transition to the ranks of the advanced societies, albeit as a component 
part of another national formation, the revolutionary moment passed – not because the 
tensions of uneven and combined development had all been resolved, but because after 1832 
a suitably adaptive state form had been extended to Scotland which was able to contain them. 
Uneven and combined development was resolved as uneven development, with Scotland as a 
whole ‘catching up and overtaking’ England, within the overall British social formation.  
The possibilities for proto-permanent revolution were sometimes retained at a local level 
even when nation-states (or stateless national territories like Scotland) attained overall 
‘developed’ status – particularly where backward areas were deliberately preserved at a level 
of development below that of society as a whole as a source of labour or raw materials, and 
then experienced rapid regional industrialisation and urbanisation. In so far as uneven and 
combined development could be found in the USA, for example, it was mainly in the ex-
Confederate states. As Ernest Mandel notes: 'They functioned as a reservoir of agricultural 
raw materials and as an “internal colony” in the sense that they formed a steady market for 
the industrial products of the North and did not develop any large-scale industry within their 
own territory (this was to change only with the Second World War)'.211 It is unsurprisingly 
then, that when forms of industrialization did finally arrive in the South immediately before 
the First World War, they gave rise to situations more typical of Saint Petersburg or Shanghai 
than Memphis, Tennessee. One such area was around the Alabama coalfields. According to 
Brian Kelly:  
 
The region presents an almost classical example of what Marxists have described as ‘combined 
and uneven development’: the turn-of-the-century South included a number of exceptional 
areas where large concentrations of industrial workers laboured in mills, foundries, and 
manufacturing plants on a par with the most advanced in the North, but these stood like frontier 
outposts of a new age in a region overwhelmingly steeped in primitive agriculture, in some 
places little-changed from the way it had been conducted in the antebellum period.212 
 
The other direction faced by the second wave nation-states was back to the English 
experience in the sense that they were able to accomplish the bourgeois revolution from 
above – 1688 being the model rather than 1640 or 1649 – and transform the state, albeit over 
a much more compressed period of time, in order to direct rapid industrialisation and contain 
the social tensions which it produced, often within the context of archaic socio-cultural 
forms.  The process is perhaps best illustrated by the only Asian country to undertake this 
form of development in the closing decades of the nineteenth century after the bourgeois 
revolution from above known to history as the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Trotsky wrote in 
the 1930s, ‘we observe even today...correlation between the bourgeois character of the state 
and the semifeudal character of the ruling caste.’213 The former outweighed the latter. Mark 
Elvin argued that ‘Japan does not have to become identical to the present-day West to be 
ranked as comparably “modern”.’214 Indeed – but we should note the similarities between the 
British and Japanese states after 1868, to which Christopher Bayly has drawn attention. 
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Between 1870 and 1914, both consciously emphasised the role of their monarch-emperors, 
the preexisting symbolism of the crown being used to represent national unity against two 
main challenges: external imperial rivalry and internal class divisions.215  Both were capitalist 
states that could be strongly contrasted with feudal absolutist Austria-Hungary or Russia, 
even down to the role of the emperor and empresses: ‘Russia represented the opposite pole to 
Japan within the spectrum of authoritarian monarchy – no corporate regime strategy, much 
depending on the monarch himself.’216 The state structure was crucial, as in many respects 
Japanese development was far more rapid than Russia’s, as Trotsky himself noted: 
 
Even late-developing Russia, which traversed the same historic course as the West in a much 
shorter length of time, needed three centuries to get from the liquidation of feudal isolation 
under Ivan the Terrible, through the Westernizing of Peter the Great, to the first liberal reforms 
of Alexander II. The so-called Meiji Restoration incorporated in a matter of a few decades the 
basic features of those three major eras in Russia's development. At such a forced pace, there 
could be no question of a smooth and even cultural development in all fields. Racing to achieve 
practical results with modern technology – especially military technology – Japan remained 
ideologically in the depths of the Middle Ages. The hasty mixture of Edison and Confucius has 
left its mark in all Japanese culture.217  
 
 The differences were sharply demonstrated by the Japanese victory over Russia in the war 
of 1904-5. Lenin welcomed the result, arguing that it clearly demonstrated the different class 
nature of the two states: 
 
Here again, as so often in history, the war between an advanced and a backward country has 
played a great revolutionary role. And the class-conscious proletariat, an implacable enemy of 
war – this inevitable and inseverable concomitant of all class rule in general – cannot shut its 
eyes to the revolutionary task which the Japanese bourgeoisie, by its crushing defeat of the 
Russian autocracy, is carrying out.218 
 
In effect, the post-Meiji Japanese state represented a way of containing the tensions 
created by uneven and combined development, even though these grew greater during and 
immediately after the First World War:  
 
The war signalled the transformation of the industrial base from light to concentrated heavy 
industries and the ceaseless migration of rural populations to the urban sites of factory 
production. … Critics, along the way, noted the sharp lines of unevenness between the newer, 
modern capitalist industries and the so-called traditional sectors, which, in the Meiji period, had 
grown concurrently and even complimentarily rather than competitively. But by 1920 and the 
succeeding years, the sharply silhouetted contrast was widely observed in the uneven 
relationship between the large metropolitan sites like Tokyo/Yokohama and Osaka/Kobe, 
which had literally been transformed overnight, and a countryside that supplied the cities with a 
labour force and capital but…received nothing in return. … Moreover, it brought new classes 
and an awareness of new identities and subject positions, and it expanded the possibilities for 
women in the labour market.219  
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If Japan is most extreme example of ‘contained’ uneven and combined development, all 
the states which emerged at the same time display similar characteristics, to one degree or 
another. Yet discussions of their trajectories tend to emphasise either the feudal archaism 
which they retained or the capitalist modernity which they embraced. In relation to the 
former, it is often suggested that archaism was expressed through military dictatorships (in 
the case of Japan) or fascist regimes (in the cases of Italy and Germany). Tom Nairn, for 
example, writes of Germany:  
 
In both situations, hastily created state-nations had dissolved a host of older countries – city and 
princely states, early-modern or even mediaeval kingdoms – in a way intended to be final, and 
which indeed still appeared to be so in the in the circumstances of the 1920s. … And yet the 
liberal-progressive unit, the grandly proclaimed wider identity, had clearly foundered. What 
way out was there but a drastic reformulation of that identity along illiberal-populist lines, 
emphasizing the things either denied or side-lined by the former unity regimes? 
 
Later we are reminded that ‘ethno-nationalism has normally had a powerfully rural or small-
town foundation’ and ‘how rural the Germany of Hitler and Heidegger was’.220 From the 
opposite perspective entirely, Zygmut Bauman argues that to treat the Nazi dictatorship and 
its dreadful consequences as an aspect of pre-modernity is in effect to avoid confronting our 
own culpability: ‘The Holocaust was born and executed in our modern rational society, at 
the high stage of civilization and the peak of human cultural achievement, and for this reason 
it is a problem of that society, civilization and culture.’221  
Neither position captures what ‘combination’ actually meant in Germany – or indeed any 
of the other countries which underwent comparable trajectories. As Richard Evans has 
pointed out, despite all that has been written about its ‘supposed backwardness’ on the eve of 
the First World War, including ‘its alleged deficit of civic values, its arguably antiquated 
social structure, its seemingly craven middle class and its apparently neo-feudal aristocracy’, 
it was not regarded in this way by contemporary observers, not least because ‘Germany was 
the Continent’s wealthiest, most powerful and most advanced economy’. This did not mean 
that no tensions had been produced by the onset of capitalist modernity:  
 
…beneath its prosperous and self-confident surface, the sheer pace of economic and social 
change was frightening and bewildering. Old values seemed to be disappearing in a welter of 
materialism and unbridled ambition. Modernist culture, from abstract painting to atonal music, 
added to the sense of disorientation… The old established hegemony of the Prussian landed 
aristocracy, which Bismarck had tried so hard to preserve, was undermined by the headlong 
rush of German society into the modern age. Bourgeois values, habits and modes of behaviour 
had triumphed in the upper and middle reaches of society by 1914; yet simultaneously they 
were being challenged by the growing self-assertion of the industrial working class, organized 
in the massive Social Democratic labour movement. Germany, unlike any other European 
country, had become a nation-state not before the industrial revolution, but at its height; and on 
the basis, not of a single state but of a federation of many different states whose German 
citizens were bound together principally by a common language, culture and ethnicity. Stresses 
and strains created by rapid industrialization interlocked with conflicting ideas about the nature 
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of the German state and nation and their place in the larger context of Europe and the world. 
German society did not enter nationhood in 1871 in a wholly stable condition. It was riven with 
rapidly deepening internal conflicts which were increasingly exported into the unresolved 
tensions of the political system that Bismarck had created.222 
 
One way of understanding the tensions within German society after 1871 is through the 
notion of ‘nonsynchronism’, first used by Ernest Bloch in 1932: ‘Germany in general…is, 
unlike England, and much less France, the classic land of non-synchronism, that is, of 
unsurmounted remnants of older economic being and consciousness.’ According to Bloch, 
this condition was ‘not dangerous to capitalism’: ‘on the contrary, capital uses that which is 
nonsynchronously contrary, if not indeed disparate, as a distraction from its own strictly 
present-day contradictions: it uses the antagonism of a still living past as a means of 
separation and struggle against the future that is dialectically giving birth to itself in the 
capitalist antagonisms.’223 We might say that ‘nonsynchronism’ is the form taken by uneven 
and combined development in situations where the state had already been restructured in the 
interests of capital, but where it was now threatened by the most modern force of all, a 
potentially revolutionary labour movement, which capital seeks to repulse by mobilising pre-
emptive counter-revolution under the banner of a mythical past. We can see this in 
microcosm in the attitudes of the Japanese sociologist and film theorist, Yasunosuke Gonda, 
during the inter-war period, here discussed by Harootunian: 
 
With Gonda and others, it was possible to understand how capitalism had led to the present, but 
what he feared most, and what his own vision of a mixed culture circulating elements from past 
and present, Japan and the West, revealed, was that continuous march of capitalism that would 
eventually eliminate unevenness – the culture of difference – for one of evenness, levelling, and 
the homogenizing of the cultural ground. It was this fear of ‘modern life’, as he and others were 
calling it in the 1930s, together with the representations of cultural form that led Gonda, and 
others, to embrace fascism. Gonda’s agenda aimed at halting the very process of 
deterritorialization that had led to the present conjuncture by transmuting that national 
consumer into the national community.224  
 
The generally conservative or even reactionary politics of ‘non-synchronism’ suggest that 
what Trotsky called ‘debased adaptation’ is not only a feature of backward societies seeking 
to preserve themselves with the help of therapeutic inoculations of capitalist modernity. 
Trotsky saw it as a much more general phenomenon, necessarily caused by the need to 
maintain bourgeois hegemony over the exploited and oppressed in an era of revolution and 
which reached its apogee in the United States. In an address to the First All-Union Society of 
Friends of Radio in 1926 he warned of the counterrevolutionary possibilities of the 
technological form his listeners had come to celebrate:  
 
It is considered unquestionable that technology and science undermine superstition. But the 
class character of society sets substantial limits here too. Take America. There, church sermons 
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are broadcast by radio, which means that the radio is serving as a means of spreading 
prejudices.225  
 
Once the notion of combined development was available to him, Trotsky saw this 
appropriation of advanced technology as the obverse of the ideological advances made by 
Russian and Chinese workers. ‘In America we have another kind of combined development. 
We have the most advanced industrial development together with the most backward – for all 
classes – ideology.’226 In a striking passage in an essay of 1933 considering the nature of 
National Socialism (strikingly similar in many ways to the virtually contemporaneous work 
of Bloch), Trotsky commented on the persistence of archaic or at least pre-modern ideas, not 
only in Nazi Germany but also more generally across the developed world: 
 
Today, not only in peasant homes but also in city skyscrapers, there lives alongside of the 
twentieth century the tenth or the thirteenth. A hundred million people use electricity and still 
believe in the magic power of signs and exorcisms. The Pope of Rome broadcasts over the 
radio about the miraculous transformation of water into wine. Movie stars go to mediums. 
Aviators who pilot miraculous mechanisms created by man’s genius wear amulets on their 
sweaters. What inexhaustible reserves they possess of darkness, ignorance and savagery!227 
 
These are not merely historical observations. As John Gray has written of the contemporary 
USA:  
 
It has by far the most powerful fundamentalist movement of any advanced country. In no 
otherwise comparable land do politicians regularly invoke the name of Jesus. Nowhere else are 
there movements to expel Darwinism from public schools. In truth, the US is a less secular 
regime than Turkey.228  
 
The political implications of this have become apparent at several points in US history, 
most recently in the religious element within the Tea Party and in (highly regionalised) 
support for Donald Trump which nevertheless – due to the vagaries of the US Electoral 
College – delivered him victory in the 2016 Presidential elections. The dominance of religion 
in public life is not, however, the key element of ‘debased adaptation’ in a US context. For 
there is a sense in which, more than Germany and Japan, more even than the UK, the US has 
sustained a pre-capitalist inheritance from its emergence as an independent state which 
persists to this day: the Constitution. In Bloch’s words this is not only ‘not dangerous to 
capitalism’, but positively beneficial for it. Daniel Lazare is exaggerating only slightly to 
describe the USA as ‘an eighteenth-century republic that has come to resemble a democracy 
in certain respects, but which at its core remains stubbornly anti-democratic’: ‘While the 
United States might look like a democracy and sometimes even act like one, it was 
fundamentally a holdover from the days when not even the most radical politicians believed 
that the people should be free to run the government as a whole.’229  This continuing element 
of archaism at the heart of the most-self-consciously ‘modern’ of societies should caution 
                                                          
225 Leon D. Trotsky [1926], ‘Radio, Science, Technology and Society’, in Problems of Everyday Life: Creating 
the Foundations for a New Society in Revolutionary Russia (New York: Pathfinder Books, 1973), p. 257. 
226 Leon D. Trotsky [1933], “Uneven and Combined Development and the Role of American Imperialism: 
Minutes of a Discussion,” Writings of Leon Trotsky [1932–33], edited by George Breitman and Sarah Lovell 
(New York: Pathfinder Books, 1972), p. 117. 
227 Leon D. Trotsky [1933], ‘What Is National Socialism?’, in The Struggle against Fascism in Germany 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 413.  
228 John Gray, Al Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern (London: Faber and Faber, 2003), p. 23. 
229 Daniel Lazare, The Velvet Coup: The Constitution, the Supreme Court and the Decline of American 
Democracy (London: Verso, 2001), p. 9. 
54 
 
against claims that that there are no longer any forms pre-dating capitalist modernity with 
which it can combine, even in the West. But these considerations take us close to the present 
and will be fully addressed in Part 4 below; before turning to that discussion, however, we 
need to return to the country whose historical trajectory uneven and combined development 
was first intended to explain.  
 
 
3.3. Uneven and Combined Development in Russia after 1917: from Revolution to 
Counter-revolution 
 
Russia continued to be marked by uneven and combined development immediately after the 
October revolution. In a letter to the first issue of the journal Under the Banner of Marxism in 
1922, Trotsky wrote:  
 
The Soviet state is a living contradiction of the old world, of its social order, of its personal 
relations, of its outlooks and beliefs. But at the same time the Soviet state itself is still full of 
contradictions, gaps, lack of coordination, vague fermentation – in a word, of phenomena in 
which the inheritance of the past is interwoven with the shoots of the future.230  
 
These contradictions continued throughout the 1920s. On a slightly less exalted note than 
Trotsky, Walter Benjamin observed similar ‘interweaving’ during his visit to Moscow in 
1926:  
 
Here the newcomer learns perhaps most quickly of all to adapt himself to the curious tempo of 
this city and to the rhythm of its peasant population. And the complete interpenetration of 
technological and primitive modes life, this world-historical experiment in the new Russia, is 
illustrated in miniature by a streetcar ride.231 
 
The Stalinist counter-revolution which began in 1928 transformed the Russian society 
described in these passages from one undergoing, with great difficulty, the transition to 
socialism, into something quite different: the first example of the integrated state capitalism 
that was after World War II to become the typical developmental form in the Global South.232 
This transformation heightened the fusion of archaic and contemporary forms to an 
unprecedented degree, above all by propelling millions of former peasants into the factories 
and cities. In England, it took three hundred and fifty years from the emergence of agrarian 
capitalism to the consolidation of industrialisation, years characterised by enclosure, 
clearance, repressive legislation and social degradation at home, and slavery, genocide and 
imperial conquest abroad. In Russia the process was even more greatly compressed than in 
Scotland, Germany or Japan, taking less than a tenth of the time it did in England, with the 
same processes magnified in intensity for every reduction in duration.  
 Despite the atrocities of Stalinism, (state-) capitalist modernity produced new forms of 
consciousness and perception among formerly agrarian peoples, in ways similar to the 
process in Western Europe, North America and Japan. During the early 1930s the Russian 
psychologist Alexander Luria undertook a number of studies of behaviour in Uzbekistan and 
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Kirghizia, both areas of what was then Soviet Central Asia. These were areas where the 
economy was largely pre-capitalist and the majority of the population were illiterate. The first 
five-year plan provided for more intensive industrialisation of regions like Central Asia than 
in the USSR more generally. Accordingly: ‘Industrial production, and numbers of workers 
employed in industry, expanded more rapidly in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and in the 
Urals and West Siberia, than in the rest of the USSR.’ Furthermore, this was from a lower 
level: ‘While 9.4 per cent of the Soviet population lived in these republics, they contained 
only 1.5 per cent of those employed in large-scale industry; and most industrial workers were 
Russians.’ By 1934 this had completely changed, with the number employed in large-scale 
industry nearly trebling from 53,000 to 158,000: ‘The increase in the working class in these 
areas took place against the background of the forcible transfer of a large part of Central 
Asian agriculture to the production of cotton, and the forcible settlement of the nomadic 
Kazakhs, many of whom died from starvation in the subsequent famine, or emigrated from 
Kazakhstan.’233 Both regions were therefore experiencing what Luria later called ‘a radical 
restructuring of their socioeconomic system and culture’ as a result of Stalinist 
collectivisation and the industrialisation process. The economy was based on cotton, with 
some transhumant cattle-rearers who spent part of the year in the mountains. The population 
were dominated by Islam, in respect of whose tenets women were confined to their own 
quarters, from which they could only emerge if draped in the veil. ‘The radical changes in 
class structure were accompanied by new cultural shifts.’ These included the universalisation 
of literacy and numeracy, but also of agronomy. ‘As a result, people became acquainted not 
only with new fields of knowledge but also with new motives for action.’ These 
developments produced new forms of consciousness, in which ‘abstract’ rather than 
‘situational’ thinking came to predominate, on the basis of new state capitalist social relations 
rather than those associated with those of petty commodity production. As Luria notes: 
 
…sociohistorical shifts not only introduce new content into the mental world of human beings; 
they also create new forms of activity and new structures of cognitive functioning. They 
advance human consciousness to new levels. We now see the inaccuracy of the centuries-old 
notions in accordance with which the basic structures of perception, representation, reasoning, 
deduction, imagination, and self-awareness are fixed forms of spiritual life and remain 
unchanged under differing social conditions. The basic categories of human mental life can be 
understood as products of social history – they are subject to change when the basic forms of 
social practice are altered and are thus social in nature.234 
 
Why then did these transformations not produce a revolutionary response similar to those 
which had erupted in 1905 and 1917? As we by now come to expect, a crucial aspect was the 
specific character of the emerging state – or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, a 
crucial aspect was the specific character of the personnel whose relationships constituted the 
state. Alex Callinicos has noted that the counter-revolution in Russia had four main 
components: forced collectivisation, rapid industrialisation, systematic coercion and – most 
important in the context of this discussion – the fact that ‘a minority of the population 
benefited from the changes it brought’: ‘the social meaning of the changes involved was 
upward mobility for a minority at a time when the mass of the population was experiencing 
an appalling decline in its material conditions’.235 We tend to think of Stalinist Russia 
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primarily as a totalitarian monolith but, near the top, social relations were also flexible 
enough to allow entry into the new ruling class and for its members to make sharp tactical 
shifts within what was in many respects a chaotic (and certainly not ‘planned’) accumulation 
process. As Mike Haynes points out:  
 
The drive to industrialise Russia opened up new possibilities for people to find ‘room at the 
top’. New enterprises needed managers. So did hospitals, schools universities and research 
institutes. The expanding party state needed new layers of senior administrators. Beneath them, 
intermediate layers of white collar workers, professionals, doctors, teachers and architects had 
to be filled out. … The fact that capitalism is always in movement creates some capacity for 
people to move up to the top. But the leap forward begun in Russia in the 1930s vastly 
expanded these opportunities. 
 
Haynes argues against regarding the ruling class as wholly new, rather: ‘The rapid changes 
opened up possibilities for mobility alongside those who had already established themselves 
before 1928.’236 At least some talented and potentially rebellious people were elevated into a 
new ruling class which regarded itself – for the most part quite sincerely at this stage – as a 
revolutionary force in Russian society; but precisely because ‘Marxism’ was the official 
doctrine of the state, it was unavailable to the overwhelming majority of the new, urbanised 
working class as a doctrine of resistance, let alone of revolution, in the way it had for an 
earlier generation of workers facing the Tsarist state.   
The obstacles to revolutionary consciousness were not purely ideological. Moshe Lewin 
explains some of the reasons why the ‘social cleavages did not turn into political ones’:  
 
Repression and terror alone could not explain the phenomenon. Factors like the cultural level, 
the relatively short industrial experience of the bulk of the employees (and the upward social 
mobility for many in the system), the existence inside the working class of large unintegrated 
segments of newcomers, women, youth, a kind of worker’s aristocracy, too, as well as a large 
differentiation span, all those explain social tensions, crude language, vodka and hooliganism, 
tekuchka [i.e. ‘spontaneous mobility of manpower’] and dirt, but may also serve as an 
explanation for the lack of any direct political challenge to the regime. Such a mass was 
probably difficult to rule – but easy to control…237 
 
Control was partly exercised by the ways in which the processes of urbanisation and 
industrialisation were instituted, which was quite different to the pre-1917 period. In relation 
to urbanisation, the parallels are not so much with the recent growth of mega-cities in the 
contemporary Global South (which will be discussed in Part 4 of this article) but somewhere 
rather more unexpected.  
At the conclusion of her comparison of industrial cities in the USA and USSR, Kate 
Brown points out that both states were centrally concerned to suppress the resistance of 
workers to the dictates of capitalist industrialisation, ‘to fix social relations in place’:  
 
…despite the fact that both the United States and Soviet Union were founded on revolution and 
grew through rapid urbanization, leaders in both countries distrusted the revolutionary and 
spontaneous quality of urban space and worked to destroy it. With straight lines and the force 
of the grid, Soviet and American leaders planned new ‘garden cities’ cut through with wide, 
rebellion-proof avenues, which negated the unpredictability and anarchy of nineteenth-century 
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cities. As a result, both expanding American corporate power and expanding Soviet party-state 
power etched an anti-revolutionary conservatism onto twentieth-century urban scapes.238  
 
Nor were workplaces themselves conducive to the type of organisation which had been 
characteristic, above all in engineering, before 1917. Here too there were ironic parallels with 
Russia’s Cold War rival: 
 
Before 1917…there was a high concentration of labour in Russian plants and this helped forge 
solidarity. But workers then, even under Tsarist repression, had more chance of independent 
organisations. After 1928 the larger plants operated more like company towns, fiefdoms of the 
plant managers, which gave them a degree of authority not only over workers in the workplace 
but outside it as well.239 
 
It is in this context that Stalinist Russia’s own versions of ‘debased adaptation’ and ‘non-
synchronicity’ emerged. As Smith writes, ‘once the project of achieving Communist 
modernity got underway, it quickly became apparent that a side-effect of massive social and 
economic transformation was to revitalize many “neo-traditional” practices and 
representations’, including ‘the emergence of a charismatic leader, the revival of clientism as 
a principle of social organization, and reconstitution of social hierarchies more akin to status 
groups than to modern social classes’.240 The retreat to pre-existing ideologies was inscribed 
into the Stalinist experience from the Russian point of origin during the late 1920s, as a form 
of consolation for a population being subjected to otherwise unendurable social convulsions, 
both terrorized into submission and mobilized into production for a process of breakneck 
industrialization. Lewin points out: ‘Institutions and methods which seemed to be entirely 
new, after deeper insight show the often quite astonishing reemergence of many old traits and 
forms.’ Not least of these was the reproduction, the recreation in secular form, of the 
iconography and values of Russian Orthodoxy: 
 
One telling example of extolling some of the more primitive trends of rural society when state 
interests seemed to have warranted it, and offering it as a value for the whole nation, is the 
policy in regard to the family undertaken in the 1930s. …it was clearly the large, archaic rural 
family, with its high demands on the reproductive faculties of women, authoritarian structure, 
and apparently solid moral stability, that was presented as a model. … The ‘crusaders’ 
themselves got trapped in some of the least modern, most orthodox, and most nationalist 
elements in their tradition, now put to use as ingredients of a renewed worship of the state and 
its interests.241 
 
In cultural terms these regressions are far from the defiant modernism which had 
characterised the revolutionary years and, not unexpectedly, the consolidation of the Stalinist 
regime within the USSR saw the institutionalisation of anti-modernism as state policy. John 
Berger traces the implications for the artists involved: 
 
For a few years after 1921 the condition of Russian art was the very antithesis of that which had 
preceded it for nearly two centuries. ‘We have taken the Bastille of the Academy’, claimed the 
students. For a few years artists served the State on their own initiative in a context of 
maximum freedom. Soon a very similar academicism was to be re-imposed. … They had to 
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abandon their total prophetic claims and resign themselves to becoming good workers in a 
single productive sector.242 
 
This was new form of ‘academic naturalism’ which had, as Macintyre points out, ‘appeared 
in other times and places and notably in Victorian England, another society dominated by a 
technically oriented, sexually conservative bourgeoisie’.243 This is of course an aspect of a 
wider conservatism shared by British and Soviet societies.244 It is worth noting, in this 
connection, that it was not only in Stalinist Russia, but in Fascist Germany that ‘a restoration of 
former bourgeois cultural forms and relations is instituted’ during the 1930s.245 
Needless to say the levels of mobilisation associated with break-neck industrialisation 
could not be sustained for decades on end – but then, they did not need to be. Even before 
Stalin’s death in 1953 the processes of industrialisation and, to a large extent, urbanisation 
were essentially complete, and the regime stabilised. Looking back from the nineteen sixties, 
MacIntyre imagined what Trotsky’s response would have been: ‘The liberalization of 
Khrushchev would have appeared to him as parallel to the liberalisation which has developed 
in other capitalisms once primitive accumulation has been accomplished.’246 We cannot know 
what Trotsky would have thought, but this assessment shift involved is accurate enough. The 
relaxation of state repression went hand-in-hand with modest but real improvements in levels 
of consumption and standards of living more generally, although these were still shadowed 
by developments in the West, they were by now clearly moving in the same direction.247 The 
most familiar image we have of the USSR is as it was at the very end – decaying, hollowed-
out and in full disintegration. It is therefore easy to forget that, even as late as the 1970s, 
serious figures in the West expected it to match or overtake living standards in the USA by 
early in the twenty-first century.248 By the time these predictions were being made, however, 
the era of uneven and combined development in Russian history was long over: it had 
become at least as much an exemplar of capitalist modernity as its Cold War rival. 
 
 
4. CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES 
 
4.1. The Persistence of Uneven and Combined Development  
Can we still discern the process of uneven and combined development in contemporary 
capitalism? A common theme on the left since the late 1980s in particular, more or less 
coincident with the consolidation of neoliberalism, has been the elimination of the non-
synchronous or, in terms of this chapter, the evening-out of unevenness and the stabilisation 
of combination. Guy Debord, reflecting on his 1967 critique of the Spectacular Society twenty 
years later, argued that it now had reached a point of total integration in which where all 
forms predating capitalist modernity had been absorbed and rendered affectless:  
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Beyond a legacy of old books and old buildings, still of some significance but destined to 
continual reduction and, moreover, increasingly highlighted and classified to suit the 
spectacle’s requirements, there remains nothing, in culture or nature, which has not been 
transformed, and polluted, according to the means and interests of modern industry.249  
 
More recently, although rather less comprehensibly, Hartmut Rosa, one of the main 
proponents of ‘accelerationalism’ has argued:  
 
The ubiquitous simultaneity of late modernity…is thus, strictly speaking, no longer a 
simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous, since that presupposes the idea of a temporalized, 
directed, and moving (though asynchronous) history. Instead, it is, as it were, a static, 
situational, ‘timeless’, and orderless simultaneity of historical fragments.250  
 
It is the theorists of postmodernism, however, how have been most insistent in claiming that 
the contradictions of capitalist modernity have been overcome. Jameson, perhaps the most 
influential of these figures, claims that everything associated with ‘pre-modernity’ had ‘finally 
been swept away without a trace’:    
 
Everything is now organized and planned; nature has been triumphantly blotted out, along with 
peasants, petit-bourgeois commerce, handicraft, feudal aristocracies and imperial bureaucracies. 
Ours is a more homogeneously modernized condition: we no longer are encumbered with the 
embarrassment of non-simultaneities and non-synchronicities. Everything has reached the same 
hour on the great clock of development or rationalization (at least from the perspective of ‘the 
West’).251 
 
As is quite often the case with Jameson, it is unclear whether the quoted passage expresses his 
own view or is simply intended to reflect a widely-held belief, which it certainly does: but in 
either case, does the belief correspond to reality?  
 
4.1.1.  The End of Pre-capitalist Survivals? 
 
One response to such claims might be to argue that uneven and combined development still 
persists, but that the mechanisms by which it produces its effects is no longer the same as in 
Trotsky’s lifetime, precisely because there are no longer any pre-capitalist survivals with 
which capitalist modernity can combine. ‘Today’, writes Joseph Choonara, ‘uneven and 
combined development is best conceived as a drawing together of successive phases – 
including, crucially, capitalist phases – in novel forms within countries of the Global 
South.’252 Choonara stands in the Trotskyist tradition, but similar positions have been taken 
by writers outside it. Jan Nedervee Pieterse, for example, writes in relation to post-Fordist 
production that: 
  
the actual options available and directions taken are more likely to be influenced by the 
interactions among different modes of capitalism than is indicated by merely examining 
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varieties in the North, as if these represent the front end of capitalism (which is not tenable in 
view of the rise of Pacific Asia) and as if the front end would not be affected by the rear.253  
 
In fact, although uneven and combined development can involve what used to be called ‘the 
articulation of modes of production’ – and actually did so in, for example, pre-revolutionary 
Russia and pre-Independence India, it need not.254 Jairus Banaji has argued – possibly 
deploying a rather over-capacious definition of ‘capitalism’ – that ‘what the world-economy 
of the nineteenth century threw up was an articulation of forms of capitalism more than a 
combination of modes of production’.255 Trotsky himself certainly thought that uneven and 
combined development was possible in societies where capitalist laws of motion were already 
dominant, as he thought they were in China by the late 1920s.256 Regardless of intellectual 
pedigree, however, it is true that the combination of different phases of capitalist 
development can produce entirely new social consequences. Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri discover such a process in Latin America, in passages which echo Trotsky’s remarks 
about the effect of English or French capital being transplanted onto the steppes of the Donets 
Basin.257  
 
From the perspective of stages of development’ one might think that through the contemporary 
export of industrial production, an auto factory built by Ford in Brazil in the 1990s might be 
comparable to a Ford factory in Detroit in the 1930s because both instances of production 
belong to the same industrial stage.  
 
According to these authors such a thought would however be mistaken:  
 
…the two factories are radically different in terms of technology and productive passages. 
When fixed capital is exported, it is exported generally at its highest level of productivity. The 
Ford factory in 1990s Brazil, then, would not be built with the technology of the Ford factory of 
1930s Detroit, but would be based on the most advanced productive computer and information 
technologies available. The technological infrastructure of the factory would locate it squarely 
within the information economy.258 
 
But does uneven and combined development today only involve the transplantation of the 
newest technologies into those areas which had never experienced the older versions, or does 
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it still involve the impact of capitalist modernisation on peasants and rural dwellers? The 
latter scenario does rather depend on the continued existence of a peasant class to be 
impacted upon, which several leading Marxists thinkers have suggested is no longer the case. 
In the final volume of his history of the ‘short’ twentieth century, for example, Hobsbawm 
identified the most significant social change to have taken place in its second half, the one 
which broke decisively with the entire previous history of humanity, as ‘the death of the 
peasantry’:  
 
The peasantry, which had formed the majority of the human race throughout recorded history, 
had been made redundant by agricultural revolution, but the millions no longer needed on the 
land had in the past been readily absorbed by labour-hungry occupations elsewhere, which 
required only a willingness to work, the adaptation of country skills, like digging and building 
walls, or the capacity to learn on the job. What would happen to the workers in those 
occupations when they in turn became unnecessary? Even if some could be retrained for the 
high-grade jobs of the information age which continued to expand (most of which increasingly 
demanded a higher education), there were not enough of these to compensate. What, for that 
matter, would happen to the peasants of the Third World who still flooded out of the 
villages?259    
 
If peasants are still ‘flooding’ out of villages then this implies that reports of their death as a 
class have been greatly exaggerated. As we shall see, however, Hobsbawm was right to point 
to the consequences for the newly urbanized populations and the cities in which they live. As 
might be expected from his previously quoted comments, Jameson sees the supposedly 
disappearing peasantry as an important aspect of how everything which pre-existed capitalist 
modernity is being obliterated, and is particularly concerned with the effect on our 
sensibilities: 
 
...people who lived in two distinct worlds simultaneously; born in those agricultural villages we 
still characterise as medieval or premodern, they developed their vocations in the new urban 
agglomerates, with their radically distinct and ‘modern’ spaces and temporalities. The 
sensitivity to deep time in the moderns then registers this comparatist perception of the two 
socioecomic temporalities, which the first modernists had to negotiate in their own lived 
experience. By the same token, when the premodern vanishes, when the peasantry shrinks to a 
picturesque remnant, when suburbs replace the villages and modernity reigns triumphant and 
homogenous over all space, then the very sense of an alternative temporality disappears as well, 
and postmodern generations are dispossessed (without ever knowing it) of any differential 
sense of that deep time the first moderns sought to inscribe in their writing.260 
 
There is a degree of telescoping involved in both accounts. The decline of the peasantry as a 
proportion of the global population is undeniable, though it has been slower and more varied 
than expected – indeed, it is possible that peasants still constitute the largest global class.261 
The majority of the world industrial working class – 79% in 2010 – are now based in the 
Global South, but this does not mean that the majority of people there are industrial workers; 
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by 2010 only 23.1% were.262 In this respect, proletarianization in the Global South presents a 
paradoxical picture and one which does not simply repeat earlier patterns: 
 
The historical pattern of capitalist industrialisation in the West and Japan was accompanied by 
the kind of industrialisation and employment generation there that led to the decline of the rural 
population to the point that it constitutes, at most between 2 and 8 per cent of the overall 
population in the advanced countries. For countries like Brazil, India, China and Mexico the 
rural population is currently a majority. In due course it may well become a minority, but well 
above the proportions now prevailing in the earlier industrialising countries.263 
 
Furthermore, while proletarianization is an ongoing process it is not always simply a case of 
abandoning the farm and entering the factory in a once-and-for-all break. The move from 
peasant to worker involves people retaining links, moving back and forth between rural and 
urban areas, with a correspondingly complex development of class consciousness. The 
process is also spatially uneven: in some regions the ‘new enclosures’ and other processes 
associated with the emergence of the neoliberal trade and food regimes push small and 
middling peasants and their offspring off the land and into the cities (though not necessarily 
into factory work), while in others a degree of ‘re-peasantisation’ in the form of partial 
reliance on small-holdings for subsistence/income by urban workers still continues in the 
formal and informal sectors.264 In the early 1980s Neil Smith wrote of how: 
  
Pre-capitalist modes of production had been integrated into the world capitalist system as 
‘internalized externals’. As such they have not made the complete transition from formal to real 
integration, and the real integration of the global space-economy is necessarily incomplete.265  
 
To say the least, this understates the extent to which real subsumption (or integration) has 
taken place, even in the countryside.266 From his studies in rural India, Raju Das argues that 
one of the ways in which rurality is maintained is where: 
 
a) the use of technology aimed at increasing labour productivity (meaning that the transition to 
real subsumption has occurred); b) the use of various forms of tied or unfree labour as well as 
free labour made to work long hours for very low wages, thus reinforcing the system of formal 
subsumption; or c) landowners resorting to hybrid subsumption.  
 
By the latter Das means the ‘mercantile/usury-based exploitation as well as exploitation 
based on rental payment’ in situations where:  
 
…landowners, who were earlier formally subsuming labourers on annual contracts as well as daily 
labourers, resorted to large-scale casualization: permanent workers became casuals. This situation 
gradually changed to one where many landowners started renting out their land, often to those who 
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were earlier working as casuals or on permanent contracts, contributing to their partial 
peasantisation.267  
 
These types of complexities in the capital/labour relation, rather than smooth transitions from 
formal to real subsumption, or straight binary oppositions between capital and labour are of 
course exactly what uneven and combined development would lead us to expect.  
 
4.1.2. ‘Dual economy’, ‘Hybridity’, ‘Syncretism’ 
 
Even if we reject the excessive claims for the untrammelled dominance of capitalist 
modernity, there are still alternative concepts to uneven and combined development which 
tend to be deployed rather more frequently in contemporary discussions of the relationship 
between multiple socio-economic forms. In one of what was – until recently – the very few 
attempts to marry theoretical consideration of with empirical study of the process, Carole 
McAllister assessed two of these. Her discussion is a useful starting point for attempting to 
establish the continued existence of uneven and combined development as a tendency.  
One of these concepts is ‘dual economy’, which, as McAllister says   
 
…assumes the existence of two separate economic and social domains in colonial and semi-
colonial societies – one organised according to the principles of Western corporate capitalism 
and the other representing a relatively stagnant subsistence or peasant economy. The society, 
and especially its economy, is conceptualized as divided into a 'traditional' and a 'modern' way 
of life.  
 
The problem in this case, 'is the lack of attention to the interactions between the two sectors, 
and the assumption that they are self-contained’ – an assumption that McAllister challenges 
on the basis of her regional fieldwork in Malaya: 
 
…in fact, the theoretical division of any society into two such distinct and self-contained units 
is clearly a distortion. In Negeri Sembilan, as well as in other contemporary Third World 
societies, it is clear that the so-called traditional sector – organized around subsistence 
agriculture and the principles of matrilinear kinship – is essential to the functioning of 
international capitalism and that the latter in turn continues to reshape 'tradition'.268  
  
As I wrote Part 1 about China during the 1920s, even in areas subject to uneven and 
combined development, these absolute separations do exist. Highlighting them is quite a 
common approach among non-Marxist radicals. Arundhati Roy, for example, writes that:  
 
As Indian citizens, we subsist on a regular diet of caste massacres and nuclear tests, mosque 
breaking and fashion shows, church burning and expanding cell phone networks, bonded labour 
and the digital revolution, female infanticide and the Nasdaq crash, husbands who continue to 
burn their wives for dowry, and our delectable stockpile of Miss Worlds.269  
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McAllister rightly regards uneven and combined development as an alternative to the mere 
juxtaposition of extreme differences; unfortunately, some of Trotsky’s other modern 
adherents have tended to see it as constituted by them, as in this passage by Tom Kemp:  
 
India thus remained an example of combined development. Bullock carts and sacred cows 
existed side by side with advanced capitalist industry and a modern industrial proletariat. 
Religious fanaticism and superstition abounded; there was an anarchic and distorted land 
system, stagnation, mass poverty, sloth and filth. On the other hand there were railways, 
factories, banks, modern city centres and a sophisticated intelligentsia in touch with the most 
advanced ideas. These contradictions and paradoxes were essential parts of India's historical 
legacy of colonial independence.270  
 
 An example of dualism being invoked to describe a specific situation can be found in the 
October 2003 announcement by HSBC that it was moving 4,000 call centre and back office 
jobs from Britain to the Indian state of Hyderabad. The story gave the media an opportunity 
to recycle the most banal clichés in the repertoire of travel journalism, including the classic, 
‘India: Land of Contrasts’. The contrasts are scarcely picturesque: ‘The biggest difference 
between HSBC’s smart Babukhan Chambers and the British centres it is usurping is the 
grinding poverty that surrounds Babukhan – limbless beggars and families in tents’, wrote 
one Guardian journalist.271  
 These disparities pre-existed the decisions by British financial institutions like HSBC, 
Prudential and TSB/Lloyds to transfer part of their telecommunications operations offshore. 
Indeed, the only reason why these companies were prepared to do so is because India already 
had a relatively highly-skilled and – by British standards – lowly-paid workforce either 
already accustomed to the modern office environment or in the process of being trained to 
enter it. Behind these developments lies the software export industry, which has been the 
fastest growing sector in the Indian economy since 1991 – not coincidentally the year in 
which a deeply indebted Indian state sought loans from, the conditions of which were the 
opening up of the economy to both native and foreign private capital. The education systems 
of several states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are now adapted to serve 
the requirements of this sector, which has generated its own contrasts, as Anthony D'Costa 
explains: 
 
…rural India is characterised by debt bondage, social servitude, extensive poverty, illiteracy, 
and limited opportunities for social and economic mobility. Culturally there is a massive divide 
from the highly integrated, glamorous, and globalised software industry. 272 
 
D’Costa does refer to uneven and combined development in this context, but only to dismiss 
it as indicative of the problem  
 
By framing the rise of the Indian software industry as integral to uneven and combined 
development I have demonstrated that there are serious contradictions with such a development 
process. … Paradoxically, in attempting to overcome technological barriers through greater 
international economic integration, the Indian software industry is forging ahead but it is also 
exacerbating uneven and combined development at the national level.273  
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We have already seen how uneven and combined development has been assimilated to quite 
different theories, from positions of both support and opposition; a similar misidentification 
can be seen here with respect to dual systems theory. The divisions to which D’Costa draws 
attention are of course never absolute and the situations where it breaks down are exactly 
where the concept of uneven and combined development might be more usefully applied. 
Many commentators recognise that there are not unsurmountable barriers between the 
different temporalities of Indian social life, but regard this too as a problem. Jeremy Seabrook 
is typical here: ‘The loss of jobs to rich countries is small compared to the cultural 
hybridisation of hundreds of thousands of young Indians’.274 D'Costa similarly sees the 
divisions between ‘hybridised’ Indians and their compatriots as 'inherently destabilising' of 
Indian society.275 There are a number of issues here. 
As I noted earlier, hybridity is an ongoing process which predates not only Western 
colonialism, but even the earlier division of Europe, then the rest of the world into ‘West’ and 
‘East’. The notion that there once existed a pure, unsullied, non-hybrid Indian people – or 
indeed any other – has been rightly criticised by Said:  
 
If you know in advance that the African or Iranian or Chinese or Jewish or German experience 
is fundamentally integral, coherent, separate, and therefore comprehensible only to Africans, 
Iranians, Chinese, Jews or Germans, you first of all posit an essential something which, I 
believe, is both historically created and the result of interpretation – namely the existence of 
Africanness, Jewishness or Germanness, or for that matter Orientalism and Occidentalism. And 
second, you are likely as a consequence to defend the essence or experience itself rather than 
promote full knowledge of it and its entanglements and dependencies on other knowledges.276  
 
As George Lipsitz notes, the world has always been characterised by ‘transformation and 
change’:  
 
Instead of looking to the past for compensatory stories about cultural uniformity, we need to 
build the future by learning lessons from individuals and groups whose histories have prepared 
them to make productive use of contradictions, to embrace the dynamism of difference and 
diversity. 
 
Music is one of the best examples: ‘Music that originally emerged from concrete historical 
experiences in places with clearly identifiable geographical boundaries now circulates as an 
interchangeable commodity market to consumers across the globe.’ The most obvious 
example of this is the virtual universality of Hip-Hop but, as Lipsitz goes on to say, this is not 
simply a process through which the original sense of musical ‘place’ is lost or appropriated: 
 
Through the conduits of commercial culture, music made by aggrieved inner-city populations in 
Canberra, Kingston, or Compton becomes part of everyday life and culture for affluent consumers 
in the suburbs of Cleveland, Coventry or Cologne. At the same time, electro-techno-art music 
made in Germany serves as a staple for sampling within African American hip hop; Spanish 
flamenco and paso doble music provide crucial subtexts for Algerian Rai; and pedal steel guitars 
first developed by country and western musicians in the USA play a prominent role in Nigerian 
juju.277  
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The guitar itself is a good example. First developed in Spain, it attained modern form in the 
music of black Americans who combined the five-tone scale of their West African origins 
with European harmonies to produce the chord progressions characteristic of the blues.278 Or 
take Brazil, where no-one could claim that class politics has been adversely affected by the 
supposedly debilitating effects of ‘Western’ culture. During the 1990s Brazil became the 
sixth biggest market for recorded music in the world after the USA, Japan, Germany, the UK 
and France (and the second biggest market for pirate recordings, after the USA). One of the 
genres is the mangue beat movement which first developed in the city of Recife.  
 Hybridity is not new in Brazilian music. Here, as in other nations, what is usually called 
‘traditional’ national genres like the samba and the choro mixed modes of the Portuguese 
colonial settlers, the transplanted African slaves and the indigenous population since the 
nineteenth century. Mangue is no different in this respect except that it has not existed long 
enough to receive the respectable aura of tradition conferred by time and familiarity. Worse, 
it employs rhythms and instruments derived from rock – which is itself of course a hybrid. ‘In 
fact, Mangue is a metaphor for cultural diversity based on an environment full of diversity.’ 
Far from submerging what I will call ‘older’, rather than ‘traditional’ musical forms, it has 
brought them to the surface: ‘One of the most interesting effects of the mangue movement 
and its offshoots is that instead of suffocating traditional culture, mangue beat is helping local 
culture to rejuvenate itself.’279  
Part of the problem here is the very notion of ‘the West’.280 As Gordon Matthews has 
written of the equation of global capitalism with Westernisation: ‘One problem with this view 
is that “Western” is hardly a monolithic category, but encompasses many different societies, 
ideas, values: are there really any such things as “Western values”, “Western ways of 
life”?’281 National cultures are never homogenous; above all, as Lenin insisted, they are 
divided on class lines.  
 
The elements of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary form, in every 
national culture, since in every nation there are toiling and exploited masses, whose conditions of 
life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism. But every nation also 
possesses a bourgeois culture (and most nations a reactionary and clerical culture as well) in the 
form, not merely of 'elements', but of the dominant culture.282  
 
The point which Lenin is making here is that while there may be no such thing as a 
proletarian culture, the proletariat does have a culture, which is not identical to that of the 
bourgeoisie, even though it exists in the context of capitalist society and the dominant 
bourgeois ideology. Consequently: ‘we take from each national culture only its democratic 
and socialist elements; we take them only and absolutely in opposition to the bourgeois 
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culture and bourgeois nationalism of each nation.’ What Lenin is thinking of by ‘proletarian 
culture’ is not the early 20th century Russian equivalent of Eastenders, but something more 
like internal trade union democracy, or the libraries established by the German Social 
Democratic party and by the miners of the Rhondda Valley in south Wales for the self-
education of working class people. The object of the socialist movement is not to preserve the 
‘proletarian’ aspects of that culture but to create an international culture drawn from all these 
cases: ‘The slogan of working-class democracy is not “national culture” but the international 
culture of democracy and the world-wide working class movement.’283  
Black workers in South Africa before the fall of apartheid, for example, were heavily 
influenced by the best aspects of British working class organisation. In 1983 the Federation 
of South African Trade Unions produced a 72-page pamphlet called The Shop Steward: ‘Half 
of it is an historical account of the British shop steward movement with upbeat accounts of 
the strength of shop stewards during the First World War or at Ford plants in Britain in the 
1960s.’284 Working class movements do not only learn from the experience of the working 
class, but from those aspects of the dominant culture which the bourgeoisie has subsequently 
betrayed. South Africa also gives us an example of this. Early in 2001 a teacher's committee 
in Johannesburg advised the provincial education department that several of Shakespeare's 
plays should be removed from school reading lists. In the ensuing controversy it became 
apparent the extent to which these works had been part of the cultural formation of leading 
activists in the anti-apartheid struggle, particularly Julius Caesar, in which they identified 
with the conspirators against tyranny. In 1944 the first manifesto of the Youth League of the 
ANC, in which Nelson Mandela played his first political role, concluded with the passage 
from the play that begins: 'The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars.' Later, when many of the 
same activists were imprisoned on Robben Island, they would recite passages from the same 
text and others which were open to radical interpretation. When Sonny Verkatrathnam 
secretly circulated his copy of the Complete Works asking his fellow-prisoners to autograph 
their favourite passages, Mandela chose the speech which begins: 'Cowards die many times 
before their deaths.'285 And in this respect they were resuming a tradition which had started 
nearly 200 years before in Britain. As Robert Hughes points out:  
 
When thousands of voteless, propertyless workers the length and breadth of England met in 
their reading-groups in the 1820s to discuss republican ideas and discover the significance of 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, they were seeking to unite themselves by taking back the 
meaning of the dominant culture from custodians who didn’t live up to them.286  
 
In this context concerns over the supposed cultural homogenisation resultant on 
Westernisation’ – which Naomi Klein summarised in 2000 as ‘the idea of everyone eating at 
Burger King, wearing Nike shoes and watching Backstreet Boys videos’ – is to fixate on the 
superficial.287 As Klein herself recounts of the workers she met in the Special Enterprise 
Zones of Global South:  
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They are young men and women in Hong Kong and Jakarta who wear Nikes and eat at 
McDonald’s, and tell me they are too busy organising factory workers to bother with Western 
lifestyle politics. And while Westerners sweat over what kind of shoes and shirts are the most 
ethical to buy, the people sweating in the factories line their dorm rooms with McDonald’s 
advertisements, paint ‘NBA Homeboy’ murals on their doors and love anything with ‘Meekey’ 
[i.e. Mickey Mouse]. The organisers in the Cavite zone often dress for work in ersatz Disney or 
Tommy T-shirted – cheap knockoffs from the local market. How do they reconcile the 
contradiction between their clothes and their anger at the multinationals? They told me they had 
never really thought about it like that: politics in Cavite is about fighting for concrete 
improvements in worker’s lives – not about what name happens to be on a t-shirt you happen to 
have on your back.288 
 
The arrival of the new is any case not necessarily experienced as an alien intrusion by 
people who in most respects adhere to longer-established forms of social and economic life. 
Electronic media and communications technologies are perhaps the contemporary bearers of 
capitalist modernity in the way that the railway and the telegram were in the mid-nineteenth 
century, and like their predecessors, they can also play a role in social organisation. In what – 
for Seabrook – is a relatively balanced passage, he notes their contradictory impact:    
 
People are not tabula rasa on which the global media inscribes its messages at will. But neither 
is it an adequate explanation to claim that people interpret the messages after their own fashion 
and integrate them into their own world-view. It is more complicated. People do assimilate 
images and information according to their own experience, but, particularly in cultures where 
until recently people have remained closed to the assault of efficient technologies of cultural 
dissemination, this is scarcely an encounter of equals.289 
 
Seabrook here elides media content and technological form: the former will indeed contain an 
ideological charge – although it is not clear to me why unfamiliarity should necessarily lead 
to greater susceptibility – but the latter can be put to multiple uses, with quite different 
political implications. An illustration of the simplest type of impact is given by the novelist 
William Dalrymple, who here evokes a mixture of archaic and contemporary forms in the 
northern Indian state of Himachal Pradesh:  
 
Within a day, I had walked beyond the last metalled road. Along with the tarmac, I left both the 
telephones and the electricity grid far behind me. Soon I was heading into an apparently 
premodern world: up in the hill villages, the harvest was being cut by hand with sickles and 
bound in sheaves, stacked one by one into stooks. Oxen ploughed the narrow terraces with 
wooden ploughs. In the villages, stone houses with wooden fretwork balconies like those in 
Mughal miniatures tumbled down steep mountainsides, slate roofs alternating with roof terraces 
where the women were drying apricots and stacking kindling for the winter. You could almost 
taste the woody resin-scent of the deodars and the warm peach-brandy aroma of the drying 
fruit. One of the goatherds who wandered past our camp the second evening said he was on his 
way to consult the local oracle, a shaman who channeled a Pahari deity and was celebrated for 
the accuracy of his prophecies. It was trekking as time travel: I seemed to have walked up into a 
Jack-and-the-Beanstalk world about as far as I could imagine from the noise and pollution of 
New Delhi. ... Later that morning, at the top of the pass, I stopped in at the village [of] Shakti 
Dehra, and fell into conversation with the headman. Within minutes, Joginder Rajput had 
whipped out a cellphone and begun talking to his younger brother who needed him to send 
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down some bullocks for the ploughing. The government telephone network had failed to get 
landlines up to the village yet, he explained, but there was a good signal from one of the private 
cellphone companies and about half the households in the village now had mobiles.290 
 
Rajput’s reliance on a private provider certainly indicates the extent to which late uneven and 
combined development occurs under the sign of neoliberalism, but it is clear that the 
possession of a mobile phone has made easier aspects of his working life and that of his 
family.  
Technology does not, however, only impact on individuals, but can also be incorporated 
into forms of social interaction. In Sipsongpanna, the southwestern border region of Yunnan 
in China, the ‘hills have been levelled to make way for new roads, power lines have replaced 
the canopy of the rain forest, and new migrants from the coast are building cities in place of 
villages’. The Buddhist religion practised by the Tai population has been repressed since 
1953, but has recently experienced a revival as monks operating across the national borders 
of Thailand, Laos, Burma and China have attempted to revive the classical Tai ‘though today 
they carry it not on palm leaves but on floppy disks, videos and CDs’. As Sara Davis says: 
‘Thus we should attend not just to the video itself but to the person who carries the video, 
who puts it in the machine and presses “play”, who explains the images that appear in terms a 
village teenager can understand. In the right hands, modernity is made to feel, not foreign or 
alienating, but as familiar, remembered, and natural as old legend.’291  
Both these examples display what I earlier called ‘adaptation’ in the face of capitalist 
modernity. I will discuss the modernity of political Islamism below, but it has to be seen as a 
similar response. The familiarity of adherents with the latest means of destruction allows 
Roger Scruton to contemplate the irony whereby, 'the techniques and institutions on which 
Al-Qa'eda depends are the gifts of the new global institutions': 'It is Western enterprise with 
its multinational outreach that produced the technology that bin Laden has exploited so 
effectively against us.'292 Gray extends the argument in a way that points to a more significant 
aspect of Al Qaeda’s implantation in contemporary capitalism – its reliance on 
communications media:  
 
It is modern not only in the fact that it uses satellite phones, laptop computers and encrypted 
websites. The attack on the Twin Towers demonstrates that Al Qaeda understands that twenty-
first century wars are spectacular encounters in which the dissemination of media images is a 
core strategy. Its use of satellite television to mobilise support in Muslim countries is part of his 
strategy.293 
 
Finally, and more positively, communications technologies have also played an important 
role in facilitating working-class movements. Geoffrey Crothall, editor of China Labour 
Bulletin, recently pointed out that the spread of strikes was not only due to the increasing 
volatility of Chinese workers:  
 
One of the key reasons is simply that strikes are much more visible. Just about every factory 
worker, especially in Guangdong, has a cheap smartphone and can post news about their strike 
and the response of management and the local government to it on social media and have that 
information circulate within a matter of minutes.  This enhanced visibility has also encouraged 
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more workers to take strike action. They see workers from other factories or workplaces that 
are in exactly the same position as them taking strike action and they think ‘we can do this 
too’.294 
 
The other dominant alternative to uneven and combined development is syncretism. In one 
sense this is the more important of the two, since the postmodern argument for the end of the 
non-synchronous is effectively a ‘super-syncretism’ on a global scale. As McAllister notes, 
syncretism registers ‘the thorough mingling and mixing of historically separate social and 
cultural traits’, but: ‘In such a perspective, historically discrete elements merge into a 
syncretic mixture whose different strands eventually become so tightly woven that they are 
quite difficult to separate out.’ The difficulty here is that adherents of syncretism fail to 
recognise the tensions which these mergers produce:  
 
…under the impact of the current process of rapid economic and social change, some of the 
strands that appeared to be bound together in one 'rope' are being dramatically ripped apart and 
then reinterpreted and rewoven into new patterns. In sum the model presents reality as more 
static and seamless than it proves to be and as composed of discrete cultural elements that 
easily combine and recombine rather than fundamental social relations that often wrench as 
they shift.295      
 
Some syncretist positions converge with positions which are nominally informed by the 
concept of uneven and combined development. Mike Davis, for example, argues that Dubai 
and China have this in common: ‘Starting from feudalism and peasant Maoism, respectively, 
both have arrived at the stage of hypercapitalism through what Trotsky called “the dialectic 
of uneven and combined development”.’ What this suggests, however, is that uneven and 
combined development is a process with an end point at which the specific tensions 
associated with it are overcome – although obviously not those characteristic of capitalism in 
general:  
 
In the cases of Dubai and China, all the arduous intermediate stages of commercial evolution 
have been telescoped or short circuited to embrace the “perfected” synthesis of shopping, 
entertainment, and architectural spectacle on the most pharaonic scale.296  
 
A different case for syncretism has been put by leading former-neoliberal-turned-
dissident-conservative, Gray, for whom non-Western societies are free to adapt aspects of 
Western capitalism to create entirely new formations:  
 
The growth of the world economy does not inaugurate a universal civilisation, as both Smith 
and Marx thought it must. Instead it allows the growth of indigenous kinds of capitalism, 
diverging from the ideal free market and from each other. … Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill 
believed that modern societies throughout the world would become replicas of western 
societies. The West would necessarily be a model, its imitators secular, Enlightenment cultures. 
… History has falsified this Enlightenment faith. Modern societies come in many varieties. 
Like nineteenth-century Japan, China and Russia, Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia are 
developing as modern countries today by borrowing selectively from western societies while 
rejecting western models.297 
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What Gray calls ‘selective borrowing’ is close to what in Part 1 I called ‘debased adaptation’, 
and carries the same risks for the ruling-classes involved. These have been pointed out by a 
very different conservative thinker, although one who is similarly sceptical about the 
prospects for neoliberalism, Edward Luttwak, who has highlighted ‘the perils of incomplete 
imitation’, whereby developing world ruling classes ‘have been importing a dangerously 
unstable version of American turbo-capitalism, because the formula is incomplete’. What is 
missing? On the one hand, the legal regulation to control what he calls ‘the overpowering 
strength of big business’ and on the other the internal humility by the winners and acceptance 
of the essential justice of their personal situation by the losers from the system:  
 
So far, however, in too many countries undergoing turbo-capitalist change, the winners enjoy 
their wealth all too visibly, are enormously eager to enrich their children, and they give away 
very little, except to the Church. As for the losers, what they feel is not guilt, but bitter 
resentment. And neither group is filled with the moral certainty required to punish losers who 
break the rules.298  
 
It is possible to consider ‘incomplete adaptation’ in more concrete and explicitly Marxist 
terms, in relation to growth in specific sectors of the economy, where expansion may be at 
quite a different level from the rest. Beverley Silver has focussed on the impact of working-
class organisation in such situations of sectional growth: 
 
Strong new working class movements had been created as a combined result of the spatial fixes 
pursued by multinational capital and the import substitution industrialisation efforts of 
modernising states. In some cases, like Brazil's automobile workers; labour militancy was 
rooted in the newly expanding mass production consumer durable industries. In other cases, 
like the rise of Solidarnosc in Poland's shipyards, militancy was centred in gigantic 
establishments providing capital goods. In still others, like Iran's oil workers, labour militancy 
was centred on critical natural resource export industries.299  
  
As we have already seen, Silver is not the only Marxist effectively to recapitulate elements of 
uneven and combined development without being aware of the concept, or its relevance. 
Presenting her particular perspective on the impossibility of complete ‘catch-up’, Silver notes 
that 'while spatial fixes tend to erode the North-South divide, technological fixes, product 
fixes and protectionism tended to reconstitute the divide continually':  
 
Spatial fixes relocated the social contradictions of mass production (including strong working 
classes), but they have not relocated the wealth through which high-wage countries historically 
accommodated these same contradictions. As a result, strong grievances and strong bargaining 
power go hand in hand, creating the conditions for permanent social crises in much of the post-
colonial world.300  
 
 
4.1.3.  Uneven and Combined Development in the West – An Incomplete Process 
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If uneven and combined development still occurs in the Global South, can we at least declare 
it to be completed process in the West? Clearly, it is less significant there, particularly since 
the Second World War, but two aspects still remain. One is the continued drawing together of 
different phases of capitalist development, a process of which we saw examples earlier in the 
Global South. Hardt and Negri highlight similar combinations in Italy during the 1970s and 
1980s: 
 
The transformation of the Italian economy since the 1950s demonstrates clearly that relatively 
backward economies do not simply follow the same stages the dominant regions experience, 
but evolve through alternative and mixed patterns. After World War II, Italy was still a 
predominantly peasant-based society, but in the 1950s and 1960s it went through furious but 
incomplete modernisation and industrialisation, the first economic miracle. Then, however, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, when the processes of industrialisation were still not complete, the Italian 
economy embarked on another transformation, a process of postmodernisation, and achieved a 
second economic miracle. These Italian miracles were not really leaps forward that allowed it 
to catch up with the dominant economies; rather, they represented mixtures of different 
incomplete economic forms. What is most significant here, and what might usefully pose the 
Italian case as the general model for all other backward economies, is that the Italian economy 
did not complete one stage (industrialisation) before moving on to another (informatisation). 
Various regions will evolve to have peasant elements mixed with partial industrialisation and 
partial informatisation. The economic stages are thus all present at once, merged into a hybrid, 
composite economy that varies not in kind but in degree across the globe.301   
 
Although the concept is not named, the argument here suggests one of the ways in which 
uneven and combined development (‘hybrid, composite economy’) retains its relevance in the 
contemporary West.  
The other aspect is migration. Again using post-war Italy as our example, we can see the 
process unfolding as in-migrants from the Mezzogiorno revolted against their living 
conditions and low pay during the 'industrial miracle' of the late fifties and early sixties.302 
We have already noted in the case of Hardt and Negri how many Italian commentators 
invoke ‘leaping over stages’ without any reference to Trotsky. Here, for example, is former 
Communist militant Lucio Magri discussing the way in which post-war Italy was the site of 
both the most highly advanced technologies and forms of labour organisation:   
 
Technological leap did not only mean the application of better equipment and better work 
organisation to a productive apparatus partly out of use (as in Germany and France). It meant 
revolutionizing both the one and the other and involving large areas previously excluded from 
modernity: that is moving quickly from a narrow and sometimes craft based, industrial base to a 
Fordist industry that was already (at its most advanced) on the threshold of automation, and 
then extending it to new sectors and new types of production and consumption. It meant leaping 
over the intermediate stages that other countries had previously crossed with difficulty.  
 
Magri then refers to ‘the social and cultural upheavals induced or anticipated by the Italian 
economic miracle’ and highlights its ‘novel interlinking of modernity and backwardness, how 
it fuelled imbalances and regional or class conflict between North and South, capital and 
labour, and old and new middle layers’.303  
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The preceding section indicates some of the enduring characteristics of uneven and 
combined development; but given that it necessarily involves the unexpected outcomes of 
drawing together different forms, within a system as dynamic as capitalism, it would be 
unusual if new combinations did not arise. Two of these are particularly significant.  
 
 
4.2. New Developments in Urbanism and Ideology 
 
4.2.1. Mega-Cities  
 
I have stressed throughout this chapter how urbanisation – whether in Lahore or Los Angeles 
– has played an equivalent role to industrialisation and, in some cases, has been even more 
significant in generating uneven and combined development. This remains the case but, in the 
Global South at least, it has taken on new forms. The number of cities with populations of 
over one million rose from 86 in 1950 to 400 in 2004 and these are expected to account for 
all future population growth from 2020, until the anticipated peak is reached with a global 
population of 10 billion in 2050, of which 95 per cent will live in urban areas in the 
developing world.304 What kind of urban areas are these? 
At one extreme they simply involve adding new streets and buildings of modern design 
and composed of modern materials onto an older base, as in Thailand: ‘Bangkok is a First 
World City imposed on the decaying fabric of the original’, writes Seabrook.305 At the other 
extreme, it involves constructing entirely new cities in previously uninhabited rural or even 
desert conditions, as in China. What is perhaps even more startling than the appearance of 
these monuments to Chinese expansion is their tendency to expand to the point of 
convergence: the Pearl River Delta was still a rural agricultural area as late as 1973; it now 
consists of 9 cities, the total population of which is 42 million people. These are already 
merging, as it were, organically, but the Chinese state plans to consolidate them into one 
gigantic megacity by 2030, by which point the population should have risen to 80 million.306  
Between these two extremes lie two other, perhaps more typical developments. One is 
where the boundaries between the cities and their surrounding hinterlands begin to dissolve, 
along with their distinction from each other. Gregory Guldin has written of areas in China 
which are 'neither rural nor urban but a blending of the two wherein a dense web of 
transaction ties large urban cores to their surrounding regions'.307 The other is where cities 
expand in ways which are genuinely urban, creating peripheral slums quite unlike those 
which arose during the original process of industrialisation in the West. Davis describes this 
as a consequence of 'urbanization-without-growth' which has become 'radically decoupled 
from industrialisation, even from development per se':  
 
The global forces “pushing” people from the countryside – mechanization in Java and India, 
food imports in Mexico, Haiti and Kenya, civil war and drought throughout Africa, and 
everywhere the consolidation of small into large holdings and the competition of industrial-
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scale agribusiness – seem to sustain urbanization even when the “pull” of the city is drastically 
weakened by debt and depression.308  
 
Seabrook describes this process in the capital of Indonesia: 
 
Urbanization in Dhaka is quite unlike any traditional idea of the city. Whole areas remain semi-
rural, and there is little high-rise building. Whole tracts of open land become covered with 
dense grass in the monsoon, lush grazing ground for cattle. … Even so, an invasive 
industrialization is the reason for their existence. The tension between village and city is made 
visible in Dhaka, and in the end it is not the village that prevails. The cooking fires may be in 
traditional clay chulhas, or stoves, in front of the huts, but the cooking fuel proves to be a 
mixture of waste material from plastics and garment factories, which melts into a foul-smelling 
liquid.309 
 
Quite often, the cities of the global south display elements from all four of the ‘ideal types’ 
outlined here, which are rarely incarnated in completely pristine form. What they all have in 
common is that many inhabitants of the new slums can increasingly be characterised as 
‘informal workers’, now over a one billion strong and two-fifths of the population of the 
developing world. Davis reasonably asks:  
 
The labour-power of a million people has been expelled from the world system, and who can 
imagine any plausible scenario, under liberal auspices, that would reintegrate them as 
productive workers or mass consumers?310  
 
Seabrook imagines the sense of frustration and loss experienced by former peasant 
transplanted into a city that endlessly denies them what it promises:  
 
Whenever you look at the goods in the shop window – especially in the air-conditioned mall, 
where you sometimes take few minutes refuge from the heat or the rain – it strikes you afresh 
how poor you remain in spite of the striving. In the village you knew what you needed for 
survival; and although you might have wished for some small luxuries, you never allowed your 
imagination to wander in the realms of the impossible. In the city, you are taunted with the 
absences in your life every time you pass through the central shopping area, with its glass and 
marble enclosures, and windows full of thin papier-mâche models wearing fashionable clothes 
for a foreign autumn, the array of dazzling white refrigerators and washing machines, the rows 
of flickering TV screens all showing different channels – ospreys in flight, speedway racing 
from Minneapolis, Alpine peaks in Switzerland. At night, the street-lamps and advertisements 
shimmer in the wet road, so that even beneath your feet a chasm of magical colour reflects your 
own diffuse feelings of inadequacy and dissatisfaction.311  
 
This is powerfully evocative, but – typically – has no sense of how experiences of this sort 
might lead city-dwellers to organise, rather than simply bemoan their fate. In fact, it would be 
wrong to imagine that the mass of the population live lives of quiescent desperation in the 
absence of an immediate catalyst. In the Egyptian context, for example, Eric Denis has gone 
so far as to write of ‘urbanization from below’: 
 
In 1996, the rate of urbanization in Egypt (defined as the part of the population living in the 800 
agglomerations greater than 10,000 inhabitants) was calculated at 70 per cent. Today, that 
                                                          
308 Davis, ‘Planet of Slums’, p. 10. 
309 Seabrook, In the Cities of the South, pp. 176-77. 
310 Davis, ‘Planet of Slums’, p. 27. 
311 Seabrook, Consuming Cultures, pp. 251-252. 
75 
 
figure is around 80 percent. Most of these neo-urbanites, no longer engaged in agriculture, have 
to earn their living and make settlements habitable by themselves – without services from the 
state and, indeed, without its recognition.312  
 
The middle-class hatred and fear of these populations is palpable. During the 1990s: 
‘Commentators warned that the inhabitants of the ‘ashwa’iyat [i.e. ‘random’ or ‘haphazard’] 
were not urban and hadari (‘civilized’) but rather rural fellaheen – something that didn’t 
belong in the city and was poisoning its lifeblood.’ As Jack Shenker notes, two decades later, 
on the eve of the revolution of 2011, the inhabitants of the informal settlements were not 
simply occupying the wrong space, but living in the wrong time:  
 
These people, went the narrative, are not our flesh and blood; they are not even of our time. … 
One investigation into the ‘ashwa’iyat uncovered ‘carts dating from the time of Methuselah’.313  
 
These smug moderns were right to be fearful. Co-existence with Methuselanian modes of 
transportation would indeed represent an extreme form of uneven and combined 
development, far beyond even the polarities fused prior to Russia in 1917: but the impacts are 
quite similar. Shenker rightly points out that, despite the media focus on Tahir Square, the 
roots of the revolution of 2011 lay elsewhere:  
 
The start of the revolution was…not truly in the city, but in the non-city – those ever-expanding 
pools of state abandonment which, for so many decades, had been seeping through the 
metropolis even as those at the top gazed stubbornly out at sand.314 
 
Although defeated, the Egyptian revolution has been the most important of the 
contemporary social explosions. It was not, however, alone in having its roots in the new 
urban peripheries. As Colin Mooers points out about Latin America: ‘Urban neighbourhoods 
under popular control in Caracas, Santiago, Lima, Buenos Aires and La Paz mobilized around issues 
of housing, water rights and food distribution; and the recuperation of closed factories was pivotal in 
bringing down traditional governments committed to neoliberalism and paving the way for the 
ascendancy of Left governments.’315 In at least one important case, that of El Alto in Bolivia, an 
entire city has been the site of new forms of social organisation. In one sense El Alto is an 
overspill of La Paz, for which it provides much of the workforce and, crucially, through 
which three of the four supply-routes pass. El Alto is both relatively new – as a city it has 
only really existed since the Second World War – and also growing exponentially, with 
inhabitants mostly consisting of those driven from their former occupations or locations. In a 
way, the population of El Alto is a classic ‘combined’ group, consisting of former peasants 
forced off their land, former tin miners made redundant following the ‘rationalization’ of the 
industry, and former inhabitants of La Paz who can no longer afford to stay there. It has also 
the largest indigenous population of any city in Bolivia.  
                                                          
312 Eric Denis, ‘Demographic Surprises Foreshadow Change in Neoliberal Egypt’, in The Journey to Tahrir: 
Revolution, Protest and Social Change in Egypt, edited by Jeannie Sowers and Chris Toensing (London: Verso, 
2012), p. 241. 
313 Jack Shenker, The Egyptians: A Radical Story (London: Allen Lane, 2016), pp. 89-90. The notion of 
populations belonging to a different period in history from the present is not, of course, confined to elites in the 
Global South. As the late Doreen Massey wrote of the Western hostility to migrants from the Global South, ‘it 
was not merely the arrival of what have frequently been called “the margins” (a spatial concept) but the arrival 
of people from the past. Distance was suddenly eradicated spatially and temporally’. See For Space (London: 
Sage, 2005), p. 70 
314 Shenker, The Egyptians, p. 99. 
315 Colin Mooers, Imperial Subjects: Citizenship in an Age of Crisis and Empire (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2014), p. 127. 
76 
 
Sian Lazar has made an important study of the city, conducted around 2003, the year in 
which the explosion of struggle in El Alto ultimately compelled President Sanchez de Lozada 
to resign. In her work, Lazar notes that, for both peasants in the surrounding area and urban 
workers in the informal sector: ‘Their household model of production allows for fluidity of 
associational life, but has also allowed them to form alliances and organisations based on 
territorial location; the street where they sell, the village or region where they live and farm, 
and, with the addition of the vecino organisational structures in the cities, their zone.’ This 
does not mean that more traditional forms of association have been completely overtaken: 
‘Trade unions are flourishing in the informal economy of El Alto and form a crucial part of 
the structure of civic organisation that is parallel to the state and shapes multi-tiered 
citizenship in the city.’ The emergence of these complex interactions between forms of 
organisation based on both place of residence and place of work leads Lazar to conclude that 
‘the working class in Bolivia is reconstituting itself as a political subject, albeit not in its 
traditional forms’.316 These forms may not resemble those which emerged in Petrograd in 
1905 or 1917, but why should this be surprising?317 In the fusions of the archaic and the 
contemporary the latter component at least is always subject to change, although as El Alto 
demonstrates this has not lessened the resulting potential for social explosiveness.        
However, as I have emphasised throughout this chapter, it would be wrong to imagine the 
consequences of contemporary uneven and combined development always tend towards 
revolutionary or at least left-wing conclusions. The rapid transformation of cities has a dark 
side exemplified, perhaps, by the rise of urban gendered violence in India, as Manali Desai 
reports: 
 
For the new, urban, middle-class India, hedonism, voyeurism and sexual prowess are eternally 
emblazoned on the cities’ and highways’ larger-than-life billboards, in films and, not least, in a 
vast amount of pornography. India is the world’s fifth largest consumer of online porn – not 
such a surprise, given the size of its population, yet the relatively poor e-connectivity of rural 
India compared with China, for example, also needs to be taken into account. All this points to 
a release of libidinal energy after decades of prudery, leavened only by the occasional glimpse 
of Bollywood flesh. But this sexual ‘freedom’ is not only circumscribed by sharp gender 
inequalities, reinforced by caste and ethnic domination; it has also produced a fierce reaction, 
which is directly threatening to women. The aspirational, gym-toned male body, with distinctly 
Western consumer tastes – whisky, cigarettes, fast cars – looms large on city billboards, 
enjoining men to participate in the image, if only vicariously. For India’s surplus men, fantasies 
fuelled by bootleg liquor are compounded by frustrated mobility and other forms of class 
desire.  
 
In the Indian case, the recent explosion of sexual violence against women is partly produced by 
a tension between the contradictory demands of Hindu nationalism for male libidinal restraint 
and the new temptations and frustrations attendant on new forms of city life. In other areas, 
however, it is religion itself which has been reshaped by uneven and combined development. 
Religion represents a consolation or defence against the intrusion of capitalist modernity, but 
religion is also communicated and celebrated using the techniques and technologies that 
capitalist modernity has provided. Elsewhere it has formed an alternative to a left politics. 
Davis has gone as far as to say that in the mega-cities:  
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Marx has yielded the historical stage to Mohammed and the Holy Ghost. If God died in the 
cities of the industrial revolution, he has risen again in the post-industrial cities of the 
developing world. …populist Islam and Pentecostal Christianity (and, in Bombay, the cult of 
Shiva) occupy a social space analogous to that of early twentieth century socialism and 
anarchism.318  
 
As a general argument this is too pessimistic. What is involved is not simply an unchallenged 
revival of religious belief, but a contest between radical left and populist religious responses to 
capitalist modernity. As we have seen, in Latin America it is the former which has tended to 
dominate, in Central Africa, it is the latter. As Alexander Colas has written, Marxists needs to 
use the notion of ‘populism’ as it is represented by Islamism,  
 
…not as descriptors of accidental, residual forms of mass political mobilisation, but, rather, as 
structural features of societies – like those in Africa – far more powerfully subject to the 
vagaries of combined and uneven capitalist development.319  
 
The situation in the Middle East is more mixed, although – as the unfolding catastrophe in 
Syria reminds us – it has to date had no happier an outcome. 
 
4.2.2. Political Islam 
 
I noted in Part 1 that uneven and combined development tended to produce three possible 
responses in the Muslim world: (1) in which Islam incorporated sufficient elements of 
capitalist modernity to maintain organisational structures and modes of social interaction, 
even if this meant inventing novel traditions which allowed it to function in a changed social 
context (‘renewal’); (2) in which former adherents simply abandoned their beliefs in order to 
embrace new revolutionary doctrines associated with capitalist modernity (‘adoption’); and 
(3) which in a sense faces in both directions, where new forms of collective organisation such 
as trade unions were deployed to defend both material conditions and forms of religious 
observance (‘adaptation’). This position is, in a sense, the most important, as it represents an 
unstable situation which ultimately leads to the alternatives represented by either (1) or (2). It 
is the main terrain of the contest to which I have referred. It is however important to 
understand that outcome (2) today has two possible variants: revolutionary socialism or 
radical Islam. These alternatives were brought into opposition for the first time in the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978-9.  
As we saw in Part 1, Tim McDaniel has drawn parallels between the Russian and Iranian 
Revolutions. He compares the Russian and Iranian working classes before the overthrow of 
their respective autocracies, but contrasts the roles which they played during these 
revolutions: 
 
Both were numerically small. … In addition, both industrial labour forces were highly 
heterogeneous, characterized by large influxes of peasant migrants unacquainted with socialist 
ideas or traditions of worker struggle. In both too, because of the rapid pace of industrialization, 
‘industry’ was very heterogeneous, ranging from traditional craft-type establishments to 
modern plants with advanced technology. Obviously, these traits shared by the two industrial 
labour forces were not decisive in shaping labour protest, for they cannot explain the very great 
differences in militancy and class consciousness.320 
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There are two points to be made here. First, it is not clear that the role of the Iranian working 
class was less than that of the Russian in the revolutionary process, given that the former – 
although even smaller as a proportion of the population – was decisive in breaking the regime 
and even, in the Shoras, threw up forms of organisation which are clearly of the same type as 
the soviets or factory councils.321 Second, without reducing the entire difference in outcome 
to the ‘absence of revolutionary leadership’ beloved of Leninist cliché, it is simply 
unhistorical to ignore the role of the Bolsheviks and particularly, the distinct political 
programme which they were able to offer workers, which was at least partly responsible for 
consolidating class consciousness and providing strategic leadership, the absence of which 
was telling in Iran.  
There is, however, one aspect of McDaniel’s argument which points towards a central 
issue of state forms. McDaniel rightly affords ‘key significance’ to ‘the contrast between a 
basically capitalist model of industrialization with pre-twentieth-century styles of political 
despotism’, as in Russia, and ‘a neopatrimonial model with the most modern technology of 
repression’, as in Iran.322 Behind this slightly over-elaborate terminology lies the fundamental 
distinction between the state in pre-capitalist Russia and the state in capitalist Iran, whatever 
formal similarities there may have been between the respective titles held by Nicholas 
Romanov and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.323 This distinction was carried over into the 
outcomes. Theda Skocpol writes that, ‘the central phalanx of the clergy fused its authority 
and activities with the state itself’ and claims that this was not  
 
‘a return to tradition’ in Iran, but rather a strikingly innovative contemporary departure, in 
which Khomeini and his associates took upon themselves a vanguard, state-building and state-
controlling role analogous to that of the Jacobins in revolutionary France and the Communists 
in revolutionary Russia and China.324  
 
Whatever the other differences between the latter three revolutions, in each case the state was 
overthrown; in the case of Iran, it was only the regime. Consequently, and despite the 
Western fixation on the supposed singularity of Islamist ideology, the regime of the mullahs 
inherited the pre-existing state rather than creating its own. Skocpol indicates as much herself 
later in the same discussion: 
 
Pre-revolutionary Iran was…a rentier state, where revenues from exports of oil and natural gas 
were channelled into the state, not so much into truly productive investments, but instead into 
lavish purchases of modern armaments and into luxury consumption. An Iranian Islamic 
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Republic could remain, for quite some time, another sort of rentier state: a populist, welfare-
orientated rentier state, with ulama passing out alms in return for moral conformity on a grander 
scale than ever before.325    
 
If the Islamic Republic resembles the state of the Pahlavi dynasty in its rentier essence, it also 
has a wider set of affinities with other capitalist states, as Fred Halliday points out:  
 
If one looks at the subsequent history of the Iranian revolution, not as a scriptural but as 
pragmatic, political one, with ideology used to justify the mundane and universal goal of 
keeping state power, then much becomes clear. The mullahs have seized and kept control 
through the mechanisms found elsewhere – mobilization for war, discretionary use of welfare, 
repression of political opponents, demagogy about foreign threats and conspiracies abroad.326   
 
Halliday is right to emphasise the constraining effects on ideology of attempting to 
successfully manage a capitalist nation-state of any size, but in his understandable desire to 
resist Islamophobic hysteria, he perhaps underplays the impact the Iranian and other Islamic 
regimes on social and personal behaviour. Ankie Hoogvelt highlights the real dividing line in 
relation to state intervention: ‘The Islamisation of officially secular and moderate regimes 
targets personal law and penal law, leaving intact the existing economic formation and 
political model inherited from previous regimes.’327 
The constraints mentioned above apply to regimes, but not to Islamists who have no 
prospect of achieving state power. Political Islam as a form of adaptation is quite different 
from the defence of tradition involved in renewal. This dissimilarity has been obscured by the 
fact that any group of Muslims who happen to be opposed to Western interests tend to be 
described as ‘Islamic radicals’, no matter how conservative they may be. The Taliban may 
have allowed Al Qaeda to use Afghanistan as a base, but that did not mean the two 
organisations were similar in any way other than their shared religious designation: the 
former was deeply traditional in its desire to return established forms of village organisation; 
the latter profoundly radical in its ambition to create a regime which had not previously 
existed on earth. In neither case is ‘religion’ an autonomous force. On the contrary, the 
motivations of radicals in particular are formed by their material circumstances:     
 
Just because a lack of graduate employment, decent housing, social mobility, food, etc., is 
explained by an individual through reference to religion does not make it a religious grievance. 
It remains a political grievance articulated with reference to a particular religious worldview.328 
 
Indeed, Olivier Roy has argued that in the French context, Islamism:  
 
…is not the revolt of Islam or that of Muslims, but a specific problem concerning two 
categories of teenagers – mostly immigrants, but also native French citizens. The question is 
not the radicalization of Islam, but the Islamization of radicalism.329  
 
Roy’s question – why does radicalization take this particular form among certain groups – is 
one that needs to be asked, not only of France or the West more generally, but of the 
heartlands of the Muslim world itself. Part of the answer lies with the modernizing secular 
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nationalist regimes, which not only failed materially to provide for the majority of their 
populations, but usually took the form of murderous dictatorships which were – as in the case 
of Syria – prepared to kill countless people and destroy unquantifiable amounts of property in 
order to preserve themselves in power. Those lucky enough to escape the attentions of the 
Assad regime might of course then find themselves victim of the latest incarnations of 
capitalist modernity in the form of US drone missiles. It is not entirely surprising that those 
on the receiving end of either or both might be driven to identify their own, quite different, 
version of what it means to be modern.  
The starting point for understanding Islamism in the mirror of uneven and combined 
development has therefore to be that it is not a traditional rejection of modernity. By this I do 
not simply mean that Islamists inhabit contemporary culture, although this is how a certain 
school of conservative thought tends to conceive their relation to modernity, offering, at its 
most superficial, scenarios such as the one imagined here by Samuel Huntington: 
‘Somewhere in the Middle East a half-dozen young men could well be dressed in jeans, 
drinking Coke, listening to rap, and, between their bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to 
blow up an American airliner.330  
If, as we have already seen, the techniques and technologies of Islamic radicalism are 
quintessentially modern; the ideology, and the forms of consciousness to which it 
corresponds are, as we should by now come to expect, far more ‘combined’. ISIS, which has 
of course long surpassed Al Qaeda as the incarnation of the Islamist threat, illustrates the 
ways in which the archaic and the contemporary can fuse under present conditions. After the 
Charlie Hebdo massacre, Hari Kunzu rightly scorned those who regarded the killers as 
exponents of a ‘medieval’ ideology: 
 
The jihadi movement is a thoroughly modern beast, which ironically owes much to the French 
revolutionary legacy of 1789. Though they are religious millenarians, looking to bring about 
global submission to the will of God, they are also utopian revolutionaries, and have adopted 
tactical thinking from the various movements that trace their legacy to Paris, and that inaugural 
moment of modernity.331 
 
Gray has argued that, consciously or not, ISIS stands in an even longer revolutionary 
heritage, in that it has parallels with both millenarian experiments like that of the Anabaptist 
commune at Munster and modern revolutionary movements, by which he means the entire 
range from the Jacobins to the Khmer Rouge; but also adduces another aspect, that of 
transnational crime syndicates: 
 
So what is Isis essentially – violent millenarian cult, totalitarian state terrorist network or 
criminal cartel? The answer is that it is none of these and all of them. Far from being a 
reversion to anything in the past, Isis is something new – a modern version of barbarism that 
has emerged in states that have been shattered by western intervention.332  
 
Ultimately, combination of the archaic and contemporary is embedded in the consciousness 
of individuals who are subject to the process.  
 
The men who planned and carried out the Islamist attacks on America – all but four of them 
Saudi citizens – have often been depicted in the press as being “medieval fanatics”. In fact, it 
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would be more accurate to describe them as confused but highly educated middle class 
professionals… Such figures represent a clash of civilisations occurring not so much between 
civilisations, as the author Samuel Huntington would maintain, but rather within individuals, 
products of the same cultural dislocation and disorientation that accompanies accelerating 
economic change and globalisation.333 
 
The journalist Jamie Doward wrote of his encounter with the British jihadi, Mohammed 
Ezzouek, whom we can take as one example:  
 
The first thing I noticed about him was his size: tiny, birdlike. … The second thing was his 
beard. Long, black and wispy, it had clearly taken months to grow and was central to his 
identity. The third was his trainers, Nike, almost box-fresh. This man is a walking 
contradiction, I thought. He spoke street slang while praising the prophet. He went to Somalia 
to live under a caliphate and here he was, talking to me in London, complaining about the 
difficulties getting a mobile phone contract. … The group’s members appear to have existed in 
a liminal world where east met west and modernity clashed with medieval. Many played five-a-
side football together, shared an interest in designer clothes and were at the same schools. But 
they were also captivated by a London-based Islamist cleric, Hani al-Sibai, who refers to 
himself as a sheikh and has been named by the US Treasury as a supporter of al-Qaida. Their 
world is exemplified in the Twitter feeds of Isis fighters who link to speeches by extremist 
clerics interspersed with rap videos and pictures of themselves posing with fearsome-looking 
automatic weapons.334 
 
 To conclude this part of my discussion, it might be useful to stand back from ISIS, the 
horrors associated with it and the controversies to which it has given rise, and turn to an earlier 
example of the emergence of modern Islamism. This was centred in the Malaysian state of 
Negeri Sembilan, and was not dominated by young men with ‘fearsome-looking automatic 
weapons’ of the sort mentioned by Doward. We are fortunate to have McAllister’s case study 
of this process, to which I have already referred, as she explicitly treats it as an example of 
uneven and combined development. McAllister argues that the Islamic revival or dakwah in 
Malaysia, ‘is primarily a reaction against both the economic stress and dislocation and cultural 
deracination brought by capitalist development; it is in large part an attempt to define a 
personal and a political alternative’. As in many other, more famous cases, it is essentially 
modern rather than a retreat to tradition: ‘Although such resistance might in one sense be 
interpreted as a return to the past or a strengthening of tradition, it is eminently clear that this 
wave of Islamic militancy – and the reassertion but also reinterpretation of traditional Malay 
Islam it promotes – is a contemporary phenomenon, arising from people's current problems 
and needs.’ But McAllister also draws attention to the contradictions which this 
reinterpretation involves, not least for the women who were so central to the dakwah 
movement: 
 
At the same time, immersion in the revival serves to divert attention away from social to 
primarily religious matters and essentially blunts their critical awareness of economic and 
political realities; this occurs in spite of the collective choice of so many young women to 
embrace fundamentalist Islam represents at least an unconsciousness [sic] resistance to the 
hegemony of capitalist culture. For a minority of Negeri Sembilan devotees, the dakwah 
movement, however, has a radically different effect. It actually helps them focus and articulate 
their growing criticism of their country's course of dependent capitalist development and its 
impact on their own lives. For these female adherents, conscious resistance and protest are part 
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of their commitment to Islamic revival, even though such commitment is often characterised by 
a denial of their matrilinear traditions and thus their pre-existing rights and freedoms as 
women.335 
 
The fact that adherents of radical Islam desire a complete transformation of society does 
not mean that even the successful achievement of state power would necessarily lead to that 
outcome. Those who do not consciously seek to overthrow capitalism, those who do not even 
recognize it as the real force shaping the conditions to which they are opposed, will always 
end up accepting capitalist imperatives, if only because these seem to be natural, God-given 
processes beyond human intervention. Unlike ISIS, the dakwah movement was not shaped by 
the catastrophic impact of Western military intervention, but by the type of industrial and 
urban intrusions which we have now traced for over the two hundred years or so; but it raises 




5. CHINA: WHERE ALL ROADS MEET336 
 
5.1 China in the Neoliberal World Order 
 
My argument in the preceding parts of this article has been that uneven and combined 
development is not only a universal phenomenon under conditions of capitalist modernity, 
but an ongoing one which will only cease when the last peasant has been pushed or pulled off 
their land into wage labour and city life. Nuclear holocaust, environmental collapse or even 
the socialist revolution are likely to have occurred long before humanity ever reaches that 
point: it is a process which will never conclude while capitalism subsists. In this final part, I 
conclude my discussion by returning to a country which has appeared at several points in the 
discussion so far, notably in Parts 1 and 4, and which is currently experiencing uneven and 
combined development in its most intense form.  
China was the first country outside of Russia for which Trotsky argued that a strategy of 
permanent revolution was possible. As in the Russian case, this was because the process of 
uneven and combined development had produced – among other things – a working class 
which was small relative to the overall population, but possessed of an exceptional degree of 
revolutionary militancy. Even the dramatic changes which occurred in China during the first 
three decades of the Twentieth century have, however, been overshadowed by the 
contemporary impact of uneven and combined development, which resumed late in 1978, 
when the party-state began to reinsert China into the world economy.  
The subsequent transformation of China has been interpreted in several different ways. For 
some bourgeois commentators, such as Ian Bremmer, it represents perhaps the most advanced 
form of a transition to what he calls state capitalism, which he defines as ‘not the 
reemergence of socialist central planning in a twentieth-century package’ but rather ‘a form 
of bureaucratically engineered capitalism particular to each government that practices it’ and 
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one ‘in which the state dominates markets primarily for political gain’.337 Most 
commentators, however, have taken quite the opposite view. For Christian Caryl, the date at 
which the Chinese ‘reform era’ began means that it must be regarded as one of five founding 
moments of a new historical era:   
 
The forces unleashed in 1979 marked the beginning of the end of the great socialist utopias that 
had dominated so much of the twentieth century. These five stories – the Iranian Revolution, 
the start of the Afghan jihad, Thatcher’s election victory, the pope’s first Polish pilgrimage, and 
the launch of China’s economic reforms – deflected the course of history in a radically new 
direction. It was in 1979 that the twin forces of markets and religion, discounted for so long, 
came back with a vengeance.338 
 
For David Harvey, the ‘force of markets’ is the more significant, to the point where he sees 
the Chinese reforms as a key component of the global neoliberal turn.339  I agree that China is 
currently part of the neoliberal world order, but this was scarcely the intention of the Party 
leadership when it initiated the reform programme, which preceded not only the 
consolidation of neoliberalism, but the elections of Thatcher and Reagan which signalled, in 
their respective ‘isms’, its initial forms. The individual components of the neoliberal order 
were first assembled into a coherent package in the UK and USA, in both vanguard neoliberal 
form during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher and social neoliberal form during that of 
Tony Blair.340 These forms were the most advanced, but precisely for that reason were not 
necessarily the most typical of the phenomenon, nor did they necessarily reveal the future 
pattern of development elsewhere in the world, since neoliberalism has reinforced rather than 
undermined the inherent unevenness of capitalism. But the era of neoliberalism, like the era 
of state capitalism (in the Marxist rather than Bremmerian sense) which preceded it, contains 
a spectrum of different positions, some more extreme than others. 
In fact, as Bob Jessop has pointed out, neoliberalism has always been characterised by 
spatial differentiation in which several varieties operated simultaneously. His typology 
involves four geographically demarcated moments, each reflecting the structured inequality 
of the global capitalist system. Two of these forms can be found in the developed capitalisms 
of the West. The first involved neoliberal regime shifts, above all in the English-speaking 
world, where the institutional characteristics of the Great Boom – Social or Liberal 
Democracy in politics, Keynesianism in economic management, and Fordism in industrial 
organisation – were replaced during the dominance of parties belonging to the New Right. 
The second involved neoliberal policy adjustments, for example in the Scandinavian and 
Rhenish countries, where partial adaptations to neoliberalism were made while retaining 
some elements from the former period. The third involve neoliberal system transformation in 
the former Stalinist states of Russia and Easter Europe, and to a lesser extent in South-East 
Asia, where the existing state capitalist economies (although Jessop prefers the terms ‘state 
socialist’) were transformed with varying degrees of abruptness into particularly extreme 
versions of the Western multinational capitalist model. The fourth involves neoliberal 
structural adjustment programmes in the Global South, which are essentially an aspect of 
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contemporary imperialism as exercised by Western-dominated transnational institutions like 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.341 In a sense, the Chinese experience is 
closest to the second type, even though as a state and a society it had more in common with it 
those which experienced the third.  
As this suggests, the initial adoption of market solutions was slower and more cautious 
than appears in retrospect. As Claudio Katz points out: 
 
From 1978 to 1992, this path [i.e. ‘its transition to capitalism’ – ND] was limited by the 
preeminence of a model of commercial reforms which were subordinated to central planning. 
Under this scheme, rural communes were converted into agro-industrial units guided by the 
profit principle, but without opening to widespread privatisations. Managers appeared with the 
power to reorganize industrial plants, but they did not have the power to enforce mass layoffs 
or to sell enterprises… The turn to capitalism was consummated at the beginning of the 1990s, 
starting with the privatisations carried out by the old directors of the state enterprises with the 
intention of forging a capitalist class.  The members of this group were transformed into the 
main investors in the new companies. Private accumulation was also accelerated through 
exploitation of the agricultural producers.342 
 
Now, it is important not to ‘bend the stick’ too far in response to an exaggerated accounts of 
the extent of the immediate post-1978 transformation. Nigel Harris identified as early as 1986 
the direction of travel: ‘The changes in the People’s Republic of China – selling public 
companies to private shareholders, privatizing housing and medicine, opening sectors to 
competitive joint ventures with foreign companies – were not only remarkable in the speed 
with which the changes were introduced and the contrast with past Chinese history; the 
Chinese were part of an apparently universal move back to a private capitalist world’343 What 
one can say is that while neoliberalism led to deindustrialisation in large parts of the West, it 
led in China to previously unimaginable levels of industrialisation, to which we now turn.    
 
 
5.2 Three Aspects of Uneven and Combined Development in Contemporary China  
 
As I noted in a previous survey, originally published in the mid-2000s, almost anything one 
says about China is out of date before it appears in print, but it is possible to discern 
continuities with earlier manifestations of uneven and combined development.344 Here, I want 
to briefly discuss three: the instabilities caused by migrant flows into the cities; the actuality 
of working-class resistance and self-organisation; and the capacities of the state to ‘contain’ 
these instabilities. 
 
5.1.1 Internal Migration 
 
As in the aftermath of the First World War, there is currently a massive influx of workers into 
the cities, but now on a much greater scale. Many of these cities did not pre-exist the 
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migration but, as we saw in Part 4, are being constructed solely for the purposes of containing 
new factories and distributions hubs. Previously, the household registration or hukou system 
was designed to ‘to limit rural-to-urban migration’ as part of the process by which ‘the 
growth of cities was curtailed’: ‘Within the Maoist city, the economic and social landscape 
was carved into repetitive, cellular units made up of danwei compounds.’345 Is it too much to 
assume that at some unconscious level Mao understood that the growth of the cities would 
threaten precisely the kind of social upheaval that might endanger the Party’s rule?346  
There have, however, been changes since 1991 in particular in both the composition of the 
migrant population and the relationship new migrants have to their point of origin. The three 
great areas of neoliberal industrialisation are the Pearl River delta, the Yangtze River delta 
and what might be called the Beijing-Tianjin corridor. Richard Walker and Daniel Buck note: 
‘There are three major routes to proletarianization in China: from the farming countryside, 
out of collapsing state companies in the cities, and through the dissolution of former village 
enterprises.’347 The new workforce has certainly been formed from these three groups, but 
these had different relationships to the working class. The second group listed by Walker and 
Buck, employees in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), were surely already ‘proletarians’ in 
their former jobs, unless one subscribes to the curious view that wage labourers employed by 
the state do not count as ‘workers’. In fact, their fate resembles that of workers in the 
privatised industries in the West, although workers in SOEs had better social protections and 
employment guarantees until they were dismantled in the 1980s and 1990s. The third group, 
workers in the rural township and village enterprises (TVES) which both supported the rural 
infrastructure and subcontracted to the SOEs, occupied a more ambivalent position. These 
were of course located in ‘the farming countryside’ but, as Walker and Buck suggest, their 
employees occupied a transitional position, being former peasants ‘nominally protected by 
the obligations of local government’. However, as many SOEs were dismantled and the 
survivors looked for cheaper subcontractors, the TVES themselves went into crisis, shedding 
the majority of workers who were now reduced ‘to proletarians subject to the full force of the 
market’, an experience which the authors rightly describe as ‘Marx’s shift from “formal” to 
“real” subsumption of labour’. Finally, the first group, the peasantry proper, have undergone 
the classic process of proletarianization: ‘rural displacement to the cities is vast, numbering 
[by 2007] roughly 120 billion since 1980 – the largest migration in world history’.348   
In the 1920s, migrants intended to move on a permanent basis, but this was not necessarily 
so in the 1980s and 1990s, as Kevin Lin explains:   
 
The first generation [of migrant workers] were rural peasants who, pushed by rural poverty and 
pulled by the burgeoning urban economy, migrated to China’s urban centres in the 1980s. Their 
city wages were meagre but still higher than their rural incomes. For young women, factory 
work and urban life also brought a new sense of freedom. But the household registration system 
and their own rural roots meant that the first-generation migrant workers have been predisposed 
to eventually returning to their villages.349  
 
This ‘dual’ identity was possible because the state maintains a landholding system that allows 
members of a family to work in urban industry while retaining links to the small holding. One 
factor which helped slacken the tensions which would otherwise have built up uncontrollably 
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in the cities was therefore the link many workers continued to have with the countryside, both 
as a place of refuge in periods of unemployment or non-payment of wages, and as a source of 
subsistence through farming: 
 
It is the family farm that lends the migrant worker away from home a substitute for the benefits 
he or she is not getting from urban work, as well as security in the event of dis-employment or 
unemployment or in old age, while this same worker helps supplement the otherwise 
unsustainably low incomes of the auxiliary family members engaged in underemployed 
farming of small plots for low returns. So long as substantial surplus labour remains in the 
countryside, the key structural conditions for this new half-worker half-cultivator 
family economic unit will prevail.350  
 
By contrast, the second generation of migrant workers, who were mainly born in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and who might amount to as many as 58% of the total, have weaker links to the 
countryside: ‘Most of them, like the first-generation, have come directly from farms and 
small cities, but a small percentage were born or raised by their first-generation migrant 
parents. In general this group’s link to the countryside is weaker, and they are more 
accustomed to urban living.’ This does not mean, however, that they have completely ceased 
to identify themselves as peasants or inhabitants of their rural hometowns: ‘These migrant 
workers are living in a societal limbo seeing themselves as neither urban or rural; their urban 
residency and youthful aspirations clash with social and institutional barriers to permanent 
settlement.’351  
There is of course a gendered aspect to the situation in which migrants find themselves. 
Julia Chuang’s fieldwork among women migrants working in the export-processing zones 
suggests that they are far more likely than men to return to their villages of origin, in part 
because of pressure from female family members: ‘Some older women in Fa-Ming expect 
young migrant women to adhere to traditional values and practices even as they are exposed 
to modern, urban values in destinations.’352 The pressures are not simply about upholding 
traditions, but are a means of dealing with a practical issue: the effective absence – after 
nearly 70 years of ‘communism’ – of a welfare state in the countryside and the consequent 
reliance on women to provide or at least pay for support: ‘In the sending community, women 
face a double bind: they are expected to support husbands who engage in precarious and 
high-risk migrations; and they are expected to negotiate with those husbands to channel a 
portion of remittance income to their aging parents, who lack access to welfare or social 
support.’353 One of Chuang’s interviewees (‘Golden Flower’) from Fa-Ming village in Sichuan 
province had been a temporary migrant to the city before her marriage: 
 
But Golden Flower chafed at the uneven bargain that marriage represented. She saw domestic 
work as a form of bondage, intolerable specifically in comparison to the life she had known 
during migration. She envisaged her near future: ‘In the end I’ll be alone raising pigs in the 
village while he is out in the city working. At least he can go out and work, have some space 
for a real life out in the city’.354 
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What kind of situation do the migrants face in the workplaces that await them in the cities?  
Ching Kwan Lee argues that what prevails across the board are forms of ‘disorganised 
despotism’ involving ‘workers’ institutional dependence on management for livelihood, 
managerial power to impose coercive modes of labour control, and workers’ collective 
apprehension of such control as violations of their interests and rights’, and that ‘varying 
degrees’ of such despotism can be found ‘across industrial firms of different ownership 
types’ on a contingent basis: ‘For example, the generally long working hours and more 
intensive labour processes in private firms than in state firms are due more to the volume and 
nature of orders they respectively receive, not due to any difference in management’s 
institutional power and its imperative to impose discipline in these two types of firm.’355 
Additionally, migrant workers, who are referred to as ‘peasant workers’ (nongmingong) in 
Chinese, tend to be looked down on as uneducated and generally lacking in culture by urban 
resident workers, and naturally are resentful of this condescension: clearly, this is a barrier to 
class unity. The official union federation, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU), only proclaimed that it had a responsibility to ‘represent’ migrant workers in 2003. 
Given that the ACFTU is primarily an instrument of state and management control, this is 
something of a mixed blessing, but is at least partly a response to the reality of migrant 
worker militancy.356 
 
5.2.2. Worker Resistance 
 
The fact that migrant workers tend to be employed in the private sector and are consequently 
subjected to the harsher conditions prevailing there, together with the declining availability of 
the countryside as a means of escape, however temporary, may have contributed to their 
being more militant than workers in the older state-owned sector, where closures and lay-offs 
have tended to be the central problems. The relative difference in degrees of militancy is not 
necessarily reflected in the explanatory framework within which Chinese workers seek to 
understand their own situation. If anything, Lee’s research found that those still employed by 
the state indict their oppressors within ‘a cognitive framework of “class” and he refers to one 
worker’s ‘spirited critique of the degeneration of the official union into a “yellow union” and 
the transformation of enterprise cadres into a capitalist class’, while others ‘deploy Marxist 
concepts to understand and evaluate market socialism’, reporting one who ‘condemns as 
unfair the unequal distribution of income by appealing to Marx’s labour theory of value’. 
Migrant workers, however, tend to express their opposition in different terms: ‘Migrant 
peasant workers’ encounter with market and capitalist forces bring about a critique alluding 
to “alienation”, grounded more in terms of denial of human dignity, loss of personal 
autonomy, and dishonesty, not in terms of exploitation.’357 This is not as surprising as it 
might seem. Marxism was available to newly radicalized workers in the 1920s as a new and 
unsullied doctrine, filtered through the Bolshevik experience, which helped them make sense 
of their own exploitation and oppression; but, as in Stalinist Russia itself, where the ideology 
of the bureaucratic ruling class has supposedly been ‘Marxism-Leninism’ for nearly 70 years, 
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it cannot play the same role. At best, workers in the state sector can draw attention to the 
inconsistencies of neoliberal ‘socialism’, while those in the private sector, for whom Maoist 
rhetoric has been less significant, express their opposition through a form of moral economy. 
‘The two groups of workers, traditional and new, are merging in a common search for class 
subjectivity.’358  
Much therefore depends on whether a genuine Marxism capable of explaining the 
trajectory of ‘Marxist’ China becomes available to large numbers of Chinese workers. If it 
ever does, it should find as ready an audience as in the 1920s. In their introduction to Hao 
Ren’s important collection of interviews with migrant workers involved in industrial struggle 
across the Pearl River Delta, Zhongjin Li and Eli Friedman note that ‘nominally “socialist” 
China presents in hyperbolic form many of the problems that those of us in the capitalist 
world experience: low wages, no benefits, lawlessness in the workplace, anti-union 
employers and governments, a broken system of political representation’.359 Fortunately, the 
response of Chinese workers has also been ‘hyperbolic’, at least episodically. The absence of 
what might be termed formal or institutionalised class struggle through worker’s parties, free 
trade unions, or legal social movements has not precluded the existence of class struggle, as 
has been so clearly demonstrated by rapidly growing industrial struggle and what Lee calls 
‘the staggering increase’ in Chinese workers turning to existing legal mechanisms to seek 
redress.360  
The level of ‘mass incidents’ increased after 2003 and particularly after 2008, as Chinese 
workers and peasants responded to the downturn and the introduction of the new Labour 
Contract Law and Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law with an acceleration of 
struggle. Contrary to the impression that the lack of formal freedoms precludes any changes 
from above precipitated by struggle from below, Chinese workers, through their quasi-legal 
and illegal actions, usually without formal organisation, had forced a nervous ruling class to 
concede major legal changes which have had a real impact and, at a local state level, forced a 
turn from a sole reliance on repression to a more mixed approach involving both repression 
and conciliation. The implementation of new labour laws led to a huge increase in disputes 
submitted to official labour dispute mechanisms and to the courts. At the same time far from 
damping down militant labour struggle these concessions seem to have encouraged them as 
instanced by the rise in labour protests. Ironically it seems that information on the new 
legislation has acted as catalyst for struggle especially as employers have tried to circumvent 
the new laws. One observer described the situation in the Longgang division of Shenzhen: 
 
‘At the end of 2007, strikes broke out   almost every day. And the participants came from all 
kinds of industries and jobs. They did not go to work, gathering around the gate or wandering 
in the square. The strikes were all in large factories with at least two hundred or three hundred 
workers. Such factories as Yunchang, Dahua, and Jingchang employed thousands of workers. 
At that time, the new Labour Contract law had just been implemented. Workers lost their 
seniority after the bosses terminated their existing labour contracts, so workers went on 
strike.’361   
 
The actions taken involve more than strikes (whose status is currently in a legal limbo in 
China), but also blockades of streets, demos and sit-ins. The pressure from below has had an 
impact just as it did during rapid periods of industrialisation and urbanisation in other states. 
The level of struggle is all the more extraordinary given that it is expressed outside of official 
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trade union structures, although the ACFTU may now be becoming more responsive to 
workers’ demands at a local level.362 The most spectacular recent example has been the 
March-April 2014 strike at footwear manufacturer Yue Yuen in Dongguan over non-payment 
of social security contributions, perhaps the biggest to date in the Chinese private sector. It 
climaxed in production being completely shut down across three factories for 11 days, with 
around 30,000 workers or about 80% of the workforce on strike and 10,000 of them taking 
part in street protests and demonstrations. In the end, the strike was only ended by the 
intervention of Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security ordering the company to 
pay up.363  
 
5.2.3. State Transformations 
 
In the face of facts like these, Mike Davis is surely correct to say: ‘Two hundred million 
Chinese factory workers, miners and construction labourers are the most dangerous class in 
the planet.’364 What the outcome also suggests, however, is that the state has developed the 
adaptability to absorb or ‘contain’ the effects of uneven and combined development, just as 
earlier capitalist states had done. Ironically – given the persistence of Western leftist fantasies 
about the socialist nature of the regime – one reason for this ability is that it continues to 
perform what has historically been one of the main functions of the capitalist state, but one 
which has been weakened in the West by both decades of neoliberalism and more recently by 
experiments in right-wing populism: representing and managing the interests of national 
capital as a whole.365 Why the CCP? Slavoj Zizek writes that, ‘arguably the reason why (ex-) 
Communists are re-emerging as the most efficient managers of capitalism: their historical 
enmity towards the bourgeoisie as a class fits perfectly with the progress of contemporary 
capitalism towards a managerial system without the bourgeoisie’.366 There is an element of 
truth in this, but even so, the adaptability of the state  involved what Charlie Hore refers to ‘a 
fundamental shift in power inside the ruling class’ following the neoliberal turn: 
 
The government deliberately decentralised economic power, allowing lower levels of the state 
to keep a greater proportion of profits and taxes. The expectation was that this would lead to 
greater efficiency, but what local officials actually did was follow their own interests. This is 
why Chinese economic development has been both so dynamic and so unstable: economic 
growth has been state-led, but by the lower levels of the state, leading to enormous duplication 
of investment and assets. … Although China remains a repressive police state, it is far less so 
than 25 years ago. The government deliberately scrapped many of the controls on everyday life 
to make economic reforms work. Freedom of movement had to be allowed if markets were to 
flourish; some freedom of speech was necessary if officials were to tell the truth about the 
economy and debate policy options…367 
 
Walker and Buck note how neoliberal developments since 1978 (or ‘the transition’ as they 
describe it) ‘has reconfigured the form of the state in a way that has unleashed the powers of 
capitalism’. One aspect of this has been the devolution of power to the metropolitan and 
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prefectural levels, giving local governments the ability to annex territory and existing urban 
areas, and to raise revenue through local taxes and rents. The authors draw an audacious 
parallel: 
 
Altogether, the Chinese situation reminds one of the American federal system and its urban 
growth politics, from which an array of public and private players profit handsomely. 
Backroom payoffs are far from unknown in the US, but the exchange of favours and rewards is 
done to the mutual advantage of many. What the Chinese call guanxi is very like what 
Americans call horse-trading. Regional government competition in China is also reminiscent of 
American federalism. It is pointless to complain, in this context, about the duplication and 
inefficiency of local boosterism. The evidence in both the US and China is that this kind of 
wide-open alliance between state and capital for regional development works very well indeed. 
… One would not expect the State Council to play midwife to the birth of capitalism in the 
same way as local governments. China’s ‘developmental dictatorship’ is more in line with 
continental European experience in this regard. 
 
The entirely correct view that China ‘has followed a path not so distant from those of Europe 
and North America’ leaves Walker and Buck with ‘a final question’ which is why China’s 
polity has not liberalised in line with the neoliberalisation of its economy.368 The obvious 
answer is that there is no necessary connection between capitalism – certainly not the 
neoliberal variant – and democracy. In China what David Goodman calls the ‘intermediate 
middle classes’ are not yet demanding reform, let alone overthrow of the state: ‘On the 
contrary…[they] are fundamental supporters of the contemporary Party-state, even if at times 
some are also the most articulate critics of specific actions and policy settings of the Part-
state, particularly wanting it to be more efficient and just’.369  
If an insurgent working class is one central problem facing the Chinese party-state then the 
other is precisely whether the devolution of power to individual capitalists and bureaucrats 
has begun to undermine its ability to perform its role as central authority for the system as a 
whole. In one sense President Xi Jinping’s current campaign against corruption is an attempt 
to force actors to perform their roles with an eye to the overall interests of national capital 
rather than their particular section of it, and behave accordingly: 
 
One of Xi’s most pressing concerns since becoming president of the largest one-party state 
in the world has been re-establishing the CCP’s authority over its nearly 90 million members. 
The central government can issue laws and formulate policy, but given factionalism and 
competition for power among officials at all levels, it has struggled to get the rank and file to 
implement those policies or uphold those laws. The central government can issue laws and 
formulate policy, but given factionalism and competition for power among officials at all 
levels, it has struggled to get the rank and file to implement those policies or uphold those laws. 
Local governments, for example, often collude with businesses to enrich themselves at the 
expense of the people, soliciting backlash in the form of mass protest and social unrest, and 
threatening the party’s power. 
 
And, as these author’s note: ‘These problems are made more urgent by a slowing 
economy.’370 
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IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION 
 
In a sense this brings us back to our starting point, for the situation does resemble that of 
Russia with which I began this series of articles – not because a bourgeois revolution is still 
to be accomplished, but because fundamental social change can only come at the hands of the 
working class. Our end, however, is not entirely in our beginning. Paul Mason has written 
that: ‘Shenzhen’s workers are to global capitalism what Manchester’s workers were 200 
years ago.’371 Mason’s desire to establish the continuities within the global history of the 
working class is commendable, but there are limits to the parallels which can be drawn. The 
Marxist science-fiction author, Kim Stanley Robinson, has one of his characters say that 
‘historical analogy is the last refuge of people who can’t grasp the current situation’.372 That 
seems to be appropriate here. The Mancunian workers who marched to Saint Peter’s Fields in 
1819 and the Glaswegian workers who struck for the vote the following year had available to 
them neither socialism as a goal nor Marxism as a theory. It is a great, if bleak historical 
irony that, after the material and ideological devastation wrought by Stalinism, the same is 
true for most workers today, and not only in China. There are therefore no analogies entirely 
adequate to describe our current situation and we should therefore not expect to find strategic 
or organisational models ready-made for use. What we can predict from our experience until 
now is that uneven and combined development will continue to play a role in throwing up 
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